According to the explanatory memorandum of the Resolution, Russia’s influence activities in Estonia are part of a broader strategy that seeks to weaken the security and resilience of the Estonian state, targets Estonia’s Russian-speaking population and social cohesion, and spreads narratives that are damaging to the Estonian state and its allies. “The committee will be needed to assess funding chains, identify the potential role of public sector support, analyse the participation of NGOs, individuals and networks, assess the damage to internal security and social cohesion, and make proposals for mitigating risks,” the proposers of the Resolution noted.

According to the Resolution, the committee of investigation will focus on four main topics: the financing of Russia’s influence activities in Estonia, the possible role of the Estonian public sector, the impact of propaganda on Estonia’s population, and the framework of hybrid warfare. Among other things, the committee will have to find out to what extent projects, associations and activities promoting the interests of the Russian Federation have received direct or indirect funding from Estonia’s state agencies, local governments, local government divisions, and companies controlled by them.

The committee will also have to clarify to what extent organizations, associations and individuals operating in Estonia have participated in or been involved in Russia’s influence and divisive activities. According to the amendment made during the proceedings, the committee must also clarify the extent to which companies operating in Estonia have participated in or been involved in Russia’s influence and divisive activities.

The committee’s task will be to provide the Riigikogu with a comprehensive overview of the extent of influence activities and to make proposals for legislative, organizational, and security measures. Together with independent experts, the committee will have to develop proposals on how to prevent and reduce the risks associated with influence and divisive activities, and improve the capacity of authorities to identify threats, as well as make proposals for legal, organizational, and financial changes.

The formation of the committee of investigation will be based on the same principle that has been agreed upon for the establishment of the select committees of the Riigikogu, according to which the coalition and the opposition are equally represented in the committee. The committee will have to submit its final report to the Riigikogu and the public by 1 February 2027 at the latest.

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The Draft Resolution on forming a committee of investigation was submitted last week by members of the Riigikogu Eerik-Niiles Kross, Toomas Uibo, Riina Sikkut, Ants Frosch and Peeter Tali. According to the Draft, a committee of investigation consisting of representatives from all parliamentary groups will be established in the Riigikogu to systematically analyse the influence activities of the Russian Federation, ways of funding them, connections with Estonia’s public sector, propaganda projects, and the risks associated with them.

The initiators of the Draft Resolution pointed out that Russia’s influence activities in Estonia were part of a broader strategy that aimed to weaken Estonia’s national security and resilience, was targeted at Estonia’s Russian-speaking population and social cohesion, and spread narratives that were damaging to Estonia and its allies. “The committee is necessary in order to assess funding chains, identify the possible role of public sector support, analyse the involvement of NGOs, individuals, and networks, assess the damage to internal security and social cohesion, and make proposals to mitigate the risks,” they noted in the explanatory memorandum.

According to the Draft Resolution, the committee of investigation will focus on four main topics: the financing of Russia’s influence activities in Estonia, the possible role of Estonia’s public sector, the impact of propaganda on Estonia’s population, and the framework of hybrid warfare. Among other things, the committee must find out to what extent the projects, associations, or activities promoting the interests of the Russian Federation have received direct or indirect funding from Estonia’s state agencies, local governments, local government agencies, or companies controlled by them. The committee must also determine to what extent the organisations, associations, or individuals operating in Estonia have participated in or been involved in Russia’s influence and divisive activities.

According to the Draft Resolution, the committee’s task is to provide the Riigikogu with a comprehensive overview of the extent of influence activities and to make proposals for legislative, organisational, and security measures. In cooperation with independent experts, the committee must draw up proposals on how to prevent and reduce the risks associated with influence and divisive activities and improve the capacity of public authorities to identify threats, as well as make proposals for legal, organisational, or financial changes.

The explanatory memorandum states that the establishment of the committee of investigation will be based on the same principle that was agreed upon when establishing the select committees of the Riigikogu, namely that the coalition and the opposition are equally represented in the committee. The committee must submit its final report to the Riigikogu and the public by 1 February 2027 at the latest.

According to the Riigikogu Rules of Procedure and Internal Rules Act, the Riigikogu may form committees of investigation in order to investigate the circumstances of events of public interest. A committee of investigation has the right to summon persons to appear before the committee, and the summoned person is obligated to appear, provide explanations, and reply to questions. The committee also has the right to require the presentation of data and documents necessary for the performance of its duties. The Riigikogu last formed such a committee in 2015, when a committee of investigation was established to identify possible corruption risks in Port of Tallinn Ltd.

The Constitutional Committee decided to make a proposal to the Board of the Riigikogu to include the Draft Resolution of the Riigikogu “Formation of the Riigikogu committee of investigation to investigate the influence activities of the Russian Federation, ways of funding them, and related risks” (770 OE) on the agenda for the sitting on 17 December, and to conclude its first reading. In order to be passed, the Draft Resolution will also have to pass a second reading in the Riigikogu.

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