Affective polarization in multiparty systems:

Conceptualization, measurement and foundations

Andres Reiljan

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences
of the European University Institute

Florence, March 2021

European University Institute
Department of Political and Social Sciences

Affective polarization in multiparty systems:
Conceptualization, measurement and foundations

Andres Reiljan

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences
of the European University Institute

Examining Board

Professor Alexander Trechsel, EUI (Supervisor)
Professor Hanspeter Kriesi, EUI
Professor Markus Wagner, University of Vienna
Professor Jennifer McCoy, Georgia State University

Researcher declaration to accompany the submission of written work
Department of Political and Social Sciences - Doctoral Programme

I Andres Reiljan certify that I am the author of the work 'Affective polarization in multiparty systems: Conceptualization, measurement and foundations' I have presented for examination for the Ph.D. at the European University Institute. I also certify that this is solely my own original work, other than where I have clearly indicated, in this declaration and in the thesis, that it is the work of others.

I warrant that I have obtained all the permissions required for using any material from other copyrighted publications.

I certify that this work complies with the Code of Ethics in Academic Research issued by the European University Institute (IUE 332/2/10 (CA 297).

I declare that this work consists of 61105 words.

Statement of inclusion of previous work:

I confirm that chapter 2 draws upon an earlier article I published in the European Journal of Political Research.

I confirm that chapter 4 was jointly co-authored with Alexander Ryan and I contributed 60% of the work.

Signature and date:

19 March, 2021

Contents

Thesis abstract **11**

Acknowledgements **12**

1. Introduction **15**

1.1 Conceptualizing affective polarization 17

1.2 Measuring affective polarization 22

1.3 Foundations of affective polarization 28

1.4 Outline of the thesis 34

2. 'Fear and loathing across party lines' (also) in Europe: Affective polarization in European party systems **39**

2.1 Introduction 39

2.2 The concept of affective polarization in the wider framework of polarization studies 40

2.3 Measuring affective polarization in multiparty systems 44

2.4 The linkage between ideological and affective polarization 46

2.5 Data and variable operationalization 49

2.6 Results 51

2.6.1 Levels of affective polarization in Europe and the United States 51

2.6.2 Affective polarization and ideological polarization: Related, but not the same 55

2.7 Discussion 60

3. Going beyond ideology and partisan tribalism: The cross-national determinants of affective polarization **63**

3.1 Introduction 63

3.2 System level predictors of affective polarization: a theoretical framework 65

3.2.1 Rational and social identity approach: ideological polarization and partisan tribalism 65

3.2.2 Expanding and combining the rational and partisan identity approaches 67

3.3 Data, case selection and variable operationalization 72

Variable operationalization 73

3.4 Results 77

3.4.1 Levels of affective polarization across countries 77

3.4.2 The determinants of affective polarization 79

3.4.3 Robustness checks 85

3.5 Discussion 88

4. Ideological tripolarization, partisan tribalism and institutional trust: The foundations of affective polarization in the Swedish multiparty system 90

4.1 Introduction 90

4.2 Theoretical framework 92

4.2.1 Partisan tribalism and ideological disagreement as the main drivers of affective polarization 92

4.2.2 Tripolar party system configuration and affective polarization 94

4.2.3 Institutional trust and affective polarization 95

4.3 Data and measurements 97

4.3.1 Measurements 98

4.4 Results 101

4.4.1 The structure and trends of affective polarization in Sweden 101

4.4.2 The foundations of affective polarization between the mainstream right and left blocs 103

4.4.3 The foundations of affective polarization between the Sweden Democrats and the mainstream blocs 107

4.5 Discussion 112

5. Conclusion 115

5.1 Summary of the main findings 115

5.2 Conceptualization and measurement of affective polarization 118

5.3 Foundations of affective polarization 122

Supplementary material 127

Appendix A – Chapter 2 127

A1: Partisan group like-dislike matrices by country and year 127

A2: Measuring ideological polarisation in party systems 140

A3: Other descriptive statistics by country and year 143

Appendix B – Chapter 3 145

B1: Supplementary statistics 145

B2: The ethnic polarization variable operationalization 148

Appendix C – Chapter 4 151

C1: Variable operationalization and item wording 151

C2: Supplementary statistics 161

References 169

List of figures

Figure 1.1. Conceptual map of partisanship and affective polarization. 19
Figure 2.1. Spatial representation of ideological and affective distance. 42
Figure 2.2. Affective polarization as a function of ideological polarization. 56
Figure 2.3. Affective polarization as a function of ideological polarization, without Montenegro, Serbia and the United States, and with country average API and IPI scores. 58
Figure 3.1. Average weighted in- and out-party evaluation scores by country. 78
Figure 3.2. Marginal effects of the four main independent variables on affective polarization. 82
Figure 3.3. Marginal effects of quality of governance on in- and out-party evaluations separately. .. 84
Figure 4.1. Average in- and out-party evaluations in Sweden (1986-2016). 101
Figure 4.2. Average in- and out-bloc evaluations within and between the centre-right and -left blocs, and between the Sweden Democrats and the two blocs. 103
Figure 4.3. The predictors of affective polarization and out-bloc evaluation between the Alliance and the Red-green bloc. 104
Figure 4.4. Predicted in-party and out-bloc evaluations between Alliance and Red-green bloc, based on partisan identity strength and socioeconomic attitudes (fully specified model). 106
Figure 4.5. The predictors of affective polarization and out-bloc evaluation between the two mainstream blocs and the Sweden Democrats (SD) 109
Figure 4.6. Predicted degree of affective polarization towards Sweden Democrats among the Alliance and Red-green voters, based on the refugee stance (fully specified model). 110
Figure 4.7. Predicted degree of affective polarization between the Sweden Democrats and the Alliance, based on the level of institutional trust (fully specified model) 111

Figure C2.1. The determinants of affective polarization between the Alliance and the Red-Green bloc for each year separately. 164
Figure C2.2. The determinants of average out-bloc evaluation between the Alliance and the Red-Green bloc for each year separately. 164
Figure C2.3. The determinants of mainstream bloc voters' affective polarization towards SD for each year separately. 166
Figure C2.4. The determinants of mainstream bloc voters' evaluation towards SD for each year separately. 166
Figure C2.5. The determinants of SD voters' affective polarization towards mainstream blocs for each year separately. 167
Figure C2.6. The determinants of SD voters' out-bloc evaluation towards mainstream blocs for each year separately. 167

List of tables

Table 1.1. Partisan like-dislike matrices of the United States, Turkey and Sweden 25
Table 1.2. Outline of the thesis 38
Table 2.1. Affective Polarization Index score by country 52
Table 2.2. Average in- and out party evaluations, partisan and voter turnout percentages by region 54
Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics 76
Table 3.2. The predictors of affective polarization, OLS regression 81
Table 3.3. The predictors of affective polarization (robustness checks), OLS regression 86

Table A3.1. Average in- and out-party evaluations, left-right polarization, and partisan and voter turnout percentages 143
Table B1.1. List of countries, election years and affective polarization index (API) scores 145
Table B1.2. Bivariate correlations between the variables 147
Table B1.3. The predictors of in- and out-party evaluations separately, OLS regression 147
Table C1.1. Vote shares in 2010 and 2014 general elections 154
Table C1.2. Correlation matrix of the 5 question items making up the institutional trust index 160
Table C2.1. Descriptive statistics for the Red-green vs Alliance voters' analysis (corresponds to Figures 3 and 4 in the text) 161
Table C2.2. Descriptive statistics for the Red-green/Alliance vs Sweden Democrats analyses (corresponds to Figures 5 to 7 in the text) 162
Table C2.3. Descriptive statistics for the Sweden Democrats vs Red-green/Alliance analyses (corresponds to Figures 5 and 7 in the text) 162
Table C2.4. Linear regression analysis of the determinants of affective polarization (AP), out-bloc evaluation and in-party evaluation for the Alliance and Red-green voters 163
Table C2.5. Linear regression analysis of the determinants of affective polarization (AP) and out-bloc/out-party evaluation for the Sweden Democrat and mainstream bloc voters 165
Table C2.6. Logistic regression of mainstream bloc voters affective polarization and out-party evaluation towards SD 168

Thesis abstract

This thesis constitutes one of the first attempts to explore the concept of partisan affective polarization - that has hitherto been studied almost exclusively in the United States - in comparative cross-national perspective. I outline a conceptualization of affective polarization in multiparty context as the mean difference between voters' in- and out-party feelings across all relevant party dyads. Based on this definition, I propose a novel measure – the Affective Polarization Index (API) – to estimate the degrees of affective polarization. The API scores reveal that affective polarization is acutely present in most countries across the world, and that in many cases it is even higher than in the United States. Subsequently, I study the foundations of this phenomenon, building on the rational and social identity ('tribalism') theories. The system level analysis shows that the two most prominent variables in current research (ideological divergence and partisan identity strength) are insufficient to unravel why countries exhibit differing levels of affective polarization, although the ideological and affective manifestations of polarization are significantly correlated. A substantial part of the remaining cross-national variation is explained by the quality of governance and the ethnic composition of the societies, as countries with corrupt ineffective governments and high levels of ethnic heterogeneity are more polarized on affective terms. Finally, I examine the individual level predictors of affective polarization. The findings from the case study of Sweden demonstrate that affective polarization aligns with the ideologically tripolar configuration of the party system: while partisan feelings between the mainstream right and left blocs are mostly driven by socioeconomic positions, the affect between the right-populist and mainstream parties correlates more with cultural issue stances. However, hostility towards the right-populist party is stronger than the extent of ideological disagreement predicts, and appears to be exacerbated by the high levels of trust towards the central democratic institutions among the supporters of the mainstream parties. Overall, this dissertation suggests that affective polarization has systematic underpinnings that relate to both rational and tribalist motivations.

Acknowledgements

For my mother, Anu Reiljan

For my father, Janno Reiljan (1951 – 2018)

The journey to arrive to the moment of finally submitting my thesis for the defence has been long and often dramatic. I came to the European University Institute with a vague idea of measuring political polarization in a novel way, and quickly learned that I have very little knowledge about what it actually means to conduct academic research. Just like my research topic, my time in the EUI has been very polarized. The lowest moments during this time were definitely worse than I could have imagined and I was very close to ending my nascent academic career on several occasions. It seems naive now, but I really thought that getting a PhD and becoming a political scientist would be easier. On the other hand, the highest moments have exceeded my expectations to an even larger extent. Seeing my own idea develop from a shy and primitive prospectus in 2015 into articles published in top journals in the field has been an a amazing experience. There are many people to thank for getting over the worst times, reaching the highest moments and generally making these five years a hugely important part of my life.

First, I want to thank my supervisor Professor Alexander Trechsel who chose me as a supervisee and gave me the chance to become part of the EUI community. He directed me to the right path in the beginning of my studies and gave me the freedom to explore this topic in my own way. When things got really bad in the end of my first and fifth year, he was there to help me through. I am happy that our co-operation is continuing even after my PhD is finished.

I also want to thank Professor Hanspeter Kriesi whose seminars were among the most intellectually stimulating parts of my EUI studies and whose dedication to political science has always amazed me. At the end of my first PhD year, I was completely burnt out and not certain whether I will continue my studies in the second year. Hanspeter's encouraging words about my work just few days before I left Florence for summer break gave me the motivational boost I needed to move on with this difficult yet rewarding endeavour of pursuing a PhD.

I am very grateful for Professor Markus Wagner and Professor Jennifer McCoy. For the large part of my PhD studies, I thought that I am completely alone in the wide field of cross-national affective polarization studies. It has been so exciting to see the development of this strand of literature over the last few years and I think that Markus's and Jennifer's contributions to the field have been

especially valuable. I am very happy that they agreed to be in my PhD commitee and that their comments were so supportive and insightful.

I am indebted to Alexander Ryan – my only co-author in this PhD project. He was always there to respond to my semi-random research thoughts (often after midnight hour) and provide all the possible graphs, tables and analyses (also often after midnight hour). I am very happy that our vague idea of writing a paper together that was born in the ECPR Summer School has made it through after so many twists and turns, and is now published in a good journal. I hope that this co-operation continues well beyond the work we did for this article that now constitutes Chapter 4 of my thesis.

I also want to thank Fernando Casal Bertoa and Cees van der Eijk who organized the 27th ECPR Summer School on Political Parties in Nottingham, and everyone who participated in this event. These two weeks and winning the best paper prize named after the great Peter Mair were among the highlights of my PhD years, and gave me the courage to move forward with publishing my first paper on affective polarization.

My research and life quality has benefitted immensely from what the EUI community has to offer. If I could go back in time, I would try to enjoy this amazing place even more and spend less time alone in my room. I want to thank everyone involved with the Political Behaviour Colloquium. Since 2015, I have attended dozens of PBC sessions and presented my own work there twice. This has helped me a lot in turning my own ideas into publishable articles. Academic writer's group was also extremely useful for improving my writing skills and gaining more confidence in English. I want to thank all my group mates and especially my teacher Nicky Owtram who sadly is not with us anymore.

Having a cohort of 30 people starting a PhD together in a similar field is a privilege most early career researchers do not have. I am very grateful to my SPS '15 cohort and happy to have witnessed many of us develop into good scholars who undoubtedly will make it big in social science world. I especially want to thank Wiebke for sharing many of the tough moments and making all the good times even more fun; my hiking buddy and statistical mentor Oscar who was there for me in so many ways; Jonas who always had a calm rational word of advice when I needed it (mixed with the darkest of humour); and of course Sam – my unbea(s)table table football partner and flatmate for 3 years. Despite having his own struggles, he has been such a great companion and supported me so much during these years.

Yet, not all of my EUI friendships started in seminars, workshops and colloquiums. Since the beginning, IUE Calcio „Squadra Fantastica" has really constituted the centre of my life here in Florence. Fighting side-by-side at our own Cerreti, at the potato field stadium in Signa against local

bulldogs or at the mountain arena of Montefiridolfi with the whole village cheering against you; then having a beer together and signing our anthem - this is how friendships consolidate. I am very proud to have been part of the IUE Calcio story and have nothing but respect for everyone who has taken up the responsibility to serve as a Mister, which I think is the most undervalued job in the whole EUI. I especially want to thank Presi the Third Tim Schittekatte who has become my best friend and has consistently been there for me. In the world where everyone seems to be struggling with their own lives, it is amazing to have one person who always seems to be on top of things.

I want to thank everyone involved with the organization of the annual Coppa Pavone/Linda and my teammates from Wolfpack. Over the years, this team has developed more and more into something that is truly worthy of its name, with Persian war-princess Pari and Danish viking Mads on the wings, oldschool British and Belgium demolishers Olli and Tim in defense and fearless Paul in the goal. I will forever remember our crazy ’19 campaign and hope that we can play at least one more Coppa together!

I also want to thank everyone involved in the EUI basketball team Wild Boars and the volleyball Herons. Reconnecting with these sports I hadn’t played in years has been really fun and added a great deal to my EUI experience.

Finally, I want to turn my attention back to where I come from. I am very grateful for my department in the University of Tartu where I received my BA and MA degrees. Although many of my colleagues in the EUI came from the absolute top universities in Europe, I never felt that the education I obtained in Tartu was in any way inferior compared to them. I especially want to thank my supervisors Piret Ehin and Mihkel Solvak, Professor Vello Pettai, Kristjan Vassil who gave me the idea to apply to the EUI in the first place, and my classmates Kristel Vits, Mart Raamat, Allan Padar and Villem Lõbu. I am very proud to continue my post-doctoral career at my old department in Tartu and hope to put the knowledge I have obtained in the EUI to good use there.

Last but definitely not least, I want to thank my family. I am eternally grateful to my mother, aunt and cousins with whom I shared our house in Tõrva during some very crucial periods of my doctoral studies, including the finalization of the thesis in 2020. Without the constant and relentless support by my mother, I would have never even made it anywhere close to starting a PhD. She has been my biggest fan and has always believed in my success way more than I have myself. I also gained invaluable insights and support from my father who made a career both as a politician and as an academic. I am very sad that he is not with us anymore to see my defence. Both my parents received their PhD degrees in the Soviet Union and never had the chances I have to reach their full potential as academics. This thesis and everything else I achieve in my academic career will be in their honour!

1. Introduction

In 2012, a rather simple and intuitive, yet very substantial, finding about American politics was brought to academic and public attention. Shanto Iyengar, Gaurav Sood and Yphtach Lelkes in a research article in Public Opinion Quarterly, and Jonathan Haidt and Marc Hetherington in an opinion piece in the New York Times both pointed out that the Republican and Democrat voters have become increasingly hostile towards the opposing political party since the 1980s (Iyengar et al. 2012; Haidt & Hetherington 2012). This invoked a significant shift in the studies of political polarization that had hitherto almost exclusively concentrated on ideological manifestations of polarization. The term 'affective polarization' that had before 2012 been mentioned in only few dozen academic contributions – most of them in the field of psychology – has become highly salient in political science research. By the end of 2020, the number of academic publications that mention affective polarization had risen above 1000[1], including articles in the most highly ranked political science journals. The topic has also gained notable public attention, as it has been covered in prominent media outlets such as the New York Times, Washington Post, The Atlantic and Vox.

The concept of affective polarization can be defined as a tendency to hold positive feelings towards one's in-group, while being negative about the out-group(s) (Iyengar et al. 2012; Iyengar and Westwood 2015). Such polarized feelings can emerge between different types of groups: traditionally, strong affect has existed between groups that are based on long-term and stable social identities such as race, ethnicity or religion (Westwood et al. 2018); however, mutual hostility can also emerge between ideological identities like liberals and conservatives (Mason 2018a), and even more specific opinion-based groups such as the Remainers and Brexiteers in the United Kingdom (Hobolt et al. 2020). The recent uptick in affective polarization reserach owes mostly to the increased interest towards feelings between partisan groups. In the United States, partisan affective polarization has arguably become more intense than any other social division, including race (Iyengar & Westwood 2015). Moreover, hostility towards out-parties and -partisans is exceptional, because there are no social norms that would restrict people from expressing such feelings, differentiating it from phenomenons like racism and sexism (Iyengar et al. 2019). This thesis will also focus specifically on partisan affective polarization, other group identities will be studied only from the perspective of their potential linkage with partisan feelings.

[1] According to Dimensions: https://www.dimensions.ai/

Recent research has revealed that partisan affective polarization can have far-reaching social, economic and political ramifications. Strongly polarized feelings towards parties tend to spill over into other spheres of life and eventually divide the society into antagonistic camps that are not willing to date, befriend, engage in any kinds of civic or economic cooperation, or even live in the same neighborhood with the members of the other group(s) (Iyengar et al. 2019; Huber & Malhotra 2017; McCoy et al. 2018). Under such conditions, voters tend to perceive the stakes in the electoral competition to be greater (Ward & Tavits 2019). On the one hand, this leads to higher voter turnout and other forms of political participation (Iyengar & Krupenkin 2018; Wagner 2020). Even if emanating from hostile out-party feelings, such increased political enthusiasm could possibly lead to some positive democratic reforms (e.g. enhancing the inclusion of underrepresented groups in society). On the other hand, intense negative feelings between the political camps curb their willigness to negotiate and compromise, which could lead to policy gridlock. Even more alarmingly, if voters perceive other parties as malicious groups that pose a threat to the nation, it can legitimize undemocratic behaviour by the incumbent parties to stay in power (or the opposition parties to seize power) at any cost. As such, intense affective polarization could lead to political violence and democratic backsliding or even breakdown (McCoy et al. 2018; McCoy and Somer 2019).[2] In current literature, affective polarization is clearly perceived more as a threat than an opportunity for democracy.

Research on affective polarization originates from and has been mostly confined to the United States context (Iyengar et al. 2019), but recently the topic has also started to gain traction internationally. Regardless of the specific country sample or methodology, the existing studies have confirmed that affective polarization is a ubiquitous phenomenon that is present in most party systems (Reiljan 2020; Wagner 2020; Lauka et al. 2018; Westwood et al. 2018; Ward & Tavits 2019). Nevertheless, several crucial aspects of the concept have received only scant attention in the rest of the world. It is clear that in multiparty contexts, affective polarization must be conceptualized and measured somewhat differently than in the United States with its two-party system. Currently, only Lauka et al. 2018; Reiljan (2020)[3]

[2] To be precise, McCoy et al. (2018) and McCoy and Somer (2019) use the term 'pernicious polarization', which is closely related to, but not completely identical to the concept of affective polarization. However, they describe the rise of affective polarization as part of the causal chain that leads from pernicious polarization to democratic breakdown.

[3] In an article that is published in the European Journal of Political Research and constitutes the Chapter 2 of this thesis. Throughout this thesis, I will occasionally refer to this article as 'Reiljan (2020)', as it is already part of the acknowledged affective polarization literature.

and Wagner (2020) have engaged more thoroughly with these concerns and there is no 'gold standard' on how to estimate the degree of affective polarization in multiparty systems. There is also very little research on the underlying foundations of affective polarization outside the United States. We do not know which macro level conditions account for the cross-national variation in the levels of affective polarization or which factors explain the differences between individuals. These research gaps concerning the conceptualization, measurement and foundations of affective polarization form the basis of this thesis.

As described in the previous paragraph, we still lack some quite basic knowledge about affective polarization in the non-US context. Yet, numerous examples from different countries suggest that the concept is also relevant in multiparty contexts, as intense partisan feelings can paralyze political systems and whole societies (see McCoy & Somer 2019). Therefore, I take a broad comparative perspective and aim to significantly expand our theoretical and empirical understanding of affective polarization in multiparty systems across the democratic world. In the following sections of this introductory chapter, I summarize the current literature and lay out my approaches regarding the three central themes of this thesis: conceptualization, measurement and foundations of affective polarization. Finally, I present the outline of the thesis and briefly introduce the following chapters, summarizing their individual contributions to the literature and describing the case selection, data and methods.

1.1 Conceptualizing affective polarization

Although research on affective polarization has rapidly proliferated over the last eight years, surprisingly little attention has been dedicated to conceptual issues. Thus, it is not unequivocally clear what does the concept of affective polarization precisely entail, what kind of distinct manifestations it has and how it translates into different political contexts. In this section, I will first clarify some conceptual grey areas on a more general level. Subsequently, I will outline my approach regarding a specifically large gap in current literature: defining affective polarization in a multiparty context.

First, I rely on the definition of affective polarization as the divergence in affect between in- and out-parties (Iyengar & Westwood 2015). Thus, a person who dislikes all parties is not affectively polarized, and the same applies to a person who is neutral or positive towards all parties. This distinguishes affective polarization from the notions of *partisanship* and, more specifically, *negative partisanship* that signifies solely the adverse feelings towards

some party/parties which are not necessarily accompanied by equally strong in-party sympathy (Wagner 2020; Bankert 2020). While positive party identification has received major scholarly attention already since the seminal work of Campbell et al. (1960), then negative partisan identity has been termed as the 'forgotten side of partisanship' (Medeiros & Noël 2014). Lately, negative partisanship has also gained more attention in political science literature (see Webster & Abramowitz 2016; Mayer 2017; Abramowitz & McCoy 2019; Bankert 2020), which is not surprising, considering that the previously mentioned dramatic surge in affective polarization in the United States is solely accountable to increasingly negative feelings towards the out-party (Iyengar et al. 2019). Accordingly, affective polarization research has also been more focused on hostility towards the political out-group, and sometimes negative partisanship appears to be implicitly equated with affective polarization. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that - although the two are found to be correlated - negative partisanship does not necessitate positive feelings towards any party, and vice versa (Iyengar & Krupenkin 2018; Bankert 2020; Wagner 2020). On a conceptual map, affective polarization should be placed between positive and negative partisanship, as it is dependent on the joint intensity of both (see Figure 1.1).

Secondly, it should be clarified whether we think of affective polarization as primarily a political or a more far-reaching social phenomenon. When Iyengar et al. (2012) brought the topic of affective polarization under spotlight, they lumped together several indicators that tap into distinct aspects of the concept; and most of the subsequent studies have not dealt with clearing up this conceptual space. Recently, Druckman & Levendusky (2019) introduced a distinction between general attitudes towards parties as broad (political) objects and direct behavioral outcomes outside the political sphere, i.e. the perceived social distance between party supporters. The two manifestations of affective polarization are presumably linked, as it is difficult to see why partisanship-based prejudice would emerge in the social sphere (such as not accepting an out-party in-law) if there is no mutual hostility on the political level (see McCoy et al. 2018; McCoy & Somer 2019). On the other hand, it is in no way given that polarized feelings between parties must invoke discriminatory partisan attitudes in society at large. Some recent research, indeed, confirms that affect towards parties and social distance between party supporters are correlated, but they still clearly constitute two different phenomena, both theoretically and empirically (Knudsen 2020; Druckman & Levendusky 2019; see also Kingzette 2020). I presume that the former tells us more about the nature and structure of the political competition (affective polarization as a political phenomenon), while the latter indicates the spillover of political attitudes into social life (affective polarization as a

social phenomenon). Thus, scholars working on the topic should specify, which type of affective polarization they are studying.

The conceptual discussion in the last two paragraphs is summarized on the schematic on Figure 1.1. As affective polarization represents an interplay between positive and negative partisanship, it is placed between the two on the schematic. Affective polarization is, in turn, divided into two distinct manifestations – the political and the social. The following chapters of this dissertation focus on affective polarization as primarily a political phenomenon.



Figure 1.1. Conceptual map of partisanship and affective polarization.

Having clarified the general conceptual space around and within affective polarization, we now move on to the concerns that relate specifically to the multiparty context. While in two-party systems, affective polarization can be easily understood as the difference between positive affect towards the one in-party and negative affect towards the one out-party, then applying this definition to a multiparty context necessitates some further conceptual elaborations. Although a number of scholars have studied affective polarization in multiparty systems, only Lauka et al. (2018), Reiljan (2020)[4] and Wagner (2020) have addressed the conceptual issues that arise when moving to a more complex party configuration. I will subsequently discuss two central concerns regarding the definition of affective polarization in

[4] See Chapter 2 of this thesis.

multiparty context and outline my conceptualization vis-à-vis the one offered by Wagner (2020).

First, in addition to the higher number of (relevant) parties that must be taken into consideration in multiparty systems, the relative importance of the parties – that is considered to be roughly equal in the US two-party context - varies significantly. The relative importance of a party is highly correlated to its size (i.e. vote share in the general elections), as larger parties can exert stronger influence on the party competition and are more likely to be involved in government formation (Wagner 2020). Both, Reiljan (2020) and Wagner (2020), draw from the cross-national ideological polarization literature to integrate this consideration into their affective polarization conceptualizations. According to Dalton (2008: 906), if a large party occupies an ideologically extreme position, this signifies a greater degree of polarization than if a smaller niche party would have the same placement. In the affective polarization framework, this means that if a large party invokes polarized feelings, this contributes more to the overall degree of affective polarization. Therefore, Reiljan (2020) and Wagner (2020) both propose that to determine the degree of affective polarization in multiparty context, the size of the parties should be taken into account.

Secondly, in multiparty systems, voters can have positive and negative feelings towards more than one party. Such patterns are especially probable in larger party systems where some parties align with each other and form (ideological) blocs (Wagner 2020; see also Huddy et al. 2018). This raises an issue of how to define in- and out-parties in multiparty systems. To address this challenge, Wagner (2020) suggests to drop the in- and out-party distinction and, instead, define affective polarization based on the spread of positive and negative affect between parties. Using an example of a party system with four relevant parties, Wagner establishes that, according to his conceptualization, the degree of affective polarization is equal when (a) the supporters of all four parties have mutually polarized feelings, and (b) if the intensity of the feelings is the same as in (a), but parties are affectively aligned into blocs of two, so that the voters have positive feelings towards two parties, while disliking the other two.[5] Accordingly, affective polarization is defined '...as the extent to which politics is seen as divided into two distinct camps, each of which may consist of one or more parties.' (Wagner 2020: 2)

The conceptualization that I propose diverges from Wagner's in the way it handles the issue of positive identification towards more than one party. While acknowledging that voters

[5] In his example, Wagner focuses on the individual level, but the same logic applies when we move to party system level.

in multiparty systems can be symphatetic towards multiple parties, I maintain that as long as parties run with separate lists in the elections, they are rivals at least to some extent, as they are competing for the votes individually, even if they are fighting merely over their relative influence within the same party bloc that hopes to form a government coalition.[6] It is also important to emphasize that in most electoral systems, citizens can give their vote to just one party. Moreover, the data used in the next chapters of this dissertation demonstrates that if we also include partisan 'leaners' (see Chapter 2 for the discussion over how to define partisan groups), a large majority of people in most countries is able to name one party that they prefer to the others. Thus, every party dyad in a multiparty system constitutes at least a potential dimension of conflict and the exact number of distinct (affective) camps should be determined empirically. I propose that the degree of affective polarization is higher, if there are more actual conflict dimensions. Revisiting the example of a party system with four relevant parties, then according to my conceptualization, the degree of polarization is higher if all four parties have polarized feelings between each other, as compared to the option when parties are aligned into blocs of two. As such, affective polarization is defined as a sum of all partisan conflicts in the party system, rather than the degree to which politics is divided into two camps.

I posit that if a party system is divided into more than two intensely polarized camps, this could have more severe implications for the political process than a sharp bipolar division. Considering that party elites are constrained by the attitudes of their voters, co-operation between parties that have highly polarized feelings between each other might prove very complicated. In case of a bipolar (affective) configuration, one of the two camps is likely to obtain a legislative majority and be able to form a government on the basis of the mutual sympathy between the in-bloc parties, while the opposition provides a unilateral alternative to the incumbent bloc. However, if the number of strongly polarized camps is higher and non of these blocs secures a legislative majority, government formation might turn into a very arduous process.[7] Moreover, if one camp does manage to gain a majority and form a government, they are likely to face an internally polarized opposition that does not constitute a viable alternative, which could lead to a very long-lasting domination of one party/camp. Thus, the conceptualization of affective polarization as a sum of all partisan conflict

[6] Also, we know a number of instances where such pre-election coalitions have not held and parties have used their individual gains to co-operate with some other party/bloc. For example, Lega having an agreement with Forza Italia, yet forming a government with M5S in Italy in 2017, or the breakdown of the right-wint Alliance bloc in Sweden after the 2018 election.

[7] See Chapter 2 for further discussion on affective polarization and coalition formaton.

dimensions relates more to Sartori's classic notion of *polarized pluralism* – a type of multiparty system that is more prone to low levels of legitimacy and democratic breakdown (Sartori 1976; Linz 1978).

To sum up, the central point of divergence in conceptualizing affective polarization in multiparty system is whether we should: (a) treat the whole party system as unidimensional and aim to capture the degree of bimodal distribution on that one (affective) dimension. This is the approach proposed by Wagner (2020) and it is an almost direct equivalent of the unidimensional ideological party polarization definition advanced by Dalton (2008); (b) treat every party dyad as a separate dimension in itself and sum up the degrees of bimodal distributions on these dimensions. This is the understanding of affective polarization that I rely on in this dissertation. Therefore, I propose that the degree of affective polarization in a multiparty context is determined by the intensity of the positive/negative in- and out-party feelings; the size of the parties that exhibit polarized/non-polarized feelings; and the amount of affective conflict dimensions between the parties (in relation to the number of relevant parties).

1.2 Measuring affective polarization

In this section, I will discuss the different solutions for estimating the degree of affective polarization. I will first describe the most common survey items that are utilized to capture partisan affect. Then, similarly to the previous section, I turn the focus on a multiparty context in particular. I will introduce my approach for measuring affective polarization that corresponds to the conceptualization laid out in the previous section and compare it to the other measurement techniques.

While ideological polarization has been analyzed using many different data sources, such as manifesto coding, expert evaluations, roll-call votes and public opinion surveys, affective polarization research has almost exclusively relied on the latter. Although some surveys that have been conducted among party elites also include partisan affect items[8], I am not aware of any affective polarization study based on such data and the research has hitherto focused on measuring affective polarization at voter level. A number of different survey items have been used to capture partisan affect, some of them tapping into the social aspects of affective polarization, others focusing on parties as primarily political objects. Regarding the

[8] For example, the Swedish Riksdagsundersökningen (RDU) survey asks the MPs of all the parliamentary parties about their like/dislike towards their own and the competing parties.

former, items from the social distance scale by Bogardus (1925) have been frequently used and have also gained notable public attention, especially the previously mentioned question about whether the respondent would be happy or unhappy if their child married a supporter of the other party.[9] Other items from that scale that have been applied to measure affective polarization include attitudes towards having a close friend, neighbor or a co-worker who supports the out-party (Lelkes 2016; Helbling & Jungkunz 2020). The most commonly used item for capturing the political manifestation of affective polarization has been the feeling thermometer (or like-dislike) scale, that asks the respondents to evaluate political parties on a scale ranging from very cold (strong dislike) to very warm (strong like) feelings (Iyengar et al. 2019).

As I study affective polarization as a political phenomenon, I will also rely on the like-dislike item in the subsequent chapters of this dissertations. In the US studies, a 0-100 feelings thermometer has been part of the American National Election Studies (ANES) survey for decades and the bulk of affective polarization research relies on that data. In cross-national research, the equivalent of this item has been the 0-10 like-dislike scale that has been included in all waves of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) since the 1990s. In most surveys, the like-dislike/thermometer item - that has become a real workhorse of affective polarization studies - asks respondents to evaluate their feeling towards the political parties, without specifically defining which *face* of the party (see Katz & Mair 1993) should they think of when assigning the rating. However, more detailed experimental research has revealed that general party evaluations overlap very closely with the feelings towards party elites, while the attitudes towards the supporters of the parties are significantly less hostile. This suggests that when asked to evaluate a party, people rather think of its top politicians than voters or rank-and-file members (Druckman & Levendusky 2019; Kingzette 2020). This fits well with my aim to study the political manifestation of affective polarization. Yet, it should be reiterated that the results presented in the subseqent chapters do not necessarily say much about affective polarization in society at large. Studying the latter would demand different survey items that are not so broadly available, at least for the time being.

Several indicators have been constructed on the basis of the like-dislike/thermometer scale to measure affective polarization. As established in the previous conceptualization section, understanding affective polarization is rather intuitive in the US two-party system. Accordingly, it has been measured simply as a raw difference between the in- and out-party

[9] For example, see: https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/09/really-would-you-let-your-daughter-marry-a-democrat/262959/

ratings of Democrats and Republicans (Iyengar et al. 2012; 2019). The measures developed for capturing affective polarization in a multiparty context could roughly be divided into two. The first correspond to Wagner's conceptualization of affective polarization as spread of positive and negative affect between different parties. Wagner (2020) and Ward & Tavits (2019) measure affective polarization essentially as a standard deviation (spread-of-scores) of evaluations towards all parties. Wagner also presents a weighted spread-of-scores measure, using party vote shares in the general election to determine the relative importance of each party. Lauka et al. (2018) follow a similar logic, but instead of standard deviation, they measure the proportion of very positive (8-10 on a 0-10 scale) and very negative (0-2) party evaluations. The second type of affective polarization metrics in multiparty context follows the conceptualization I laid out in the previous section and captures the average like-dislike difference between the one in-party and the multiple out-parties, weighted by party vote shares. This has been termed as the *mean-distance* approach by Wagner (2020) and in addition to Reiljan (2020), it has been used by Gidron et al. (2018)[10], Harteveld (2019) and Boxell (2020); also Wagner (2020) uses it as a comparison measure to his spread-of-scores index.

The mean-distance approach that I rely on for measuring affective polarization entails dividing people into partisan groups, based on the one party they feel closest to. This allows to capture the affective distance between every possible party dyad and determine the actual number of active conflict dimensions in the party system. The precise survey items employed to define the in-party will be explained in more detail in the subsequent chapters, but in all the empirical accounts of this dissertation, I rely on the most inclusive and lenient definition of partisanship. Therefore, anyone who expresses at least some kind of proximity to one party over others will be included in the partisan group, regardless of whether they identify strictly as partisans or not.[11] I have compiled the party evaluations from all the countries and different time points (from which data is availaible) into partisan like-dislike matrices that summarize the feelings that the supporters of each party have towards their own and the other parties in their respective country. I will subsequently present the partisan like-dislike matrices of the

[10] However, Gidron et al. (2018) use the average weighted evaluation towards out-parties as their primary measure of affective polarization, not the in-party/out-parties difference (which they employ just for robustness check). Such measurement carries a risk to rather capture the general negative sentiment towards political parties, than affective polarization.

[11] Yet, I still use a separate item to define partisanship, meaning that voter him-/herself must name that one party he/she feels closest to. Wagner (2020), when measuring affective polarization as the mean distance between in-party and all out-parties, defines respondent's in-party simply as the party that receives the highest like-dislike evaluation from the respective respondent.

United States (2016), Turkey (2015) and Sweden (2014) – based on the previously mentioned like-dislike scale that ranges from 0 (maximum dislike) to 10 - to illustrate the affective structure in three very different types of party systems. Using these examples, I highlight the differences between my approach on estimating affective polarization and the measures that capture the general distribution/standard deviation of party evaluations without identifying respondent's in-party.

Table 1.1. Partisan like-dislike matrices of the United States, Turkey and Sweden

United States, 2016

Party	**Vote %**	Dem	Rep
Dem	48.0	7.55	2.79
Rep	49.1	2.70	7.31

Turkey (2015, June[12])

Party	**Vote %**	AKP	CHP	MHP	HDP
AKP	40.9	8.98	1.43	2.16	0.66
CHP	25.0	0.95	8.75	2.00	1.66
MHP	16.3	1.79	2.01	8.19	0.54
HDP	13.1	1.12	2.24	0.38	9.22

Sweden (2014)

Party	**Vote %**	V	S	MP	C	FP	M	KD	SD
V	5.7	8.66	6.65	6.57	2.88	2.9	1.98	2.56	1.3
S	31	5.67	8.42	6.69	4.11	4.3	3.43	3.74	1.58
MP	6.9	5.74	6.47	8.57	4.83	4.29	4.28	3.44	0.8
C	6.1	2.31	4.23	4.56	8.46	6.29	7.24	5.76	1.98
FP	5.4	1.96	4.61	4.73	6.61	8.65	7.17	5.37	1.17
M	23.3	1.73	3.65	3.98	6.4	6.49	8.87	5.77	2.55
KD	4.6	1.84	3.73	4.54	6.84	6.4	7.25	8.57	2.31
SD	12.9	2.5	4.43	2.53	3.56	4.31	4.55	4.11	8.38

Notes: The displayed scores indicate the average like-dislike evaluations on a scale from 0 (strong dislike) to 10. Rows signify the average scores that respective partisan group has assigned to parties, while columns indicate the scores assigned to the respective party. The color scheme divides parties into the ones that receive a rating that is below the scale centrepoint of 5 (red cells) and the ones that are above it (green cells). Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), Waves 4 and 5.

[12] After the failure to form a functioning government, another general election was held in Turkey in November 2015.

The upper matrix in Table 1.1 displays the partisan feelings in the most simple US two-party context. As already known, voters are positive towards their own party and dislike the out-party: Table 1.1 demonstrates that the Democrat supporters evaluated their own party, on average, with 7.55 out of 10, while the mean rating to the Republican party was 2.8; among the Republican voters, the numbers were similar (in-party: 7.3, out-party 2.7). Considering that more than 90% of the respondents in 2016 were able to express their preference towards one of the two parties and the evaluations are clearly bimodal, there is not much difference between the mean-distance and spread-of-scores measures regarding that case. In Turkey (2015), similarly to the USA, the only positive ratings (green cells) in the like-dislike matrix signify in-party evaluations. The fact that all the other cells in the matrix are red, indicates that, on average, the supporters of all four largest parties perceive each other as out-groups (i.e. the evaluations towards the out-parties are (clearly) below 5, which is the centrepoint of the like-dislike scale). Thus, we have four separate affective camps, instead of two like in the USA. Regardless of how we measure the degree of affective polarization, Turkey would score higher than the United States, on the account of the more positive in-party and more negative out-party feelings. However, if the four parties would affectively converge into blocs of two, then – in case the intensity of hostility between the two camps would remain equal as it is now between four camps – the two previously outlined measurements would diverge. As some conflict dimensions would disappear, the degree of affective polarization according to the mean-distance approach would decrease, whereas it should remain similar for spread-of-scores.

In the last matrix in Table 1.1, we see the case of affective alignment and multiple positive identifications across partisan groups. Although the average in-party evaluations are still 1.5 to 3 points higher than the ratings towards the 'allied' parties in the same bloc, seven out of eight parliamentary parties in Sweden (2014) were neatly divided into two camps: V, S and MP form an affectively aligned left-bloc, while C, FP, M and KD are a coherent centre-right camp. Yet, claiming that the Swedish party systems is divided into two camps does not reveal the whole picture, as the right-populist SD (that in the 2014 election got the third place with 13% of the vote and increased it to 18% in 2018) remains unaligned. The last column and the last row of the like-dislike matrix demonstrate that the supporters of all seven other parties are very negative towards SD, while the populist voters themselves also dislike all the out-parties, although to a much lower extent. Again, I maintain that the additional conflict dimension induced by SD substantively increases the overall degree of affective polarization.

If SD would affectively align with either bloc, even if the other bloc would remain as negative towards them and vice versa, that would bring about a decrease in affective polarization. Conversely, if, for example, the far-leftist Left Party (V) supporters would not have mutually positive feelings with the two more moderate left-wing parties, and would, similarly to SD, constitute a separate affective camp, the degree of affective polarization would increase according to mean-distance method, while the spread-of-scores should remain similar.

As these examples demonstrate, the central difference between the spread-of-scores and mean-distance approaches on measuring affective polarization derives from the effect of higher numbers of affective camps to the estimated degree of polarizaton. To substantiate my claim that more affective camps in the party competition should reflect in a higher degree of affective polarization, I previously outlined two potential scenarios that could unfold in a highly affectively polarized party system with more than two camps: a very long and arduous government formation process, and a long-time domination of one party that is facing an internally polarized opposition. The examples in Table 1.1 vividly illustrate these scenarios. Since the rise of the right-populist SD in Sweden, neither of the mainstream party blocs has been able to gain the legislative majority, which has severely impeded the governent formation process, as neither of the blocs wants to co-operate with each other nor with SD. After the 2018 election, it took over four months to finally inaugurate the prime minister and calling snap elections has been on the agenda several times since 2014. In Turkey, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) held the legislative majority for 13 years, but lost it in the 2015 June election. However, they faced an internally extremely polarized three-party opposition that was not able to take power. In the aftermath of the election, all government negotiations failed and new elections were held in November 2015 where AKP regained its majority. Since then, the degree of democracy in Turkey has taken a swift downturn (Somer 2019; McCoy & Somer 2019). I believe that these examples uphold my approach on measuring affective polarization as a sum of all active conflict dimensions.[13] However, the precise (dis)advantages of both, the mean-distance and the spread-of-scores measurement, surely deserve further theoretical and empirical attention.

In conclusion, while the like-dislike/thermometer scale is widely accepted as an adequate survey item to capture the political aspect of partisan affect, there are diverging ideas on how to use it to estimate the degree of affective polarization in a multiparty context.

[13] This is not to claim that polarization in which the party system is divided into just two camps cannot have very problematic consequences, as we could witness, for example, in the United States over the last decades (for example, see Hetherington & Rudolph 2015 on the consequences of affective polarization for the US governance).

The most central difference between the two main measurement approaches pertains to determining (or not determining) voter's in-party. The discrepancy is rooted in the different conceptualizations of affective polarization that were discussed in the previous section. If we project the party system as unidimensional and aim to measure the degree of bimodality of partisan feelings on that one dimension, it is not necessary to define voter's in-party to measure affective polarization; conversely, when we think of affective polarization as a sum of all party-by-party conflicts, then the in-party should be determined. As already explained, in this dissertation, I rely on the latter approach. Nevertheless, the precise measurement methodology is not identical across the chapters. In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, I study affective polarization broadly at the system level, which is why I find the general (weighted) mean-distance based measure - that will be introduced in more detail in Chapter 2 - to be most suitable. In Chapter 4, however, I will demonstrate that to reach valid conclusions regarding the predictors of affective polarization at the individual level, it is necessary to use a more nuanced measurement technique and distinguish between different camps, not lump them into one general measure. Thus, while maintaining my understanding of affective polarization as a sum of all affective conflict dimensions, I suggest that the precise measurement strategy should be adjusted according to context and research aims.

1.3 Foundations of affective polarization

While there is little doubt that affective polarization is highly present in many party systems across the world, the knowledge about the foundations of this phenomenon is still almost exclusively US-centric. This is a troubling research gap, as any meaningful attempt to reduce intense partisanship-based hostility presumes an understanding of its origins (Webster & Abramowitz 2017; Levendusky 2018). In the US literature, a debate between two theories has emerged over what is the central driver of affective polarization. The point of disagreement is whether it is primarily an expressive phenomenon, induced by political and social identities itself, or if it is rather driven by actual policy disagreement. The first theory, thus, emphasizes the tribalist element, while the second accentuates the rational roots of partisan feelings. In the following chapters of this thesis, I elaborate on these two theories and apply them outside the US context. In this section, I will first introduce the two theories.[14] Subsequently, I summarize

[14] As I introduce these two theories also in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, this part is somewhat repetitive. However, in this introdutory chapter, I will put more emphasis on the development of both theories and emphasize the

what we know about the (tribalist and rational) foundations of affective polarization outside the US context. Finally, I will sketch out the contribution of this thesis to our theoretical and empirical understanding of the foundations of affective polarization.

When Iyengar et al. (2012) brought affective polarization under academic attention, they emphasized the tribalist underpinnings of partisan feelings, building on the social identity and intergroup conflict theories (Campbell et al. 1960; Tajfel 1970; Tajfel & Turner 1979). Their regression models revealed the increased correlation between partisan identity strength and affective polarization, while the effect of policy positions was deemed as weak and inconsistent. Mason (2015) added to this line of argumentation by demonstrating that even ideologically moderate partisans exhibit hostility towards the out-party, i.e. they 'disrespectfully agree' with each other. According to this approach, voters behave rather like sports fans who root for their home team (and against the opposing team), no matter what. To highlight the similarity of such purely partisan identity based hostility with phenomena like racism and sexism, Sunstein (2015) coined the term *partyism*. However, partisanship can also reflect other crucial social identities. In another important contribution to affective polarization literature, Mason (2016; 2018b) argued that partisan feelings in the United States have intensified due to the alignment of people's partisan and social identities like race and religion. Such sorting has increased the perceived distance from the partisan out-group and induced an 'us vs them' sentiment. Some more recent research shows that it is difficult to even disentangle the independent effects that the partisan and the overlapping social identities have on affective polarization (Orr & Huber 2020; Westwood & Peterson 2020). Whether it is partisan identity itself, some other salient social identities, or the combination of the two - all these linkages refer to group attachment as the central driver of affective polarization, indicating the tribalist roots of the phenomenon.[15]

As a response to the tribalism theory of the foundations of affective polarization, a competing account emerged few years later. Rogowski and Sutherland (2016) and Webster and Abramowitz (2017) delivered the first notable contributions that depicted affective polarization as a phenomenon that is predominantly rooted in the ideological differences

---

most important contributions, while in the separate chapters I take a more on-point approach to build up the hypotheses.

[15] A more specific question is why have identities become the basis of heightened conflict in the United States over the last decades. A number of different explanations have been offered, such as access to broadband internet (Lelkes et al. 2017), increasingly divided media landscape (Levendusky 2013), vitriolic rhetoric and negative campaigning towards political opponents at the party elite level (Iyengar et al. 2012; Hetherington & Rudolph 2015; Iyengar & Krupenkin 2018), and the rising share of ethnic/racial minorities in the general population (Boxell et al. 2020).

between the parties on elite and also voter level. While not denying that there is also a tribal element in affective polarization, Webster & Abramowitz (2017) clearly emphasized the rational foundations of partisan hostility and framed their findings as in opposition to Iyengar et al. (2012) and Mason (2015). Policy differences can induce affective polarization both via ideological extremity of voters and parties, and by partisan-ideological sorting, i.e. the alignment of voter's political stances and partisan identity (Rogowski & Sutherland 2016; Webster & Abramowitz 2017; Bougher 2017; Mason 2015). Thus, we see a certain parallel between the identity and ideology approaches: while for the former, both the strength of identities and the alignment of partisan and social identities are arguably driving affective polarization, then according to the latter it is the combination of ideological convictions and their alignment with the party.

The distinction between the two theories is well summarized by Huddy et al. (2018) who term affective polarization that derives from policy (dis)agreement as a form of *instrumental partisanship*, which is opposed to identity-driven *expressive partisanship*. Or to put it even more simply, it is a question of 'is politics a war of ideas or of Us against Them?', as the title of an opinion piece by Thomas Edsall in the New York Times asks.[16] Research that is based on the widely used ANES dataset gives substantial backing for both approaches in the US context: when included in the models simultaneously, partisan identity strength, sorting of partisan and social identities, ideological extremity and partisan-ideological sorting all are significant predictors of the divergence of partisan affect between in- and out-party (Mason 2015; Webster & Abramowitz 2017; Iyengar et al. 2019). Thus, it is difficult to give an advantage to one theory over the other based on the existing cross-sectional data, and the results tend to depend on the assumptions of the researchers (Orr & Huber 2020: 572). However, some recent experimental studies that aim at disentangling the effects of identity and ideology rather give the edge to the latter, indicating the dominance of policy (dis)agreement in determining partisan affect (Lelkes 2019; Orr & Huber 2020).

While a lively debate has unfolded in the US context, the foundations of affective polarization in the rest of the world have received only sparse attention. On the party system level, a positive correlation between ideological (left-right) and affective polarization has been detected by different authors (see Reiljan 2020; Harteveld 2019; Lauka et al. 2018; Gidron et al. 2018), but the results are unclear about the strength of this relationship and its robustness in different model specifications and country samples. As for the tribalism

[16] https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/06/opinion/is-politics-a-war-of-ideas-or-of-us-against-them.html

approach, I do not know of any study that tests the relationship between the average strength of partisan identities and affective polarization on the system level. However, Harteveld (2019) finds that the sorting of partisan and social identities is associated with higher levels of affective polarization, although it only explains the temporal dynamics within countries, not cross-national variance. As Harteveld himself notes, the social sorting score does not compare well across countries, making it difficult to accurately estimate its role in explaining cross-national differences in the levels of affective polarization.

Regarding individual level research on the predictors of affective polarization outside the US context, I am currently aware of only three studies that tap into the previously outlined debate between tribalist and ideological-rational theories: Huddy et al. (2018) run individual level models to explain partisan affect in the United Kingdom and Sweden, Viciana et al. (2019) in Spain and Satherley et al. (2020) in New Zealand. All these empirical accounts seem to support the understanding that partisan identity strength and policy positions are both important predictors that have separate independent effects on affective polarization, although there are differences regarding the relative impact of each variable. The authors, however, differ in the way they operationalize some of the central variables and in their methodological designs, making it difficult to compare their results. Also considering the very limited number of countries studied, we are not able to draw broad conclusions about the foundations of affective polarization in multiparty systems.

In this thesis, I aim at improving our theoretical and empirical understanding of the foundations of affective polarization at both, the system and individual level (in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, respectively). Relying on the previously outlined tribalist and ideological-rational approaches, I test the baseline hypotheses (stronger partisan identities/greater ideological polarization → greater affective polarization) to evaluate how well these theories can explain the cross-national variance in affective polarization and differences between individuals in a multiparty context. I will also broaden the scope of both approaches by focusing on aspects that relate specifically to multiparty systems and have been overlooked in the current US-centric literature. Moreover, I intend to connect the two central theories, proposing that tribal and rational considerations that underlie affective polarization might be more interrelated with each other than current research has shown.

Regarding the tribalism approach, this thesis provides the first study of the correlation between voters' average partisan identity strength and affective polarization at party system level, testing the linkage in conjunction with a broad set of other relevant variables. I also present new insights on the relationship between partisan identity and affective polarization at

the individual level in a multiparty context. I show that although more convinced partisans are, on average, affectively more polarized, certain parties can induce very negative affect, regardless of the strength of attachment towards one's own party.[17] As for other crucial social identities, I examine the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and affective polarization. McCoy and Somer (2019) list ethno-linguistic division as one potential *formative rift* that can lead to a deep polarization within society, and some previous literature has linked ethnic polarization to several adverse outcomes in the society, such as higher propensity for civil wars (see Montalvo & Reynal-Querol 2005). Although some studies have suggested that certain ethnic identities induce more intense in- and out-party feelings (Medeiros & Noël 2014; Satherley et al. 2020), there is no knowledge of whether countries that are more divided on an ethnic basis systematically exhibit greater partisan affective polarization. I believe that even if not the most central source of conflict in the society, ethnic divisions can form the basis for an additional dimension of conflict. According to the previously outlined conceptualization of affective polarization as a sum of all active partisan conflicts, this should induce higher levels of polarization.

To enhance our knowledge about the relationship between ideological and affective polarization, I will study this relationship at the cross-national level to confirm its robustness to different model specifications and country samples. However, in the system level study, my data is limited to a single ideological (left-right) dimension. This could be problematic, because modern politics is arguably better captured by a two-dimensional framework, which distinguishes between a cultural dimension that entails issues that relate to values and identity politics, and the classic economic left-right dimension (see Kriesi et al. 2008). Moreover, placement on such broad dimensions might rather indicate ideological identity than actual policy stances, and the two are not necessarily in accordance with each other (Mason 2018a). These limitations will be addressed in the individual level study of Sweden, where I examine the different effects of economic and cultural issues. Although it is often argued that cultural issues are especially polarizing due to their emotion-laden symbolic nature (Hetherington & Rudolph 2015), several empirical studies in the United States context actually find that when included in the statistical models simultaneously, economic issues predict affective polarization better than cultural ones (Iyengar et al. 2012; Webster & Abramowitz 2017). However, the two dimensions are strongly intertwined in the US context and potentially have the same underlying drivers, making it difficult to disentangle their effects on affective

[17] See also Wagner (2020) for an argument that a collective negative partisanship towards the populist/radical parties in the Western Europe is not accompanied by positive in-party feelings.

polarization (Johnston 2018). Multiparty systems provide more leverage for differentiating between the issues that pertain to different ideological dimensions. I will outline a theoretical and empirical framework to explain the linkage between policy positions and partisan affect in a multiparty context, demonstrating that the ideological and affective structure of the party system are in accordance with each other.

Finally, I will elaborate on the rational account of affective polarization by introducing *valence* considerations as a potential basis of partisan feelings. Many studies have shown that in addition to policy agreement, voters also prioritize the perceived competence and integrity of the parties/candidates, i.e. their valence (Stokes 1963; Clark 2009); yet, this literature has hitherto not been connected to affective polarization research. If party identification can be modelled as a 'running tally' of evaluations, based on policy agreement with and perceived governing capabilities of the parties (see Fiorina 1981), it is reasonable to assume that partisan feelings can also be driven by a similar combination of qualities. I theorize that the disparity between the perceived capabilities of the parties (valence polarization) is higher in countries with more corrupt and incompetent governments, which leads to greater affective polarization between parties.

While I build on the two previously outlined central theories, my take on the foundations of affective polarization, in fact, challenges the clear-cut distinction between the tribalist and rational roots of partisan feelings. In this regard, I do not classify affective polarization that is induced by valence considerations firmly under the rational account. While basing one's feelings towards parties into evaluations of their capabilities could be seen as a rational political behavior, it is likely that – having already chosen the preferred party – a voter engages in motivated reasoning (Festinger 1957) and ascribes more blame for negative governing outcomes to out-parties, while overestimating the performance of their own party. A somewhat analogous tendency has been noted regarding ideological perceptions, as voters tend to perceive the opposing parties as more extreme than they actually are (Levendusky & Malhotra 2015; Westfall et al. 2015). Similarly, although polarization based on ethnic identity is usually seen in tribal group-attachment terms, it should not be overlooked that ethnic divisions can also manifest in very divergent policy programmes that have important consequences on people's lives, thus increasing the stakes in the party competition. For example, citizenship rights and language-related issues are likely to be more salient in ethno-linguistically more heterogenous societies. As such, I believe that affective polarization could be a result of a complex interplay of rational reasoning and tribalist impulses, which are likely to mutually reinforce each other.

1.4 Outline of the thesis

This thesis is guided by the research gaps and questions outlined in the three previous sections. Having laid out the conceptual, methodological and theoretical framework, I now present the outline of this thesis. I will briefly summarize each of the following chapters, introducing the main objectives, contribution to the literature, methodology and the data used. It should be emphasized that all the chapters (except Introduction and Conclusion) constitute standalone papers that are submitted to or have already been published by journals separately. That explains some repetitive parts, especially in the theory and variable operationalization sections. The outline of the thesis is summarized in Table 1.2.

In Chapter 2 that has been published in the European Journal of Political Research (see Reiljan 2020, published online in 2019),[18] I discuss my conceptualization of affective polarization and place it in the framework of wider polarization studies. I introduce the Affective Polarization Index that is based on the previously outlined mean-distance approach and that allows to estimate levels of affective polarization also in multiparty systems. I apply this novel measure to compare the levels of affective polarization in 22 European democracies and the United States. The results indicate that affective polarization is acutely present in European party systems, as partisans are often extremely hostile towards competing parties, while evaluations towards in-parties are predominantly positive. The most polarized countries are in Central Eastern and Southern Europe, while Northwestern European countries are more moderate in terms of partisan feelings. The United States is placed between these two groups, being significantly less polarized than the former, while exceeding the latter.

I also establish that affective and ideological polarization are clearly distinct concepts, both theoretically and empirically. Ideological polarization is based on diverging positions with regard to policy issues and dimensions, but does not indicate anything about the intensity of the feelings that accompany these disagreements. Affective polarization, conversely, taps directly into the interparty feelings, without revealing anything about the actual substance of the conflict. Empirically, I demonstrate that although ideological and affective polarization are significantly correlated, the two concepts are far from being congruent. In fact, most of the cross-national variation in affective polarization remains unexplained by ideological divergence between parties. I show that intense affective polarization can emerge without a

[18] It should be taken into account that this chapter was written in 2017-2018, and got the final acceptance by the journal in early 2019. Thus, some of the claims in this chapter are already slightly outdated in the face of the rapidly developing literature (e.g. that there are no other systemic affective polarization indices).

deep ideological (left-right) division, whereas rather high degree of ideological polarization does not necessarily lead to intense partisan hostility.

The empirical analysis on Chapter 2 relies completely on the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) dataset that is used to divide voters into partisan groups, and to calculate affective and ideological polarization. CSES is a collaborative research program that conducts post-election surveys in a wide array of countries, using a common set of questions that prompts comparison across different political systems. I have used the Modules 3 and 4 of the project that cover the years 2005 to 2016[19], and I include only the countries that are deemed as electoral democracies. In this chapter, I have limited the sample of countries to Europe (and the United States as a point of comparison), because the main aims of the chapter are conceptual and methodological. Therefore, I decided to test my novel measure with a set of countries that is more familiar to me. The country-specific knowledge proves to be very relevant, especially for analyzing the correlation between ideological and affective polarization.

In Chapter 3, I aim at explaining the cross-national variation in the degree of affective polarization – measured by the Affective Polarization Index - among more than 40 democracies around the world. I present a theoretical framework that builds on the previously described tribalist and rational theories, but elaborates on them by bringing in valence considerations and ethnic polarization as potential foundations of affective polarization. The results, indeed, confirm that the two central variables that have emerged in the US literature - ideological polarization and partisan identity strength – are not sufficient to unravel why different party systems exhibit differing levels of partisan animosity. While ideological (left-right) polarization is a strong predictor of cross-national variation in affective polarization, the effect of partisan identity strength is insignificant in the fully specified model. I find that the countries with ineffective and corrupt government sectors exhibit very high levels of affective polarization, even if the level of wealth is controlled for, suggesting that valence considerations might play an important role in shaping affective polarization patterns. I also show that higher level of ethnic heterogeneity is correlated with greater affective polarization, regardless of partisan identity strength. The results suggest that even if affective polarization is not driven solely by ideological considerations, there appear to be logical structural reasons behind it, which should not be automatically dismissed as irrational tribalism. On the other

[19] By the time this chapter was written, CSES had not yet combined the first four waves into one integrated dataset. There were certain differences in the partisan identification items between Waves 1-2 and 3-4, which is why I decided to rule out any potential mistakes and excluded the first two waves.

hand, intended rational considerations can be distorted by in-group bias, as suggested by the finding that quality of governance has an effect only on how people evaluate other parties, while in-party evaluations are immune to it.

In this chapter, I also use the CSES dataset, but compared to Chapter 2, I have broadened the scope of my sample both geographically and temporally. I now include all the democratic countries for which data is available.[20] Moreover, I include all four completed data collection waves and add the already available data from the ongoing fifth wave. This amounts to a sample that spans from 1996 to 2018 and covers 41 countries from every continent. The government effectiveness and corruption data is obtained from the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators and ethnic polarization is calculated, based on the dynamic ethnic group proportion estimates database, provided by the Cline Center for Democracy at the University of Illinois. Although affective polarization and the central independent variables change over time (at least to some extent), the vast majority (ca 90%) of variation is evident between the countries, not within the countries over time. Therefore, I use a methodological approach that rather captures the cross-national than temporal variation. I run OLS regression models with country-clustered standard errors and replicate the results with country average scores for each variable, while not using country fixed effects. The set of variables utilized in this study explains about two thirds of the variation in affective polarization, and the results prove to be robust to different samples and model specifications.

Chapter 4 constitutes a case study of Sweden and is co-authored with Alexander Ryan from Mid Sweden University. The aim of this chapter is to scrutinize the individual level predictors of affective polarization in a classic Western European multiparty system. Based on the partisan like-dislike matrices (see Table 1.1), we determine that the Swedish multiparty system was divided into two affectively converged mainstream party blocs that were moderately polarized between each other, and an asymmetrically polarized populist right party, Sweden Democrats (SD), that invoked significantly more hostility from the supporters of mainstream parties than vice versa. To unpack the foundations of affective polarization in such a tripolar configuration, we employ a technique that distinguishes not just between in- and out-parties but also in- and out-blocs, and separates different conflict dimensions.

We find that – similarly to the United States - voters with stronger partisan identities and less centrist political attitudes are affectively more polarized. Policy positions, however, are better predictors of direct dislike towards political opponents. This applies especially to

[20] As it will be explained in Chapter 3, due to several indeficiencies regarding the data, a number of potentially eligible countries had to be dropped from the sample.

the feelings towards the populist right SD, as the mainstream blocs supporters are strongly prone to dislike SD, regardless of the strength of their in-party attachment. Secondly, we show that the effects of political attitudes correspond to the tripolar structure of the party system: while affective polarization between the centre-right and -left blocs is mostly driven by socioeconomic positions, the hostility towards SD links predominantly to cultural issues, especially immigration. Yet, even the most anti-immigration mainstream voters are highly inclined to dislike SD, indicating that ideological predispositions cannot exhaustively explain the overwhelming hostility towards the right populist party. This leads to our third main finding. We demonstrate that institutional trust has a two-edged relationship with affective polarization: populist right voters that trust the country's central institutions more, are less polarized towards mainstream blocs, whereas among centre-right voters, higher trust associates with stronger animosity towards Sweden Democrats. This suggests that some voters that agree with SD on crucial policy stances might still dislike them due to the party's populist rhetoric that is aimed against the (liberal) democratic institutions.

We use data from the national SOM-survey, which is the most commonly used random probability survey of Swedish residents. The dataset includes the classic 11-point party like-dislike scale and also a number of policy issues that tap into the socioeconomic and cultural dimensions, allowing us to study their distinct effects. We predominantly rely on OLS regression models with pooled data. However, we also provide a wide range of robustness checks, including year-by-year analyses and logistic regression models.

Although Chapter 4 focuses solely on Sweden, our findings could have important implications for affective polarization research more broadly. Similar tripolar configurations are also evident in other party systems, so our theoretical framework should be applicable also outside the Swedish context. Asymmetric polarization between the right-populist and mainstream parties is also a phenomenon that is evident in several other countries, but has hitherto been mostly overlooked and not studied more thoroughly. This chapter provides first steps into understanding and explaining this asymmetry. Moreover, we demonstrate that distingushing between different camps and conflict dimensions is crucial to arrive to correct conclusions regarding the predictors of partisan affect in a multipolar party system. This suggests that researchers should examine the affective structure of the party system before choosing the suitable methodological solution that fits their research objectives.

Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the thesis by summarizing the main findings and discussing their implications from a broader perspective. It also lays down some further avenues for research that grow out of the theoretical and empirical contribution of this thesis.

Table 1.2. Outline of the thesis

#	Chapter 2	Chapter 3	Chapter 4
Main objective(s)	Conceptualization and measurement of AP in multiparty systems; cross-national comparison; distinction between AP and ideological polarization	Cross-national comparison; explaining the cross-national variation, determining the system level predictors of AP.	Explaining the variation between individuals, determining the individual level predictors of AP in multiparty context.
Central variables	AP; ideological (left-right) polarization	AP; ideological (left-right) polarization; partisan identity strength, quality of governance; ethnic polarization	AP; ideological self-placement (socioeconomic and cultural issues); partisan identity strength; institutional trust
Countries	22 European democracies + USA	41 democracies from Europe, N-America, S-America, Asia and Africa	Sweden
Data	CSES Module 3 and 4	CSES Modules 1-5; WB Worldwide Governance Indicators; CREG	Swedish national SOM-survey

Notes: AP – Affective polarization; CSES – Comparative Study of Electoral Systems; WB – World Bank; CREG - Composition of Religious and Ethnic Groups project database, Cline Center for Democracy at the University of Illinois

2. 'Fear and loathing across party lines' (also) in Europe: Affective polarization in European party systems[21]

2.1 Introduction

In most of the academic literature, political polarization has been almost exclusively equated with ideological polarization (henceforth IP). Recently, the dominance of the IP paradigm has been challenged by a number of scholars based mostly in the United States who have started to define polarization in terms of partisan affect. The term 'affective polarization' (henceforth AP) had been sparsely used in some previous research (e.g., Richardson 1991; Hetherington & Weiler 2009), but did not have much impact until the seminal article by Iyengar et al. (2012). AP, according to their definition, is a tendency among party supporters (partisans) to view other party/parties as a disliked out-group(s), while holding positive ingroup feelings for one's own party. They found that AP has dramatically surged among the American partisans during the last decades on account of increased hostility between Republicans and Democrats. This study catapulted the affective approach to the forefront of the polarization debate in the United States, and a number of notable contributions have followed (see Hetherington & Rudolph 2015; Iyengar &Westwood 2015; Mason 2015, 2016; Rogowski & Sutherland 2016; Lelkes et al. 2017; Webster & Abramovitz 2017; Levendusky 2018; Iyengar & Krupenkin 2018).

From the normative perspective, political polarization is usually considered as a problematic phenomenon. However, a certain degree of IP is necessary to make party competition function properly, as it indicates that voters have a meaningful choice between alternating policy packages (Barber & McCarty 2015). AP, however, is predominantly considered to be a negative and dangerous phenomenon as it decreases political trust among the supporters of the party that lost the election, hinders cooperation among party elites (Hetherington & Rudolph 2015) and even induces discriminatory behaviour toward opposing partisans outside the political sphere (Iyengar & Westwood 2015). Thus, we should desire a party system where parties and partisans diverge on ideological grounds to some extent, but this is not accompanied by intense inter-party animosity.

[21] Based on an article published in the European Journal of Political Research (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12351)

Despite the gravity of the topic in the United States, the debate on AP in Europe is nearly non-existent. Few authors have considered the concept in certain European countries (see Richardson 1991; Hansen & Kosiara-Pedersen 2017; Westwood et al. 2018), but to the best of my knowledge, no broad cross-national comparative study concentrating on AP in Europe has been conducted yet. Thus, we do not know how European countries fare in terms of AP compared to each other and to the United States, not to mention the possible causes and consequences of it. Regarding the foundations of AP and IP-AP linkage, the current results from the American literature are ambiguous, as some scholars claim that IP has a strong effect on AP (Rogowski & Sutherland 2016; Webster & Abramovitz 2017), while others downplay the importance of this relationship (Iyengar et al. 2012). Adding a vast number of European countries into this debate could help reveal many possible IP-AP combinations on party system level and bring more clarity into the question of what facilitates negative feelings among partisans towards political opponents.

In a public lecture given in 2011, Shanto Iyengar described the mutual feelings between the Democrats and the Republicans as 'fear and loathing across party lines' (Iyengar 2011; see also Iyengar & Westwood 2015). He also emphasised the necessity to conduct comparative studies to find out whether the United States is the most affectively polarized country, and discussed a possibility that some 'tribal societies' could exhibit more extreme inter-group hostility. In this chapter, I demonstrate that the level of AP in the United States is actually exceeded by a number of democratic European countries. To enable such cross-national comparison, I will introduce an index to measure and compare AP also in multiparty systems. I measure AP in more than 20 European party systems and examine the IP-AP relationship cross-nationally. I show that although the two manifestations of polarization are correlated to each other, they are far from congruent and should be treated as separate concepts.

2.2 The concept of affective polarization in the wider framework of polarization studies

In a broad sense, polarization is defined as a clustering within the society that divides the population into sizeable groups on opposite sides. The degree of polarization is determined by the distance between, the homogeneity within and the size of these opposing groups (Esteban & Ray 1994: 824). Probably the most commonly used 'anchor' of group identity in

polarization studies has been the political party. Accordingly, the degree of polarization is determined by the distance between, the coherence within and the size of the parties. As already noted, between-group distance and in-group homogeneity have usually been defined in ideological terms: how far are the parties from each other in the ideological space and how ideologically coherent are they within.

The AP approach also defines polarization by the distance between and coherence within parties. However, in the AP framework, these attributes derive from direct attitudes towards the parties. One side of the equation is the in-party evaluation: how favourable is the partisan towards her own party. The second element is out-party evaluation(s): how negative is the partisan towards the competing party/parties. Thus, instead of ideological dimensions, we have to consider the affective ones, with the extremes of the continuum being a very negative and a very positive feeling towards the party. The centre-point of the dimension represents an indifferent or neutral perception. AP is present when the attitudes towards the in- and out-parties are on different sides of the neutral point, and the closer the evaluations are to the extremes of the affective spectrum, the higher is the degree of AP.

Figure 2.1 illustrates this compatibility between the two types of polarization in a hypothetical party system with two parties and two ideological dimensions.The left panel of Figure 2.1 depicts the ideological distance between economically right-conservative Party A and left-liberal Party B. The right side of Figure 2.1 illustrates the affective distance between the parties, defined by the like-dislike evaluations of the party supporters. The x-axis is based on the attitudes towards Party A, ranging from very negative to very positive, while the feelings towards Party B are on the y-axis. In line with the ideological placement of the two parties, the supporters of Party A are highly positive about their own party, while showing negative affect for Party B, and vice versa. Thus, Figure 2.1 demonstrates that AP can be presented as a spatial phenomenon, similarly to IP.

In Figure 2.1, the affective distance between the parties is defined by party supporters' attitudes. This relates to a frequently used distinction between the supply and the demand side of party systems and polarization. Supply-side polarization refers to distances between the political parties on the elite level, while demand-side polarization reflects the divergence among the electorate (Kriesi et al. 2006; Pardos-Prado & Dinas 2010). If the concept of IP has often been applied to both sides of the electoral competition, then AP has in the current literature always been considered as a demand-side phenomenon – that is, it has been measured via the attitudes of party supporters. Conceptually, AP is applicable also to the supply side of the party competition; however, there is very little data available which allows

an empirical study of the concept at the elite level. Accordingly, in the following theoretical and empirical sections, AP will be treated as a demand-side phenomenon.



Figure 2.1. Spatial representation of ideological and affective distance.

The concept of political polarization is often discussed with regard to its normative implications. Although the negative consequences of AP, such as legislative gridlock, are most visible on the elite level, demand-side AP can also have highly adverse effects on public policy outcomes and even people's daily lives. Hetherington and Rudolph (2015) demonstrate that the more negative feelings partisans have towards the out-party, the more reluctant they are to support any policies initiated by the government led by that party. Politicians in the United States have been shown to be fairly responsive to their constituents: if consensus develops among Democrat and Republican voters, legislative productivity increases; conversely, if dissensus and negative partisanship prevail among the electorate, the opposition party elites will do everything to block the initiatives of the government, leading to gridlock (Hetherington & Rudolph 2015: 3–4, 142–143). This affective responsiveness also manifests itself in harsh rhetoric between party elites, reinforcing the negative spiral even more (Iyengar & Krupenkin 2018: 215). Thus, an affectively polarized mass public can become a force that boosts conflict on the elite level, even if the initial polarizing messages originated from the elite itself (Hetherington & Rudolph 2015: 6). Moreover, the negative consequences of AP are not limited to the political sphere and can directly affect people's daily lives by inducing discrimination in other sectors of society, such as the job market.

Although current literature has considered the consequences of AP only in a presidential two-party system, I believe it could also help to better understand the role of polarization in a parliamentary multiparty context. In fragmented systems, parties usually need to form coalitions in order to assemble governments, which can prove very difficult if hostility and distrust exists between parties/partisans (Warwick 1994: 3). Studies of coalition patterns in multiparty systems have shown that sheer ideological distance – although being an important determinant – cannot fully explain the (un)willingness of political parties to cooperate with each other (Budge & Laver 1992). In some cases, parties are prepared to form coalitions across cleavages, while rejecting cooperation with ideological 'neighbours'; a vivid example is Ireland, where the two main centre-right parties have never agreed to govern together due to deep partisan hostility that dates back to the Irish Civil War in the 1920s (Laver 1992). In many contemporary European party systems, the right-populist parties invoke the highest degree of negative emotions among the public (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2018: 1685), whereas on the ideological dimensions, people often do not place these parties to the most extreme positions (De Angelis 2017). As we have witnessed in several countries, even the mainstream right-conservative parties are reluctant to form coalitions with the right-populists, which in some cases has led to arduous government formation processes and grand coalitions across the left-right division. It appears that in multiparty systems, party elites respond to high AP among their constituents with an unwillingness to form coalitions with loathed out-parties. Thus, high AP in a multiparty system can make it very difficult to form functional governments.

Based on the preceding discussion, I find that the concept of AP fits well into the wider framework of political polarization. AP can be presented in spatial terms, it is compatible with the supply-demand distinction and is likely to be relevant in both two- and multiparty systems. The central difference between the affect-based approach and the ideological paradigm is that IP derives from diverging positions taken by the parties and party supporters with regard to ideological issues and dimensions,whereas AP is determined by direct attitudes towards specific parties. Thus,a high level of IP does not necessarily signify animosity between the polarized parties, but it can form the basis for it (Persily 2015: 6–7). AP, on the other hand, indicates the interparty hostility directly, without saying anything about its basis (Lelkes 2016: 401). IP and AP could, therefore, be considered complementary to each other, and the exact relationship between the two should be determined empirically.

2.3 Measuring affective polarization in multiparty systems

To fulfil the first aim of this chapter – comparing the levels of AP cross-nationally – I need a measure that can appropriately estimate party system level AP also in multiparty context. To the best of my knowledge, no AP index exists yet, probably because the literature has hitherto focused on the American party system, where measuring AP is methodologically quite simple. The American National Election Studies (ANES) survey includes a question where respondents are asked to evaluate the political parties on a thermometer scale from 0 to 100 degrees where 0° means the most negative attitude towards the party, 50° signifies a neutral stance and 100° equals to the most positive rating. As the two groups are considered equal in their relative importance, the results are not weighted: AP is the average inparty/out-party evaluation difference among Republicans and Democrats (Iyengar et al. 2012; Webster & Abramowitz 2017).

However, in European multiparty systems, there are usually more than two relevant parties and, due to greater variation in party vote shares, the relative importance of each party is more uneven compared to the United States. To obtain an accurate estimation of party system AP, it should not be overlooked that vast distances between sizable parties signify greater polarization from the perspective of the whole system compared to when similar distances are present between smaller fringe parties (Dalton 2008: 906). Thus, to conduct a valid cross-national comparison of AP, it is necessary to: (a) include the in-party and out-party evaluations of the supporters of all the relevant parties (and towards all the relevant parties); and (b) account for the size of the parties.

To fulfil these conditions, I have conducted the Affective Polarization Index (API) that indicates the average divergence of partisan affective evaluations between in-party and out-parties, weighted by the electoral size (vote share) of the parties.[22] To make the computing procedure easier to follow, I explain the calculation of API in two steps, before presenting the full equation.

In the first step I calculate the AP score for each partisan group (i.e., supporters of a party) by subtracting the average evaluations towards out-parties from the average in-party evaluation. The in-party/out-party subtractions will be weighted with the vote shares of the out-parties and then summed up. Therefore, in a party system with N relevant parties, the relative AP of every party is:

[22] I thank Simon Skipka for his advice on how to properly write down the index equation.

$$\mathrm{AP}_n = \sum_{\substack{m=1 \\ m \neq n}}^{N} \left[(Like_n - Like_m) \times \left(\frac{Vote\ share_m}{1 - Vote\ share_n} \right) \right]$$

'Like' signifies the attitude towards the party, corresponding to the previously described thermometer ratings; 'n' denotes the in-party; and 'm' refers to the out-party. The '1 – vote share' is necessary to exclude the in-party vote share from this part of the calculation, so the combined vote shares of the out-parties would equal 100 per cent. In the second step, I weight these party AP scores with the vote shares of the respective party ($\mathrm{Party_n}$) and sum all the scores up to get the weighted average which is the affective polarization index:

$$\mathrm{API} = \sum_{\mathrm{n}=1}^{\mathrm{N}} (\mathrm{AP_n} \times \mathrm{Vote\ share_{n)}}$$

The complete API formula is therefore:

$$\mathrm{API} = \sum_{\mathrm{n}=1}^{\mathrm{N}} \left[\sum_{\substack{\mathrm{m}=1 \\ \mathrm{m} \neq \mathrm{n}}}^{\mathrm{N}} \left((\mathrm{Like_n} - \mathrm{Like_m}) \times \left(\frac{\mathrm{Vote\ share_m}}{1 - \mathrm{Vote\ share_n}} \right) \right) \times \mathrm{Vote\ share_n} \right]$$

It must be noted that API leaves out a substantial part of the electorate: non-partisans (i.e., the people who do not identify with any political party). However, I find this unavoidable[23] as affective attitudes can only be measured in relation to specific groups. It would be possible to extract the attitudes of non-partisans towards all the parties, but not vice versa. Therefore, I will proceed with the index that accounts for only the respondents who have partisan identity. To minimise the amount of people who are excluded from index calculations, I use a lenient way to define partisanship, also including the so-called 'leaners' (Petrocik 2009). The data used to calculate API in this chapter and some other technical details will be explained in the data and variable operationalization section.

[23] When this chapter got published as an article, I was not yet aware of the spread-of-scores method, which is why I do not elaborate here that it is actually possible to estimate AP also without defining the in-party. See Chapter 1 for the comparison of the two conceptualization and measurement approaches.

2.4 The linkage between ideological and affective polarization

The second aim of this chapter is to explore the relationship between ideological and affective polarization among European countries. From the current American literature, two general conclusions about the IP-AP relationship can be drawn. First, AP and IP are not congruent as AP is much more intense. Although the ideological distance between Democrats and Republicans has increased over the last decades, the majority of partisans are still ideologically centrist or just slightly leaning to either side of the liberal-conservative continuum (Lelkes 2016; Webster & Abramowitz 2017). As for AP, on the other hand, more than half of the partisans evaluate the opposing party on the feelings thermometer with a rating of less than 30 out of 100, while giving over 70 to one's own party (Hetherington &Rudolph 2015: 16, 31). Clearly, the distance between the parties, as illustrated in Figure 2.1, is greater on affective dimensions compared to ideological ones. Second, despite this incongruence, high IP does increase AP. The relative strength of this linkage varies, probably due to slight differences in the studied time periods, the way ideology is operationalized and exact model specifications, but all the authors who have studied it have found a statistically significant positive relationship between IP and AP (Iyengar et al. 2012; Mason 2015; Rogowski & Sutherland 2016; Webster & Abramowitz 2017). These results confirm that partisans who hold more extreme policy positions are, on average, affectively more polarized. Also, if party candidates are perceived to be more distant from each other, it increases AP (Rogowski & Sutherland 2016).

Although these two observations about the IP-AP relationship in the United States are not mutually exclusive, some authors strongly emphasise one over the other, leading them to tie AP to different theoretical underpinnings. The scholars that highlight the incongruence between IP and AP perceive partisanship as a social identity and draw insights from social identity theory (Iyengar et al. 2012).This relates to the classic work of Campbell et al. (1960), who demonstrated that the American voter is ideologically rather unstructured and the connection with a party is more emotional than rational (Mason 2015). Accordingly, these authors downplay the IP-AP relationship and describe AP as predominantly driven by the heightened sense of group competition among partisans, which is fuelled by increasingly negative and long-lasting political campaigns (Iyengar et al. 2012), and developments in the media environment that have occurred in the era of broadband internet (Lelkes et al. 2017; Hetherington & Rudolph 2015). The alternative approach emphasises the finding that IP is related to AP. Theoretically, this account builds on Downs (1957), who modelled voters as

ideologically motivated rational actors. In the case of high IP, partisans perceive the stakes in political competition to be higher and respond by developing affectively polarized views on parties/candidates (Rogowski & Sutherland 2016: 486). As such, AP among the partisans in the United States can be considered to have a strong rational basis (Webster & Abramowitz 2017: 643). However, just as the scholars relying on the social identity theory are not denying that IP has an effect on AP, Webster and Abramowitz (2017: 635) also concede that there is a 'tribal' element in partisan feelings and AP cannot be perceived as a completely rational phenomenon.

Insights from the American literature, therefore, suggest that there is a partial connection between IP and AP. However, these studies are limited to just one country and focus on the individual level, whereas my aim is to map the IP-AP relationship cross-nationally. To generalise, we can expect four different combinations: high IP/high AP; low IP/low AP; high IP/low AP and low IP/high AP. Traditionally, European politics have been structured by deep underlying cleavages, making ideology important to both elites and partisans, while partisanship in the United States has been characterised by less ideological constraint (Richardson 1991: 753–754; Hetherington & Rudolph 2015: 55). Although the importance of traditional cleavages has declined in European politics during the last decades (Kriesi et al. 2006), it is still reasonable to expect that many countries are placed in either the low IP/low AP or high IP/high AP quadrants, indicating that AP is significantly related to IP in Europe. Considering the previously described findings from the American literature, then in comparison with the European countries, I presume the United States to be located in the low IP/high AP category. It is possible that some European countries also deviate from the low IP/low AP-high IP/high AP diagonal. I find it likely that some ideologically less structured postcommunist democracies could be placed in the same low IP/high AP category as (presumably) the United States. It is not surprising that strong negativity towards out-parties is evident in this region (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2018: 1684), but it is unknown whether this is accompanied by positive in-party attitudes, which is also a presumption of high AP. Conversely, in some countries, ideological distance might not coincide with a negative partisan affect. It should be especially probable in consociational democracies (see Lijphart 1969), where parties often form coalitions across ideological divisions. Such coalitions could curb the negative partisan affect, even if parties and partisans remain

ideologically distant (Westwood et al. 2018).[24] These countries could, then, reside in the high IP/low AP sector. Thus, I find it possible that all four IP-AP combinations are present in Europe.

Regarding IP, defining the relevant dimension(s) of conflict is slightly more complicated than it is for AP, especially in a cross-national context. Since Downs (1957), the most commonly used basis for cross-national comparisons has been the left-right continuum. As Mair (2007) demonstrates, it has broad acceptability among voters and parties in both Western European and postcommunist Central Eastern European countries. This does not imply that the left-right division has an identical issue and cleavage basis across countries, but rather that it captures whatever are the main conflicts within the political system (Inglehart 1990; Dalton 2008). Thus, I will consider IP in the party system to be higher, the more parties are distant from each other on the left-right dimension, while acknowledging some limitations of this approach, which will be discussed in the empirical section of this chapter. It is important to clarify that parties are defined both on the supply and demand sides. This means that in addition to parties being polarized on the elite level, party supporters are supposed to be aligned with their party ideologically – that is, the supporters of left-wing parties place themselves on the left side of the spectrum, and right-wing party supporters to the right (regarding the importance of partisan-ideological alignment, see Mason 2015). This consideration will be revisited in the variable operationalization section.

Based on the preceding discussion, my central assumption is that ideologically more polarized party systems have, on average, higher partisan AP. However, I do not expect the correlation to be perfect and find it likely that a number of cases will diverge by either exhibiting high AP even in ideologically non-polarized settings or moderate partisan feelings despite high IP. Although this study is exploratory and does not test specific hypotheses, I hope that the results presented in the next sections will help to advance both empirical and theoretical understandings of the determinants of AP.

[24] As discussed in the conceptualisation section, forming such coalitions already presupposes a certain level of trust between partisans, so the direction of causation can work both ways.

2.5 Data and variable operationalization

My empirical analysis relies on data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES).[25] I have included all European countries that are considered to be electoral democracies[26] and for which data is available. Unfortunately, the data coverage of CSES is rather sporadic. Many European democracies are not part of the project, and some countries have participated in the survey only once, whereas for others there is data for several elections. Moreover, there were differences in the way partisan identity question were administered in the first two waves of CSES compared to the third and fourth module. Therefore, to ensure that my comparisons are valid, I only use data from the third and fourth wave. The final sample includes 22 European countries (and the United States) and 38 elections, covering a time period from 2005 to 2016. I only included parliamentary election data, as I use party vote shares to calculate AP and IP measures. Thus, presidential elections are not suitable because the votes are attributed to candidates, and not directly to parties.

To measure AP, I divide respondents into partisan groups using survey questions about whether they feel closer to one party compared to the others, and if 'yes', then which party that is. The partisan groups also include 'leaners' – that is, the respondents who initially answered that they are not close to any party, but then answered affirmatively to the follow-up question of whether they at least feel 'a little closer' to one political party compared to others. Several countries and elections had to be dropped from the sample because their questionnaires did not include the partisan identity follow-up question, resulting in much smaller partisan groups.

To capture the partisan affect, I use the following question in the CSES survey:

'I'd like to know what you think about each of our political parties. After I read the name of a political party, please rate it on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you strongly dislike that party and 10 means that you strongly like that party.'

I compile the average like-dislike scores of each partisan group towards their own and all the competing parties into a data matrix, where each row indicates the like-dislike scores a respective partisan group has assigned to every party and each column, correspondingly, consists of the evaluations a respective party has received from every partisan group. The

[25] Data can be downloaded from: www.cses.org
[26] Based on the Freedom in the World report by Freedom House (https://freedomhouse.org/)

diagonal axis of the like-dislike matrix indicates the in-party evaluations, while all other cells consist of out-party evaluations. All country like-dislike matrices are displayed in Appendix A1.

I then use the previously presented API equation to calculate the degree of AP in each country after each election.[27] Party vote shares are calculated in decimals (e.g., 40% = 0.4) and the like-dislike scale goes from 0 to 10; thus, the API scores can theoretically range from –10 to +10. However, scores that remain below 0 would indicate that partisans' out-party evaluations are higher than in-party evaluations. Such 'reversed' AP would not correspond to the theoretical expectations or previous findings. Therefore, I assume that the actual API scores will be above 0 and the higher the score, the greater the degree of AP.

To measure ideological (left-right) polarization, I use the Party Polarization Index developed by Dalton (2008), but in a slightly adjusted version that fits the aims of this chapter better. Dalton's index captures the dispersion of party placements around the mean left-right position of the system, weighted by the vote share of each party. The index equation is:

$$\text{Party Polarisation Index} = \sqrt{\left\{\sum(\text{Party vote share}_i) \times \left(\frac{[\text{Party LR score}_i - \text{Party system average LR score}]}{5}\right)^2\right\}}$$

The index measures IP on the supply side, although via public perceptions: party left-right placements are determined by the average score the survey respondents have assigned to parties. I find such an approach suitable for my purposes, as also the dependent variable – AP – is based on voter attitudes/perceptions.

As mentioned previously, I define IP on both the supply and demand sides. Therefore, I also calculate the demand-side Dalton's index, based on the average left-right self-placements of party supporters. The final ideological polarization index (IPI) used in the IP-AP models in the empirical section is the average of the supply and demand side measures: $IPI = (IPI_{supply} + IPI_{demand})/2$. For a more detailed explanation of measuring IP in this chapter, see Appendix A2.

[27] The aggregate vote share of the included parties varies between 84 and 100 per cent because in some countries there are many small non-parliamentary parties that together gather a considerable vote percentage. To ensure better comparability of the index scores across countries, I normalised party vote shares for both AP and IP calculations (e.g., if a party got 30 per cent of the votes and the aggregate vote share of the parties included in the survey is 90 per cent, then the relative vote share is 30/90 * 100 = 33.33%).

2.6 Results

2.6.1 Levels of affective polarization in Europe and the United States

The levels of AP in European countries and the United States, as measured by the API, are presented in Table 2.1. The first important revelation is that intense AP is highly present in European party systems, and the United States is far from being at the head of the pack. This is a remarkable result, considering that in the United States the level of AP is unequivocally considered to be very high. Within Europe, significant regional differences come to the fore. The average API score exceeds 5 in the Central Eastern European (CEE) and Southern European (SE) regions, while none of the Northwestern European (NWE) countries reaches the score of 5 and the average is barely above 4. Table 2.1 demonstrates that even the most affectively polarized NWE countries rank lower than the least polarized ones from CEE and SE, with the exception of Great Britain where the API score narrowly exceeds one CEE country (Estonia). The United States is situated in-between the two cohorts, as the average API score is higher than the NWE average due to a notable increase between 2008 and 2012, but remains far below most CEE and SE countries.

The finding that CEE and SE countries exhibit very high levels of AP might not seem particularly striking at first sight. These regions are known for their general distrust towards political parties (Rose 2009; Ignazi 2017) and negative like-dislike evaluations are to be expected. However, the results presented here show something other than a uniform pattern of dislike and rejection. The country like-dislike matrices (see Appendix A1) in CEE and SE countries demonstrate that partisans are actually highly positive towards their own party. This is slightly surprising considering the high electoral volatility in these regions, as it could take time before partisans develop a strong positive affect towards new parties. Moreover, the attitudes towards out-parties are clearly differentiated: some receive extremely low evaluations, while others are perceived with moderate dislike or even positively. This suggests that there is a more elaborate affective structure evident in CEE and SE countries than just general dislike towards political parties.

Table 2.1 also reveals substantial variation within the regions and some notable temporal movements in single countries. In CEE, there are countries with rather average levels of AP, such as Estonia, Latvia and Croatia, but also party systems that are affectively extremely polarized, the most outstanding example being Bulgaria with the API score of 6.68. Among the NWE group, variance is substantially smaller, as most countries remain in the

Table 2.1. Affective Polarization Index score by country

Country	Time 1	Time 2	Time 3	Average	Change
Bulgaria (2014)	-	-	6.68	**6.68**	
Portugal (2009,2015)	-	4.72	6.14	**5.43**	1.42
Czech Rep. (2006,2010,2013)	5.63	5.25	5.23	**5.37**	-0.40
Slovakia (2010,2016)	-	5.14	5.38	**5.26**	0.24
Montenegro (2012)	-	5.25	-	**5.25**	
Spain (2008)	5.02	-	-	**5.02**	
Greece (2009, 2012)	-	4.54	5.45	**5.00**	0.91
Serbia (2012)	-	4.89	-	**4.89**	
Poland (2005,2007,2011)	4.37	4.73	5.22	**4.78**	0.85
Croatia (2007)	4.54	-	-	**4.54**	
Latvia (2010)	-	4.50	-	**4.50**	
Great Britain (2015)	-	-	4.48	**4.48**	
Estonia (2011)	-	4.46	-	**4.46**	
France (2007)	4.45	-	-	**4.45**	
United States (2008,2012)	3.97	4.80		**4.38**	0.83
Sweden (2006,2014)	4.17	-	4.36	**4.27**	0.19
Denmark (2007)	4.24	-	-	**4.24**	
Switzerland (2011)	-	4.10	-	**4.10**	
Austria (2008)	4.10	-	-	**4.10**	
Germany (2005,2009,2013)	4.25	3.80	4.10	**4.05**	-0.15
Finland (2007,2011,2015)	3.67	4.02	3.88	**3.86**	0.21
Iceland (2007,2009)	3.81	3.85	-	**3.83**	0.04
Netherlands (2006,2010)	2.69	2.83	-	**2.76**	0.14
Southern Europe (SE)				**5.15**	
Northwestern Europe (NWE)				**4.01**	
Central Eastern Europe (CEE)				**5.09**	
N	12	15	11	**4.60**[a]	

Notes: The exact years of the election after which API calculations were made are listed in the brackets after the country's name, in respective order. [a] Average of the whole sample and the regional averages are weighted by country to take into account that the number of API scores varies from one to three among countries.
Sources: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems database, Module III and Module IV; author's own calculations.

interval between 3.8 and 4.5. The sole exception here is the Netherlands, which is by far the least affectively polarized party system in this sample with API values under 3 in both 2006 and 2010 elections. In all three SE countries included in this study, the average API scores remain between 5 and 5.4. However, Table 2.1 displays some interesting temporal variations in Greece and Portugal: the rather average API scores in 2009 (4.54 and 4.72, respectively),

increased to 5.45 in Greece by 2012 and 6.14 in Portugal by 2015.[28] A comparably steep surge in AP is recorded in Poland between 2005 and 2011. These dynamics will be discussed more thoroughly in the next subsection in conjunction with the changes in IP.

API indicates the average weighted difference between the two central components: in- and out-party evaluations. In the extant literature on AP, more attention has been dedicated to out-party evaluations as the more intriguing part of the equation. The cross-national variation in the level of AP in Europe is also – similar to the temporal increase in the United States – mostly driven by out-party hostility as the out-party evaluations vary much more significantly than in-party feelings. Table 2.2 demonstrates that the average weighted out-party rating in NWE countries is almost 4 out of 10, which could be considered as only a moderate dislike. In CEE, the same indicator is barely over 3 and in SE only 2.74, signifying a much more intense out-party rejection. In the United States, the average outparty evaluation over two elections is higher than in CEE and SE (3.33). Meanwhile, the average in-party evaluation is around 8 out of 10 in all three European regions, while being slightly lower in the United States (7.72). At the country level, there is almost twice as much variation in the weighted average out-party evaluations compared to the in-party attitudes. The former ranges from 2.05 (Bulgaria in 2014) to 5.20 (Netherlands in 2006), with the standard deviation of 0.73, while the latter extends from 7.31 (Spain in 2008) to 8.94 (Portugal in 2015), with the standard deviation of 0.41 (see Appendix A3 for these indicators per country and election). Interestingly, it seems that the high level of general distrust towards political parties in CEE and SE countries has no bearing on the in-party evaluation. Across the country sample, there is no correlation between the average in-party and out-party evaluations, suggesting that the two parts of the API equation could be influenced by separate factors.

A glimpse at the partisan like-dislike matrices reveals that the 'fear and loathing' between the Democrats and the Republicans is nothing outstanding compared to the partisan animosity evident in several European countries. In 2012, the average Republican rating to the Democratic Party was 2.91 out of 10, and Democrats 'retaliated' with 3.09. In five European countries in this sample (Bulgaria, Greece, Spain, Montenegro and Poland), the average weighted out-party evaluation is significantly lower. However, the average accounts for all out-party evaluations, also including some more positive ratings. Attitudes between specific parties are often much more extreme. For example, after the 2012 Greek elections, the right-conservative ND party supporters rated the main competitor, left-radical Syriza, with 1.38,

[28] Unfortunately, newer data on Spain is not available, but it would not be surprising to see similar developments there.

while Syriza partisans assigned 1.61 to ND. Such numbers are shattering, considering that these were and are the two biggest political parties in Greece that together gathered almost 60 per cent of the vote. Yet, this seems rather 'moderate' in comparison to Bulgaria, where the supporters of dominant right-wing party, GERB, evaluate the second and third biggest parties with 1.06 and 0.53, respectively. The capacity of this chapter does not allow the description of many other examples of similar inter-party hostility, but the essence of the results is clear: 'fear and loathing across party lines' is definitely evident in European party systems.

Table 2.2. Average in- and out party evaluations, partisan and voter turnout percentages by region

Region	N of countries	Average in-party evaluation[a]	Average out-party evaluation[b]	% of partisans[c]	Voter turnout %
Northwestern Europe	10	8.00	3.98	74.3	72.8
Central Eastern Europe	9	8.21	3.13	57.6	59.4
Southern Europe	3	7.89	2.74	62.9	66.1
United States	1	7.72	3.33	81.7	56.6

Notes: Average in- and out-party evaluations are on a scale from 0 to 10. [a] Average weighted (i.e., accounting for party size) in-party evaluation of the region, also weighted by country to take into account the fact that the number of scores included from one country varies from 1 to 3 (see Table 2.1). [b] Average weighted out-party evaluation of the region, also weighted by country. [c] Including 'leaners'.
Sources: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Module III and Module IV; author's own calculations.

Before proceeding with the analysis, I want to address the previously mentioned caveat of API not accounting for the non-partisans in the electorate. As we see from Table 2.2, in NWE countries, 74.3 per cent of the respondents claimed to feel at least somewhat closer to one political party than the others, while in SE the percentage is 62.9 and in CEE 57.6. In the United States, the average partisan percentage is 81.7, but it is not the highest amount in the whole sample (see Appendix A3). Although the differences are significant, I find them not to be as vast as to disallow meaningful comparisons regarding AP. Moreover, in Europe, the partisan percentage aligns closely with the average voter turnout of the region. It looks as if in CEE and SE countries the percentage of people who are involved in electoral politics by supporting a party or at least taking part in elections is just lower. The people who have

chosen a party, however, possess intense partisan feelings. I find it likely that this has – similar to what has been found in the United States – significant consequences for the functioning of the party system and society at large. Therefore, I believe that the cross-national/regional and temporal variations presented in this section merit further attention and explanations. The next section will provide first steps in this endeavour.

2.6.2 Affective polarization and ideological polarization: Related, but not the same

In this section, I analyse the IP-AP relationship on the party-system level. IPI scores confirm the continuing importance of the left-right dimension in European party systems as parties are clearly divided on left-right basis in most of the countries (see Appendix A3). Also, party supporters are ideologically well-aligned with their party, indicated by their average left-right self-placements.[29] To untangle the relationship between IP and AP, I first plot all the IP and AP index scores against each other to get an overview of the distribution of countries into the previously outlined four IP-AP categories and to detect some time trends (Figure 2.2). Subsequently, to account for the fact that the number of elections per country is uneven in the sample, I plot the country average IPI-API scores to give a more accurate estimation of the linear relationship between the two (Figure 2.3).

Figure 2.2 displays a weak statistically not significant relationship between the two manifestations of polarization ($R^2 = 0.1$). Regarding the possible IP-AP combinations, we see that all the quadrants on Figure 2.2 are populated. The three SE countries are conveniently in the high IP/high AP group, although in 2009 Greece and Portugal were placed close to the mean value on both axes. From CEE, Czech Republic and Bulgaria also clearly belong to the same group. In the other end of the diagonal we see, somewhat surprisingly, the United States after the 2008 election. From the European cases, Germany is the best example of low IP/low AP, and Finland has by 2015 also moved into this group. Looking at the quadrants where IP and AP are not in accordance, Montenegro and Serbia constitute the perfect cases of ideologically centrist (or just unstructured) party systems that are affectively highly polarized. By 2012, the United States has also moved into the low IP/high AP group, as could have been expected based on the existing literature. It should be considered, though, that in the United

[29] The demand and supply side IPs are strongly, but not perfectly correlated to each other ($R^2 = 0.84$).

States, IP is better captured by the notions 'liberal' and 'conservative', but even on this scale it would be lower compared to most European countries.[30] By 2011, Poland can also be found in this quadrant. From the high IP/low AP sector, we do not find ideal-type cases, although several countries are slightly above sample average in IP and marginally below the AP mean point. Switzerland in 2011 and Sweden in 2006 constitute the most definite cases of high IP/low AP, but Sweden has moved towards the centre on both axes by 2014. Finally, the party system closest to the 'normative ideal' of moderate IP/low AP that was envisaged in the introduction to this chapter is definitely the Netherlands. The cases of Switzerland and the Netherlands concur with the previously outlined prediction that in consociational democracies, ideological distances are not necessarily accompanied by negative partisan feelings.



Figure 2.2. Affective polarization as a function of ideological polarization. Notes: The cross-cutting dotted lines indicate the sample arithmetic mean of left-right polarization (x-axis) and affective polarization (y-axis), weighted by country to take into account the fact that the number of included elections varies from 1 to 3 among countries.

[30] Relying on the statistics from ANES, presented by Webster and Abramowitz (2017).

The three arrows on Figure 2.2 pinpoint the temporal dynamics in three previously mentioned noteworthy cases: Greece, Portugal and Poland. We can see temporal covariation in two different directions (IP ↑ – AP ↑ and IP ↓ – AP ↑). The two arrows with a direction from left to right indicate a sharp increase in IP that coincides with a comparably large rise in the level of AP in Greece and Portugal. Also, the partisan like-dislike matrices of Greece and Portugal (see Appendix A1) reveal an increased animosity that runs mostly along ideological lines as the left-wing anti-austerity and right-wing pro-austerity parties show very negative attitudes towards each other. These developments are likely to be the consequences of the economic, financial and political crises that have ravaged these countries. It seems that the crises have emphasised and increased the ideological differences between the parties which, in turn, has intensified partisan feelings. In Greece, the hike in polarization levels can also be attributed to the significant changes in party vote shares: supporters of the left-radical Syriza had strong negative feelings about the main right-wing party (ND) already in 2009, and vice versa, but by 2012, the vote share of Syriza had risen from 5 to 27 per cent, which means that the weight of the party in polarization index calculations has increased more than fivefold. Regarding Poland, conversely, we see that a substantial increase in the level of AP coincides with a notable decrease in IP. That is probably the case because the central conflict in the Polish party system is not so much (anymore) on the left-right axis, but rather between pro-Western modernism, represented by the Civic Platform (PO), and traditional Catholic and national values, represented by Law and Justice (PiS) party (Szczerbiak 2011). Partisan like-dislike matrices confirm that the upsurge of AP in Poland, indeed, derives from the sharply increased animosity between these two parties that have dominated the Polish political system since 2005.

Before proceeding with the analysis, it should be addressed that there are two obvious outliers in terms of IP: Montenegro and Serbia. As already discussed, both exhibit very low levels of IP, being the only European countries with Dalton index values under 2. The average perceived left-right placement of almost all Serbian and Montenegrin parties remains between 4 and 6 (on a scale from 0 to 10), and high standard deviations of the perceived placements suggest that respondents do not have a clear idea of how the parties are placed on the left-right dimension. The same applies to partisan self-placements. Montenegro and Serbia have the shortest independent democratic experience among the countries in this sample and it seems that the party systems have not aligned on the left-right axis, or at least voters have very little knowledge of it. Also, the case of United States is problematic due to the previously mentioned issue of ‘left’ and ‘right’ not being so widely used notions there. To avoid

distorting the results, I will drop these three cases (Montenegro, Serbia and the United States) from further analysis.



Figure 2.3. Affective polarization as a function of ideological polarization, without Montenegro, Serbia and the United States, and with country average API and IPI scores.

Figure 2.3 presents the IP-AP plot without these outliers and with country average scores, so each country is represented as one case. Addressing these issues changes the results dramatically: the R^2 leaps from 0.10 to 0.25.[31] The effect size is now statistically significant and also considerable in substantive terms: a one-point increase in IPI corresponds with a 0.57 point rise in API. However, I remain cautious regarding the exact strength of the IP-AP relationship on the party system level as the effect size is highly contingent on two extreme cases. In addition to the three countries that were already removed, the Netherlands (very low level of AP) and Bulgaria (very high level of AP) also exert a strong influence on the results. Removing the Netherlands would increase the R^2 above 0.3, whereas removing Bulgaria would decrease it below 0.15 (removing both leaves the R^2 at around 0.2). Nevertheless, the

[31] The change is almost completely accountable to the deletion of the three outliers, the effect of using country averages is negligible.

relationship is always positive and the distribution of countries below and above the regression line remains the same: the IP model consistently under-predicts AP in CEE and (slightly less) SE countries, while over-predicting it in NWE. The only exceptions to this rule are Croatia and Great Britain as they deviate from their group by being placed below and above the regression line, respectively.

The IP-AP connection becomes more evident in party-level data, especially in NWE and SE, and somewhat less in CEE countries. The average partisan attitudes are often clearly in line with left-right distances. For example, consider Germany in 2013, where the supporters of the right-conservative CDU/CSU assign an average score of 5.26 (out of 10) to their main rival, the centre-left SPD. The Green party that is further to the left, gets a rating of 3.80, and the party closest to the left extreme (Linke) is evaluated with 2.18. Similar left-right proximity logic applies to many other countries and parties (see Appendix A1). This seems to confirm an intuitively logical assumption that an ideological dimension/issue must be salient in the party system to have an effect on partisan feelings.

On the party system level we have by now established that if only the countries where the left-right dimension has at least some importance are included, there is a consistent positive relationship between IP and AP. However, regardless of the exact country sample, the IP model leaves most of the variation in AP unexplained. At this point, the limitations of the left-right dimension in the context of current European party competition should be discussed. Several studies have revealed the emergence of a 'transnational' cleavage (Hooghe & Marks 2018) that in some countries cross-cuts the left-right dimension and divides parties into a mainstream bloc, including traditional socialist, conservative and liberal parties, and a challenger bloc, consisting of radical, populist and anti-establishment parties (De Angelis 2017). It seems reasonable to hypothesise that polarization on that dimension explains a substantial part of the remaining variation in API scores. Yet, the placement of countries in Figure 2.3 does not support this assumption: the NWE countries where we have seen an increased conflict on transnational issues such as European integration and immigration, and the rise of populist Eurosceptic parties, are below the regression line, meaning that AP in these countries is lower than the left-right polarization predicts. Conversely, the CEE countries that are consistently placed above the prediction line have been found to be less polarized on such issues (Hobolt & Spoon 2012). If polarization on the alternative dimension would tap into the part of AP that is left unexplained by left-right polarization, the situation should be the

opposite. Thus, it appears that at least on the party system level, adding other ideological dimension(s) into the model would not increase the IP-AP correlation in this set of countries.[32]

This is not to claim that polarization on the issues pertaining to a transnational cleavage is unrelated to the partisan affect. Again, party-level data can be utilised to reveal this connection. Partisan like-dislike matrices demonstrate that right-populist parties clearly stand out in otherwise affectively rather moderate NWE countries. Be it PVV in the Netherlands, SD in Sweden, SVP in Switzerland and so on: all of these parties are most intensely disliked by the supporters of many other parties. It is very likely that this is due to the rigid stances the right-populist parties exhibit on issues like immigration, European integration and Islam, and these positions are not fully captured by my one-dimensional approach as the average left-right placements assigned to these parties are usually not extremely rightist.[33] Interestingly, AP on the 'populist-mainstream' party conflict dimension is highly asymmetric as the supporters of other parties are much more hostile towards the populist parties, than vice versa. For example, in the Netherlands in 2010, the right-populist PVV is perceived very negatively by other partisans: right-liberal VVD supporters evaluate PVV with 3.29 (out of 10), centre-left PvdA partisans with 2.03, social-liberal D66 with 1.64 and Green Left party supporters with 1.3. PVV supporters, on the other hand, give 5.51 to VVD, 4.2 to PvdA, 5.02 to D66 and 4.41 to Green Left. Moreover, the in-party evaluations of PVV partisans are very low (6.83) compared to the supporters of other parties. Such affective asymmetry is taming the level of AP in NWE countries. In sum, this cross-national analysis reaches a similar conclusion as the individual-level studies conducted in the United States: IP and AP are related to each other, but a substantial part of the variation in AP remains unexplained by IP, regardless of how ideology is operationalized.

2.7 Discussion

The results presented in this chapter reveal that affective polarization is very acutely present in European multiparty systems. The 'fear and loathing' Iyengar and Westwood (2015) observe between the Democrats and the Republicans is not merely evident in Europe, but in many cases even more intense compared to the United States. If partisans evaluate another

[32] Regarding the cases of Poland and Great Britain, I believe that polarization on transnational dimension issues such as European integration could hint why they reside above the IP-AP regression line on Figure 2.3.
[33] E.g. the average placement of SD in Sweden in 2014 is 7.2; PVV in the Netherlands in 2010 is 7.8.

party with 0 or 1 on a scale from 0 to 10, that clearly indicates strong animosity, or even hatred. As the country like-dislike matrices reveal, there are many partisan groups whose average evaluation towards some other parties remains under 2 and even under 1. Thus, we are not talking about a few especially militant partisans, but about whole groups who are, on average, extremely hostile towards other parties. The consequences such systematic loathing could have to the functioning of European party systems and societies constitute a promising avenue for future research.

As for the foundations of AP, the results suggest that ideological differences offer only a partial explanation as the majority of cross-national variation remains unexplained. Although IP and AP are in positive correlation as expected, we can see that a relatively high level of ideological polarization does not necessarily lead to strong inter-party hostility, whereas ideologically not centrifugal party systems can still be affectively very polarized. These findings confirm that ideological and affective polarization should be considered as distinct concepts, and when evaluating the degree of polarization in some party system, it should be specified which type of polarization we are talking about.

The main puzzle arising from these findings is: what explains the part of the variation in AP that is left unaccounted for by IP? The distribution of countries on the IP-AP plots presented in the previous section could help make some predictions on that matter. In the countries where there is a highly salient ethnic division and political parties representing ethnic minorities have a considerable representation in the parliament (Bulgaria, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Montenegro), AP is consistently higher than IP would predict. This suggests that, as some of the American scholars (e.g., Iyengar et al. 2012), we could search explanations to AP from social identity foundations. From such a perspective, high AP in some ethnically divided CEE countries could partly derive from tribalist roots. Of course, some other social identities could have a similar effect on partisan feelings – for example, religion being one potentially important line of division (for a discussion of ethnic/religious divisions and AP, see Westwood et al. 2018).

Nevertheless, rational accounts of AP should also not be dismissed in countries where AP is higher than IP would predict. The countries above the IP-AP regression line are, on average, much less wealthy and more corrupt compared to the ones below the line. Consequently, voters in CEE and SE countries could shape their affective evaluations towards the parties more on the basis of valence considerations (Stokes 1963): negative affect could derive from perceived incompetence and corruption. However, it would be then reasonable to assume that partisans are also more sceptical towards their own party; yet, high in-party

ratings suggest that this is not the case. This hints that partisans attribute more blame for undesirable political outcomes to out-parties, implying that rational judgments could be influenced by in-group bias. Uncovering the exact cognitive mechanisms behind strong partisan feelings requires elaborate individual-level studies.

Whether partisan affect is shaped by ideological differences, ethnic (or some other social) identities or valence considerations, it seems that party elites have an important role to play in mediating these effects. As Lijphart (1969: 211–212) has pointed out, elites could enhance the potential tensions in society in the hope of gaining political profit, but they could also act with the aim to counteract conflict and find consensus. Thus, it is not surprising that countries known for a consensual policy-making culture such as the Netherlands and Switzerland have low AP, despite moderate-to-high IP (and in the Swiss case, also a high level of ethnic fractionalisation). One could propose that proportional electoral institutions contribute to lower AP in these cases; however, there are also proportional fragmented party systems with very high AP, such as Bulgaria and the Czech Republic. This indicates that a proportional electoral system can provide an impetus for lower AP, but it must be accompanied by consensual elite behaviour.

3. Going beyond ideology and partisan tribalism: The cross-national determinants of affective polarization[34]

3.1 Introduction

During the last decade, a new approach to political polarization that concentrates on partisan feelings has emerged. A growing number of studies have started to focus on the phenomenon referred to as affective polarization, defined as the extent to which voters hold positive sentiments towards their own party, while being negative towards competing out-party/parties (Iyengar et al. 2012; Lelkes 2016). This recent increase in interest towards affective polarization has been mostly confined to the US context and is sparked by the unequivocally recognized trend of rapid upsurge in hostile feelings between Democrats and Republicans. According to Iyengar & Westwood (2015), polarization based on partisan identity constitutes the most emotionally intense division (as compared to conflicts based on race, ethnicity, religion, etc) in the USA. Such toxic partisan animosity bears problematic consequences regarding the functioning of the political system (Hetherington & Rudolph 2015; Iyengar & Krupenkin 2018;) and society at large (Iyengar & Westwood 2015; Sunstein 2015), and could even lead to democratic backsliding or breakdown (McCoy et al. 2018).

Over the last few years, comparative research on affective polarization has also started to appear. Although cross-national literature is still scarce, enough evidence has been presented to conclude that affective polarization is not solely a US phenomenon: intense partisan feelings are very acutely present in many other countries (see Reiljan 2020; Wagner 2020; Westwood et al. 2018; Huddy et al. 2018; Lauka et al. 2018; Gidron et al. 2018; Helbling & Jungkunz 2020; Boxell et al. 2020). Moreover, the studies of Wagner (2020), Reiljan (2020) and Lauka et al. (2018) - which to the best of my knowledge constitute the only (published) broad systematic cross-national comparisons of affective polarization - reveal a large cross-national variation. There are party systems, where partisans exhibit almost uniform loathing towards all or most other parties (the extent of which is far greater than the dislike between Democrats and Republicans in the USA), while holding highly positive

[34] This chapter constitutes a yet unsubmitted working paper. The earlier versions of this paper have been presented at the 77th Annual MPSA Conference in Chicago (April 2019) and at the EUI Political Behaviour Colloquium (November 2019).

feelings towards one's own party. Conversely, there are also countries where partisan hostility is rare and partisans are also more critical towards their preferred party. However, we know almost nothing about what are the foundations of this variation in affective polarization across countries.

In this chapter, I aim to address this gap in research by studying the predictors of affective polarization on the party system level. I draw insights from the two competing theories that have emerged within the US literature. The first perceives affective polarization as a largely irrational 'tribal' phenomenon. The proponents of this narrative claim that affective polarization among the American partisans derives rather from partisan identity than ideology, as the mere fact of identifying with a party is enough to invoke negative feelings towards the competing party, regardless of the extent of actual policy disagreement (Iyengar et al. 2012; Sunstein 2015; Mason 2015). The second approach emphasises the rational roots of affective polarization, asserting that partisan feelings are predominantly driven by policy preferences (Rogowski & Sutherland 2016; Webster & Abramowitz 2017; Lelkes 2019).

I build on these existing approaches and expand the theoretical framework. I elaborate on the rational account by proposing valence considerations as an alternative driver of affective polarization, concentrating on quality of governance as a potentially crucial valence issue. As an elaboration of the tribalism approach, I hypothesize that ethnic heterogeneity can lead to heightened partisan affective polarization. The results from more than 40 democracies over the world confirm that these structural conditions systematically correlate with affective polarization. Both, the rational and tribalism theories seem to be useful in understanding the foundations of partisan animosity, but the variables that pertain to the former – ideological polarization and quality of governance – prove to be much stronger predictors. However, I claim that the division between the two theories is not as clear-cut as it might seem from the US literature. While evaluating parties based on valence considerations can be considered a rational behavior, partisans' perceptions appear to be distorted by in-group bias that leads them to attribute more blame for undesirable outcomes to other parties. Also, affective polarization that derives from identity-based conflict is not necessarily irrational, as the stakes in the party competition can be very high in a country characterized by intense conflict that emanates from some salient social division.

The chapter is organized as follows: First, I outline the theoretical framework and present the hypotheses. Then, I describe the data and variable operationalization. In the first

empirical section, I give an overview of the cross-national variation in the levels of affective polarization. Subsequently, I present the multivariate models of the predictors of affective polarization and assess which hypotheses find empirical backing. The last empirical section constitutes robustness checks of the main findings. Finally, I discuss the most important empirical and theoretical implications of the results presented in this chapter.

3.2 System level predictors of affective polarization: a theoretical framework

In this section, I will outline a theoretical framework of affective polarization system level determinants. First, I construct macro level hypotheses based on the variables that have received most attention in the US debate: ideological polarization and partisan identity strength. Subsequently, I expand on these perspectives by introducing valence considerations and ethnic heterogeneity as the alternative foundations of affective polarization.

3.2.1 Rational and social identity approach: ideological polarization and partisan tribalism

While there is a wide consensus among scholars that affective polarization in the United States has significantly increased over the last decades, the issue of what lies behind this phenomenon is more contentious and two dominant theories have emerged. One group of scholars emphasizes partisan identity strength as the central driver of affective polarization, building on social identity and intergroup conflict theories (see Tajfel 1970; Tajfel & Turner 1979). According to this line of thought, partisan identity should be considered as a crucial social identity and merely identifying with one party can lead to dislike towards the other parties, simply because they are on the opposing side and regardless of actual policy disagreements (Iyengar et al. 2012; Sunstein 2015; Mason 2015). As Mason (2015: 129) puts it: '...a partisan behaves more like a sports fan than like a banker choosing an investment.' Accordingly, the more strongly voters identify with their preferred party, the higher is the degree of affective polarization.[35] An opposing approach builds on the proximity theory of

[35] I will currently leave aside the literature that considers the alignment (sorting) of partisan and other social identities as the central driver of affective polarization (see Mason 2016; 2018b). As mentioned earlier, it is

Anthony Downs (1957) and perceives the ideological polarization between the parties as the main driver of affective polarization. Parties/partisans want different policies to be implemented and if the divergence between the ideal states of different groups is wide, it is accompanied by mutual dislike and distrust (Rogowski & Sutherland 2016; Webster & Abramowitz 2017; Lelkes 2019). As such, affective polarization between partisans can be considered as a rational response to ideological conflict, while the social identity approach refers to partisan tribalism, i.e. exhibiting polarized feelings solely based on group identity and without rational basis.

While both the rational and tribalist theories have found considerable empirical support in the individual level studies (conducted mostly in the US context), at the cross-national level our current knowledge is sparse. Reiljan (2020) and Wagner (2020) have established a significant positive relationship between ideological (left-right) and affective polarization on bivariate basis across a wide range of democratic countries, but this linkage has not been tested in conjunction with other potentially important variables.[36] As for partisan identity strength, I am not aware of any studies that examine its connection with affective polarization at the macro level. In multiparty systems, the nature of partisan identity is somewhat different from the US context. The division line between different camps is not so clear-cut as in a two-party system and - especially in the time of decreasing importance of class background in partisan attachments - partisan identity might just reflect person's current political preference, not a more deeply rooted affiliation (Berglund et al. 2005). However, Huddy et al. (2018) find that although partisan identities are weaker in (European) multiparty systems, the linkage with affective polarization is still similar: strong partisans exhibit higher degrees of affective polarization, regardless of their ideological stances.[37] They contend that the difference between the US and European partisans is not so much in the nature of their partisanship, but in the level of it (p. 195). Based on these insights, I predict that the individual level findings indicating that ideological polarization and partisan identity strength

very complicated to obtain a a measure of social sorting that allows for an adequate cross-national comparison (see Harteveld 2019).

[36] Gidron et al. (2018) do test the ideological and affective polarization linkage in multivariate models and find a 'weak and inconsistent' relationship between the two variables, but it should be noted that they measure affective polarization simply as weighted dislike towards out-parties, not as the difference between in- and out-party evaluations. This differs from the conceptualization used in this chapter and the results presented later will demonstrate the importance of studying both sides of the equation (in- and out-party feelings).

[37] The part of the Huddy et al. (2018) study that focused on affective polarization examined the cases of Sweden and United Kingdom.

both have distinct independent effects on affective polarization, are also valid at the system level. Thus, I present the following two-part hypothesis:

The rational approach hypothesis (H1a):

The greater the degree of ideological polarization in the party system, the greater the degree of affective polarization, regardless of the partisan identity strength.

The partisan tribalism hypothesis (H1b):

The greater the degree of partisan identity strength among partisans, the greater the degree of affective polarization, regardless of ideological polarization.

3.2.2 Expanding and combining the rational and partisan identity approaches

Valence considerations and affective polarization

As established in the previous sub-section, negative affect towards ideologically distant out-parties can be perceived as a rational reaction by partisans. However, policy agreement is not the only concern that has been considered to influence voters' opinion of the political parties. A rational voter could also take into account the perceived governing capabilities of the parties (Fiorina 1981; Lavine et al. 2012). This relates to valence theory, according to which parties/candidates are evaluated based on the competence and integrity (honesty) attributable to them. The crucial difference between positional and valence issues is that while on the former, there is a choice between policy alternatives (e.g. pro-life or pro-choice), then regarding the latter, (almost) all the voters hold identical positions, e.g. everyone agrees that the political elites should be competent and honest (Stokes`1963; Clark 2009; Green 2007; De Sio & Weber 2014). Accordingly, a voter could have negative feelings towards an ideologically proximate party, as she perceives the party to be incompetent or crooked; or conversely, have positive or at least neutral perception of an ideologically distant party, based on it's 'clean' reputation or presumably high capability to govern the country efficiently. Disparities in the valence attributable to parties and candidates have been referred to as 'valence polarization' (Serra 2010) and can be modelled as a vertical dimension next to the horizontal ideological axis (Curini & Martelli 2010).

Due to the broad cross-national focus of this study, there is no direct measure of valence polarization at my disposal. As a proxy, I rely on the general quality of governance indicators that relate to the crucial valence characteristics of competence and integrity. Government effectiveness in terms of quality of public services, and policy formulation and implementation (Dahlberg & Holmberg 2012; Magalhães 2014) connects well to the notion of competence. Integrity/honesty, on the other hand, associates with the corruption in the government and public sector in general – an issue that has become increasingly salient in many democracies across the world over the last decades (Curini 2018). The concepts of government effectiveness and corruption are theoretically and empirically closely linked, as it is difficult to imagine a highly corrupt, yet very effectively functioning government. Being corrupt strongly suggests incompetence in governing capabilities, as it indicates that the politicians and public officials favor their own or their party's interests above what is good for the state (Van der Meer & Dekker 2011). On the other hand, it is possible that while not corrupt or biased towards some special interests, the government is still incompetent, for example due to very slow and inefficient policy implementation process (Dahlberg & Holmberg 2012). The empirical relationship between these concepts will be disentangled in the variable operationalization section of this chapter.

Government effectiveness and corruption are indicators of political system output, as opposed to ideological polarization and partisan identification that pertain to the input side. Several studies have shown that system output tends to be more consequential in shaping voters' attitudes as compared to input factors. Low quality of governance in terms of (in)effectiveness and/or corruption has been connected to lower levels of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy (Wagner et al. 2009; Dahlberg & Holmberg 2012; Torcal & Trechsel 2016), lack of trust towards political institutions, including political parties (Van der Meer 2010; Van der Meer & Dekker 2011; Kostadinova 2012) and even eroding democratic legitimacy (Magalhães 2014). Thus, at least on the aggregate level it appears that citizens recognize quite accurately how good or bad the performance of the political system is (Kriesi & Saris 2016). Based on these findings, we can expect that voters in worse performing political systems are generally more negative in their evaluations towards political parties as compared to countries with high quality of governance.

How does this relate to affective polarization? It is important to keep in mind that affective polarization signifies the difference between the feelings towards in-party and out-party/parties. Therefore, if low quality of governance would decrease the evaluation towards

all parties equally, it should not influence the degree of affective polarization. For example, if partisans evaluate their own party with 8 out of 10 and the out-party with 4 out of 10, then the difference in affect (i.e. affective polarization) is 4. If the in-party evaluation is 6 and out-party evaluation 2, the difference is also 4. However, it is likely that partisans ascribe more blame for bad performance to out-parties. As Iyengar et al. (2012) demonstrate, partisans tend to not just dislike the out-party, but they also engage in stereotyping and attributing negative traits to the latter and its supporters. For example, partisans perceive out-partisans as significantly less intelligent and more selfish than their co-partisans. I expect a similar mechanism regarding placing guilt for the low quality of governance: partisans tend to see out-parties as being more responsible for an ineffective and corrupt political system, which leads to a higher divergence in the perceived levels of competence and integrity of the parties (i.e. higher valence polarization). In a well-functioning political system, on the other hand, I expect that the level of valence polarization is lower, because issues like government ineffectiveness and corruption should carry less importance in the electoral competition. *Ceteris paribus*, better/worse quality of governance should, therefore, associate with a lower/higher degree of partisan affective polarization. This discussion leads to the following hypothesis:

The quality of governance hypothesis (H2):

The more effective and less corrupt the country's government sector is perceived to be, the lower the degree of affective polarization.

Thus, although valence theory classifies under the rational approaches to political behavior, I find that the hypothesized connection between quality of governance and affective polarization is a combination of rational and tribal considerations. While disliking parties based on their incompetence and perceived corruptness (or inability to tackle corruption in the public sector) can be considered as a rational reaction, then attributing more blame to other parties compared to one's own would likely refer to an in-group bias.

Ethnic heterogeneity and affective polarization

On theoretical grounds, the social identity/tribalism approach on affective polarization connects to the social-psychological theory advocated by the so-called Michigan school's

scholars. In their classic work, Campbell et al. (1960) demonstrated that the American voter is (was) ideologically rather unstructured and the voting decision is mostly based on the perceived 'group benefits'. However, the groups Campbell et al. (1960) considered as the drivers of political behavior were based on social, not partisan identities (e.g. African Americans, farmers, working class people), while according to the partisan tribalism theory the crucial group is the political party itself. In my proposed elaboration of tribalism approach on affective polarization, I will take a step back towards the original work of Campbell et al. (1960) and hypothesize that certain social identities can still have a strong independent effect on interparty hostility, regardless of the partisan identity (and ideology).

In this study, I focus on ethnic heterogeneity as a possible driver of affective polarization for three reasons. First, conflicts based on ethnic identities are still highly salient in many countries all over the world and often form an important and emotionally loaded dimension of political competition. Ethnic cleavage has played a crucial role in the party systems of some countries where large politically organised minorities are present (Tavits 2005; Hloušek & Kopecek 2008; Ehin & Solvak 2012) and ethnically more diverse polities have been found to have a higher probability for internal tensions and even civil wars (Reynal-Querol 2002; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol 2005). The importance of traditional class and religion based cleavages has, however, decreased over the last decades, at least in the Western world (Kriesi et al. 2006). Secondly, ethnic heterogeneity is somewhat easier and more straighforward to capture than, for example, class and religion based divisions. Class identities are not so distinct anymore in today's world and cross-nationally comparing the class structures would be rather complex. Regarding religion, there can be a conflict between the more secular and more traditional followers of the same religion (e.g. Poland), which would be difficult to capture with some broad cross-national measure. Moreover, it is questionable whether non-religious people that make up quite large portions of the population in some countries should be treated as a unified group or not. Finally, ethnic division is often independent from the central ideological axis, forming an alternative dimension of political competition (Westwood et al. 2018; Han 2015). This is in contrast to class and religious divisions that are more likely to be captured by the ideological left-right/liberal-conservative dimensions, at least partially. Thus, I find that in a broad cross-national macro level study, concentrating on ethnic divison is the most feasible way to elaborate on the tribalism approach to affective polarization.

Current research on affective polarization has taken a comparative approach regarding social (including ethnic) and partisan identities. Iyengar and Westwood (2015) demonstrated that animosity between Democrats and Republicans exceeds affective polarization based on race in the United States. Westwood et al. (2018) show that the same applies in Belgium and Spain regarding ethnic divisions and in Great Britan regarding the Muslim-Christian division: partisans are much more hostile towards out-partisans in comparison to members of ethnic or religious out-groups. My approach to this nexus of variables – affective polarization, partisan identity and ethnic identity – is slightly different. I find it probable that at the system level, a strong ethnic division can incite affective polarization both via inducing the strength of partisan identities and also independently. It is likely that in an ethnically highly polarized society, partisans feel stronger attachment to the party that represents the interests of their ethnic group. However, partisans in such polities might also not feel strongly attached to their party and support it just out of habit or because of a lack of an alternative. Nevertheless, if ethnic tensions are high, it is reasonable to assume that such partisans still dislike the parties that they perceive as representing other ethnic group(s), even if they do not feel particularly close to their own party. That should form a foundation for a higher degree of affective polarizaton, regardless of the other previously described independent variables (ideological polarization, partisan identity strength and quality of governance).

Evaluating the intensity of ethnic divisions in comparative terms is a complicated task. In order to produce an empirically testable hypothesis, I rely on a broad assumption that in ethnically more heterogenous societies, the potential for ethnic tensions and ethnic group based partisanship is higher, leading to a higher level of affective polarization.

<u>The ethnic heterogeneity hypothesis (H3):</u>

The greater the degree of ethnic heterogeneity in the country, the greater the degree of affective polarization.

Although rooted in group belonging and, thus, corresponding to the tribal approach to affective polarization, disliking other parties based on ethnic identities should not necessarily be perceived as an irrational phenomenon. Ethnic conflict could have very real and palpable consequences to people's lives, which can raise the electoral stakes in an ethnically highly divided party competition (e.g. Catalonia). Thus, just as affective polarization based on valence considerations can be a mixture of rational and tribalistic motivations, I propose the same to be true for partisan hostility induced by ethnic division.

3.3 Data, case selection and variable operationalization

This chapter mainly relies on the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) dataset[38] that is used to calculate both ideological and affective polarization, and partisan identity strength. Accordingly, the case selection is determined by what countries and elections are part of the CSES project. I use data from the integrated file that combines CSES Modules 1 to 4. I also include the countries and elections for which Wave 5 data is already available. All the countries where (at least partly) free competitive elections take place are included in the sample. Thus, my sample covers the available countries that are classified as 'free' and 'partly free' by Freedom House.[39] Additionally, the election had to be for the legislative assembly, as I use party vote shares to calculate ideological and affective polarization measures (explained later in this section). Therefore, presidential elections are not suitable for my purposes, as the votes are attributed to the candidates, not directly to the parties. However, I did include cases where legislative and presidential elections were held simultaneously. In these instances, the vote shares used in the calculations were the ones attributed to the parties in the (lower chamber) legislative election. A number of cases had to be dropped due to differences in the way partisan identity was determined[40] or because the cumulative vote percentage of the parties included in the survey was too low and some important parties had been left out.[41] Due to deficiencies regarding some other variables (partisan identity strength item missing, reliable ethnic heterogeneity data not available), a few more countries had to be removed from the sample. The final sample includes 41 countries and 108 elections from the period of 1996-2018. The list of countries, elections and the respective affective polarization scores is presented in Appendix B1.

The number of elections included from different countries is uneven and varies from one to six. As one country-year (e.g. Germany 2009) represents one case in the regression models, it should be considered that not all cases are independent, because there is most likely correlation within countries (e.g. Germany 2013 is correlated to Germany 2009). To tackle

[38] Available at: http://cses.org/

[39] Eventually, many 'partly free' elections had to be dropped due to different problems with data; for example in some of such countries, the percentage of respondents with partisan identity was so low that it rendered calculating affective polarization based on this data meaningless (e.g. Philippines and Thailand). The 'partly free' elections that reached the final sample are Mexico (1997, 2009, 2015), Turkey (2011, 2015), Montenegro (2016) and Hungary (2018).

[40] The follow-up question that identifies also the partisan 'leaners' was not asked in a number of countries.

[41] For example in Israel (2013) - a very fractionalized party system - just 6 parties were included and their cumulative vote share was only 72%. In these elections, 12 parties made it to the parliament, thus, half of them were not asked in the survey and could not be used to calculate polarization. In such circumstances, it is very likely that the obtained polarization scores do not adequately reflect the reality.

this problem, I use cluster-corrected robust standard errors to report the statistical significance of the coefficients (for a similar approach, see Curini and Hino (2012)). I also replicate the results with country average scores (one country=one case).

Variable operationalization

The dependent variable of this study - *affective polarization* - is measured by the Affective Polarization Index (API) introduced in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. The index is calculated in the same way as in Chapter 2, but certain new empirical issues arise due to the broadened geographical scope of this chapter. As previously, I include the 'leaners' into partisan groups, but in certain cases the percentage of partisans is still very low. This causes problems not only because the results are less representative of the whole population, but also the partisan groups in the survey are too small to make valid statistical conclusions. I have drawn the threshold of the required partisan percentage to 30, i.e. if less than 30% of the respondents identify with a political party, I do not include this case in the sample. The lowest partisan percentages in the final sample are 30.4 in South Korea (2000) and 30.9 in Lithuania (2016). The average percentage is 65.6.

Ideological polarization is, also similarly to Chapter 2, measured by the party polarization index developed by Russell Dalton (2008). However, in the models in this chapter, I use the classic version of Dalton's index that relies on the voter perceptions of party positions, i.e. the supply side ideological (left-right) polarization. Similarly to the previous chapter, I also calculated the demand side index based on the average left-right placements of the partisans. The two are very strongly correlated (r=.91) also in the broader set of countries used in this chapter and the results are very similar, regardless of whether I would use the supply, demand or the combined (as in the previous chapter) measure of left-right polarization. Thus, I rely on the classic supply side version of the index that is used most commonly in other research.

Partisan identity strength is measured, using the following CSES question:

'Do you feel very close to this party, somewhat close, or not very close?'

This question is asked only from the respondents who have previously answered that they feel close or at least somewhat closer ('leaners') to one party compared to others, and have then

named this party. I code the partisan identity strength to range from 0 (not very close) to 2 (very close) and calculate the average partisan identity strength for each case.[42]

The two *Quality of governance indicators - Government effectiveness and Corruption* - are operationalized by two items in the World Bank's The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) dataset.[43] The WGI indicators use a wide range of sources, combining data from household surveys, commercial business information providers, and public and non-governmental organizations. The Government Effectiveness indicator '…Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.' This index is a very broad measure for an entire government's performance (Dahlberg & Holmberg 2012), which suits well to the broad cross-national nature of this study. The Control of Corruption (CC) index measures perceptions of the extent to '...which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 'capture' of the state by elites and private interests.'[44] Both indicators are 5-point scales that range from -2.5 (weak government performance, i.e. low level of government effectiveness/high level of corruption) to 2.5 (strong performance, i.e. high level of government effectiveness/low level of corruption). As predicted, the two indicators are very strongly correlated to each other (r=.95), making it virtually impossible to disentangle their effects from each other. Thus, I combine them into a Quality of governance index. For the ease of interpretation, I rescale the index to range from 0 (low quality of governance) to 5.

Ethnic heterogeneity is measured by the *ethnic polarization index*, introduced by Reynal-Querol (2002). According to Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), this index is more suitable to predict ethnic conflict compared to the often used ethnic fractionalization index (see Alesina et al. 2003; Fearon 2003), as it evaluates how close is the ethnic composition of a country to a bipolar distribution. As such, large groups contribute more to the ethnic polarization index compared to their relative size, whereas small groups have a stronger effect on the ethnic fractionalization index (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol 2005: 799). This aligns with

[42] As an alternative operationalization, I also measured the percentage of the partisans who claimed to feel very close to their party. This corresponds to the individual level studies, where the partisan identity strength is usually entered in the models as a dummy variable of strong PID (see Iyengar et al. 2012; Mason 2015). The average strength and strong partisans percentage measure are strongly correlated (r=.82) and the results are very similar, regardless of which measure is used.

[43] https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/worldwide-governance-indicators

[44] Data and methodological notes can be downloaded at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home

the findings indicating that the potential for ethnic conflict is higher in societies where a large ethnic minority faces a majority, rather than highly fractionalized countries where there is no clear majority (Horowitz 1985; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol 2005). The formula of the index is the following:

$$\text{Ethnic polarization} = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left(\frac{\frac{1}{2} - \pi_i}{\frac{1}{2}} \right)^2 \pi_i$$

, where π_i signifies the proportion of each ethnic group in the country.

Ethnic polarization is a rather complicted variable to operationalize, as it is difficult to obtain a time-varying measure of ethnic composition in each country, due to lack of suitable data. To retrieve the ethnic group proportion estimates, I use the data compiled by the researchers in the Cline Center for Democracy at the University of Illinois. Within the Composition of Religious and Ethnic Groups (CREG) project, they compiled data on ethnic groups in 165 countries over the period of 1945 to 2013.[45] Using three different sources (the Britannica Book of the Year (BBOY), the CIA World Factbook (CIA-WF) and the World Almanac Book of Facts (WABF)), they combined and cross-checked all the available data and then projected the group estimates for the years about which no specific data was available, using multi-level mixed models with fixed group effects and random year effects (Nardulli et al. 2012). There are some insufficiencies regarding the CREG data, most notably that the ethnic group data estimates range only until 2013, whereas the cases included in this chapter extend to 2018. Also, few of the countries that are in my sample are missing from the CREG dataset. See Appendix B2 for a more thorough overview of this dataset and how I dealt with some problematic cases.[46]

Finally, I include three control variables: party system size, executive-legislative relationship and GDP per capita.

Party system size is operationalized as the effective number of (electoral) parties (Laakso and Taagepera 1979), calculated by the following formula:

$$\text{Effective number of parties} = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} v_i^2},$$

[45] https://clinecenter.illinois.edu/project/Religious-Ethnic-Identity/composition-religious-and-ethnic-groups-creg-project

[46] To validate my findings, I also tried two alternative operationalizations of ethnic division, both of which are described in Appendix B2.

where ‘n’ denotes the number of parties and ‘v’ is the normalized vote share of the party.

The executive-legislative relationship is operationalized as a dummy variable, based on the classification of Shugart (2005; 2006). The variable takes the value of 1 in case of presidential systems and also ‘...for the types of semipresidential systems that either Shugart (2005) identifies as president-parliamentary (e.g., Peru, Taiwan) or, despite being premier-presidential systems, do not present any prime ministerial dominant form of leadership’ (Curini and Hino 2012: 469).

The GDP PPP *per capita* indicator (divided by 1000 for the ease of interpretation) is provided by the World Bank database.[47] This control variable is especially important to validate the robustness of the potential effect of the quality of governance on affective polarization, as the countries with more efficient and less corrupt governments are usually also wealthier.

Table 3.1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of all the variables outlined in this section. See Appendix B1 for bivariate correlations between all the variables (Table B1.2).

Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Affective polarization	108	4.58	.87	2.69	7.38
Left-right polarization	108	3.65	1.26	.67	6.2
PID strength	108	.97	.23	.34	1.59
Quality of governance	108	3.70	.77	2.24	4.85
Ethnic polarization	108	.41	.27	.03	.90
Effective N of parties	108	4.41	1.31	2.12	7.61
(Semi)-Presidentialism	108	0.17	.37	0	1
GDP PPP per capita (/1000)	108	28.96	11.95	6.91	57.9

[47] I used the measure of GDP PPP per capita in current US dollars, data available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD

3.4 Results

3.4.1 Levels of affective polarization across countries

Before presenting the models of affective polarization predictors, I will give a general overview of the variation regading the dependent variable among the 41 countries that were included in the sample.

Figure 3.1 lists the countries by the average Affective Polarization Index (API) score over the elections that are included in the sample.[48] To illustrate the concept spatially, I display the average weighted levels of both in- and out-party evaluation on a single continuum where one end signifies the strongest possible dislike and the other end the strongest sympathy towards the parties. The dependent variable of this study – affective polarization – is represented by the distance between the in- and out-party dots on the graph. As Figure 3.1 indicates, Turkey is the most affectively polarized country in terms of partisan feelings, with the average API score of 6.8. Other countries at the top of the list are also the 'usual suspects' based on previous research (see also Chapter 2 of the dissertation). We see that affective polarization is consistently high in Central Eastern Europe, with Bulgaria ranking second, Hungary third and Montenegro fourth in the whole sample. All four South European and the only African country in the sample - South Africa - also rank high. Maybe somewhat surprisingly the South American countries, with the exception of Uruguay, are not outstandingly polarized compared to the previously mentioned cases. At the bottom of the list are The Netherlands with the average API score of 2.8.[49] Also, the Southeast Asian polities – Taiwan, Japan and South Korea – rank very low in terms of affective polarization, and the Nordic states, quite expectedly, are also represented in the low-API group by Iceland, Finland and Norway. The average API score for the United States over the 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016 elections is 4.51, which remains slightly under the sample average (4.58).

[48] For example for Uruguay the score is based solely on the 2009 election as it is the only one for which there is data, but the German score is the average of 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013 and 2017 elections.

[49] The Netherlands is a unique case as the average weighted out-party evaluation is in the centre of the emotional spectrum and in 2006 it reaches as high as 5.2. Thus, the average in- and out-party evaluation are on the same side of scale centrepoint, which might prompt a question whether affective polarization even exists in The Netherlands. To answer that question, one should look at the evaluations between partisan groups separately. Although, on average, partisans are neutral or even slightly positive towards competing parties, negative feelings are still present in certain cases. As discussed in the previous chapter, the right-populist PVV invokes the most negative emotions.



Figure 3.1. Average weighted in- and out-party evaluation scores by country. Notes: Countries are ranked by the degree of affective polarization (the difference between the weighted average in- and out-party evaluation scores). Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Modules 1 to 5.

We can see from Figure 3.1 that the out-party evaluations vary somewhat more than in-party ratings (standard deviation for the former is .64 and for the latter .51). Nevertheless, the difference of standard deviations is smaller as compared to Chapter 2 where only European democracies and the United States were included in the sample, and the variation regarding in-party evaluations also has a significant effect on the affective polarization rankings among countries. Lowest in-party evaluations (~7.0) are recorded in Taiwan and Japan, which

contributes strongly to their very low degrees of affective polarization. Out-parties are significantly more disliked in these countries compared to, for example, Iceland and Finland, where the API score is higher on the account of higher in-party sympathy. Although out-party hostility is the more 'exciting' part of the affective polarization equation, I find that in-party evaluations should also not be dismissed when studying affective polarization. If we think of an emotional dimension, then an evaluation of 7 is closer to the centre (5) of the emotional spectrum, whereas 9 is almost at the end of the 10-point scale. The concept of polarization presumes (affective or ideological) distances and placements that diverge from the centre. Thus, affective polarization is different from simple dislike towards out-parties and should also involve positive feelings towards one's own party.

Before moving on to the multivariate regression models, it is important to emphasize that most of the variation regarding the degree of affective polarization is *between the countries*, while the fluctuations *within the countries* are much smaller. The analysis of variance (ANOVA) reveals that 87% of the variation is explained by differences between countries alone.[50] While the value of affective polarization index varies from below 3 in The Netherlands to ca 7 in Turkey, then within countries, the highest recorded change in the index value is the 1.6-point increase in Montenegro (see Table B1.1 in Appendix B1 for all the affective polarization scores per country and election). Consequently, we can also expect that the models presented in the previous sections capture rather the cross-national variance than within-country dynamics. Nevertheless, correspondingly to the widespread feeling that politics have become more hostile across the world (Gidron et al. 2019), the API scores have in most countries increased over the last decade(s), although the trend is not universal and the increment of change is rather modest in most countries.

3.4.2 The determinants of affective polarization

In this section, I present the multivariate models to explain the cross-national variation in affective polarization. First, I will enter the variables in pairs of two (+ control variables), based on the previously outlined hypotheses (Models 1 and 2). Finally, I will include all the independent variables in the full model (Model 3).

[50] The exact indicator should be treated with some caution, as the N of elections per country varies and for some countries, the within-country variation cannot be measured at all, as they are represented in the sample by only one election. However, it is undoubtedly clear that most of the variation in the level of affective polarization is cross-national.

Model 1 in Table 3.2 presents the variables that correspond to the two baseline hypotheses (H1a and H1b), and the three controls. We see that in this model specification, both the ideological polarization and partisan identity strength have a statistically significant relationship with affective polarization in the predicted direction, although the effect of ideological left-right polarization is slightly stronger. Moving from the lowest left-right polarization value in the sample to the highest is associated with around 1.5-point increase in API score. The substantive effect of partisan identity strength is in the same range. The unstandardized regression coefficient of 1.17 indicates the increase in the Affective Polarization Index value when partisan identity strength increases by one scale step on a 0-to-2 scale. The values of the variable range between .33 (in Poland, 2011, where less than 5 per cent of the partisans claimed to be very close to their own party) and 1.59 (in Turkey, 2015, where more than 60 per cent of the partisans felt very close to their party), with the average value being close to the mid-point of the scale (.97). Thus, moving from the lowest to highest average partisan identity strength brings about an almost 1.45-point increase in the affective polarization score, which corresponds to ca 1.7 standard deviations. The model with the control variables explains 43% of the variation in the dependent variable. These results give preliminary macro level support to both H1a and H1b. On the other hand, more than half of the cross-national variation remains unexplained by this model, suggesting that some other important variables must be at play.

The effect of the two variables that I proposed to expand the current rational vs tribalism dichotomy are presented in Model 2. The R^2 of the model is slightly higher compared to Model 1 and both variables have a signficant effect in the expected direction. However, in this case, the effect is mostly driven by one variable: the quality of governance index, which combines the government effectivenss and (control of) corruption indicators. The quality of governance index values in this sample of countries range from 2.2 to 4.9, therefore, moving from one end to another is associated with approximately 1.8-point change in affective polarization. Out of the variables studied in this chapter, quality of governance also has the strongest bivariate relationship with affective polarization (r=-.57). It is noteworthy that GDP per capita that had a significant taming effect on affective polarization in Model 1 has now been rendered insignificant, due to the inclusion of the quality of governance variable. The effect of ethnic polarization has the expected positive direction, but is much weaker compared to the quality of governance and also the (semi-)presidentialism dummy variable. Nevertheless, both hypotheses (H2 and H3) receive preliminary support.

Table 3.2. The predictors of affective polarization, OLS regression

	Ideological polarization & partisan tribalism model	Valence & ethnic polarization model	Full model
	(Model 1)	(Model 2)	(Model 3)
Left-right polarization (0-10)	.27 (.09)**		.27 (.06)***
Partisan identity strength (0-2)	1.17 (.46)*		.35 (.30)
Quality of governance index (0-5)		-.68 (.15)***	-.61 (.11)***
Ethnic polarization (0-1)		.73 (.31)*	.75 (.29)*
Effective N of parties	-.16 (.07)*	-.14 (.07)*	-.18 (.06)**
(Semi-)Presidential system (0/1)	-.49 (.26)	-.88 (.30)**	-.76 (.24)**
GDP PPP/1000	-.03 (.01)***	.00 (.01)	.00 (.00)
Constant	4.00 (.52)	7.48 (.68)	6.09 (.52)
R^2	.43	.50	.65
N of countries	41	41	41
N of elections	108	108	108

Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients, cluster-corrected robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p ≤ 0.001; **p ≤ 0.01; *p ≤ 0.05.

Model 3 combines all the variables from Models 1 and 2 together. The first significant observation concerns the general explanatory power of the model which has increased considerably compared to the previous models. The R^2 is now at .65, indicating that this combination of variables explains about two thirds of the variation in the level of affective polarization. The two clearly dominant variables in the model are quality of governance and ideological polarization that in the fully specified model have even more robust independent effects. Regarding the social identity/tribalism variables, we see that the effect of partisan identity strength has decreased dramatically in Model 3 and is not statistically significant anymore, indicating that in a fully specified model, H1b is refuted. That the effect of partisan identity strength is explained away by other variables, suggests that certain structural conditions induce both partisan identity strength and affective polarization. As predicted, this

drop in the effect of PID owes especially to the inclusion of ethnic polarization.[51] The effect of the latter, conversely, has even slightly increased in Model 3. The highest ethnic polarization index value in the sample is .90 (Peru, 2011), so the regression coefficient of .75 indicates that even if a broad set of other variables is controlled for, the most ethnically heterogenous countries exhibit ca .65-point higher affective polarization index score compared to the most ethnically homogenous ones. Yet, the effect size is still not close to the ones of ideological polarization and quality of governance. Figure 3.2 that displays the marginal effects of all four central independent variables (standardized) on affective polarization clearly illustrates the dominance of the two variables that emanate from the rational theory (see the panels 2a and 2c).



Figure 3.2. Marginal effects of the four main independent variables on affective polarization. Notes: Predicted levels of affective polarization. Independent variables ranging from 1.5 standard deviations below the average value to 1.5 standard deviations above average (fully specified model, see Model 3 in Table 3.2). Grey areas indicate 95% confidence intervals.

[51] The two variables are positively correlated to each other, r=.50

Model 3 also demonstrates that the two institutional controls have significant effects on affective polarization. A higher effective number of parties has a taming effect, as one additional party corresponds to a .14-point lower level of affective polarization. This finding is not surprising, considering that partisan divisions are somewhat more blurred in multiparty systems and parties are incentivized to form coalitions to govern together. Yet, the effect is not very strong and in a number of countries the degree of affective polarization is very high, despite the relatively large amount of relevant parties. Somewhat more surprising could be the finding that the (semi-)presidentialism dummy variable has a consistent negative relationship with affective polarization that significantly strengthens when ethnic polarization and quality of governance enter the model. All the other variables controlled for, (semi-)presidential systems exhibit .76-point lower degree of affective polarization (almost one standard deviation). A potential explanation to this finding could be that the high importance of the president's institution in the party system could facilitate office-seeking behavior of the parties (Curini & Hino 2012). To win the presidency, a candidate usually has to (eventually) gather at least 50%+1 of the votes. Consequently, the parties that want to seriously compete for the presidency have to be acceptable to a wide range of voters, including the supporters of some other parties. This could motivate parties to reach out more across the ideological or ethnic divisions, in order to stand a chance to win the office. This is likely to have a curbing effect on affective polarization. However, it should also be noted that most of the semi-presidential/presidential party sytems included in this country sample are from South America or Southeast Asia; thus, this finding could be an artefact of some specific attributes that relate to these regions.

The strongest predictor of affective polarization both on bivariate basis and in a fully specified model is the quality of governance index. In the theoretical discussion, I proposed that valence polarization between parties is higher if the quality of governance is low, because issues like government effectiveness and corruption should be more important in such context and voters are likely to ascribe more blame for weak performance on out-parties. Figure 3.3 that displays the effect of the quality of governance index separately on the average in- and out-party evaluations supports this assumption. The left panel of Figure 3.3 indicates that quality of governance has virtually no impact on the average in-party evaluation, whereas the right panel demonstrates a massive effect on out-party evaluations. All other variables controlled for, the predicted out-party evaluation in the countries with the most well-performing governments is above 4 out of 10, which indicates only moderate dislike. In the

countries with the lowest government effectiveness and highest levels of corruption, the predicted out-party rating remains below 3. That makes quality of governance by far the strongest predictor of out-party ratings (see Appendix B1, Table B1.3 for the full models of in- and out-party evaluations separately). Thus, we see that in-parties do not get either punished nor rewarded on the basis of quality of governance, whereas out-party evaluations are very strongly connected to regime performance.



Figure 3.3. Marginal effects of quality of governance on in- and out-party evaluations separately. Notes: Predicted levels of in-party evaluation (left panel) and out-party evaluation (right panel). Quality of governance variable ranging from 1.5 standard deviations below the average value to 1.5 standard deviations above average (fully specified model, see Table B1.3 in the Appendix). Grey areas indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Overall, the multivariate models confirm that affective polarization can be driven by a broad set of determinants that all have independent effects which add up to each other. To illustrate this, we can zoom in to the most affectively polarized country in the sample: Turkey. Turkey is very highly polarized in left-right terms, boasting the average Dalton index value of 5.9, which is the highest in the sample. Parties range from the far left (HDP) to far right (the ruling AKP), at least according to voters' perceptions. Also, Turkey is among the countries with most corruption and the least effective government in this sample and ineffective/corrupt government sector is acknowledged as a serious problem.[52] Furthermore, ethnic polarization in Turkey is clearly above the sample average and we know that ethnicity-based conflict is very intense, as Kurds constitute a large organized minority. In the 2015 CSES election report, Turkish country experts find that the emergence of HDP and the Kurdish issue in general were the most important factors influencing the election outcome. Turkey is just one,

[52] For example, see the Freedom House report on Turkey in 2015: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/turkey

although the most extreme, example that shows how different factors can add up to a very high level of partisan affective polarization.[53]

3.4.3 Robustness checks

To test the robustness of the findings presented in the previous section, I analyze whether the results could be driven by some individual outlier elections, countries or regions, and whether the regression coefficients could be distorted due to the uneven number of elections included in the sample per country.

Additional diagnostics on the full model (Model 3 in Table 3.2) confirm that the residuals are normally distributed and not alarmingly large, i.e. for some countries and elections the model slightly overpredicts, whereas for others it marginally underpredicts the value of affective polarization. However, in one case – Montenegro (2016) - the model mispredicts the value of affective polarization by more than two standard deviations: Montenegro 2016 (predicted API score: 5.11; actual score: 6.86; residual: 1.75).[54] Montenegro (2016) is the third most affectively polarized election in the whole sample and also has rather extreme values on the main independent variables, as it ranks very low on ideological left-right polarization and quality of governance, while having one of the highest levels of ethnic polarization. As a combination of outlierness and leverage, this case has the highest potential influence on the regression coefficients. Model 1 in Table 3.3 runs the model with the same specification as the full model in the previous section, but without Montenegro (2016). The results confirm that the main findings are not altered to a concerning extent. However, the relative strength of left-right polarization increases notably with the exclusion of Montenegro (2016). While in Model 3 in Table 3.2, governance quality is the strongest predictor of affective polarization, then now it is narrowly surpassed by left-right polarization.

[53] Also the analysis of McCoy and Somer (2019) identifies an unusually high amount of different polarization dimensions in Turkey, even compared to other highly polarized polities such as Hungary, Venezuela or Poland.

[54] It should be noted that the Montenegrin 2016 election was held in very particular and tense circumstances. On the election day, the authorities announced that a number of people were arrested for plotting a coup and planning to assassinate the incumbent prime minister M. Đukanović. Moreover, Đukanović publicly accused the largest opposition party (DF) in this alleged coup attempt, whereas DF claimed that the whole event was staged to give the ruling party an advantage in the election (see the Freedom House report on the Montenegrin 2016 election: https://freedomhouse.org/country/montenegro/freedom-world/2017). Obviously, such events could heavily boost affective polarization between party supporters. It is somewhat reassuring regarding the predicting power of the statistical model that the election with the highest residual took place under such conditions. Moreover, the model predicts the Montenegrin 2012 API score almost perfectly (residual -.02).

This demonstrates that one should take caution when comparing the relative effect of these variables. On the other hand, it reassures that governance quality and ideological polarization remain as the dominant variables, regardless of any potential outliers.

Table 3.3. The predictors of affective polarization (robustness checks), OLS regression

	Full model w/o MNE 2016 (Model 1)	Full model w/o SE Asia (Model 2)	Country average model (Model 3)
Left-right polarization (0-10)	.31 (.05)***	.22 (.06)***	.27 (.07)***
Partisan identity strength (0-2)	.24 (.29)	.45 (.30)	.39 (.48)
Governance quality index (0-5)	-.58 (.10)***	-.63 (.11)***	-.59 (.16)***
Ethnic polarization (0-1)	.70 (.27)*	.55 (.30)	.69 (.36)
Effective N of parties	-.19 (.06)**	-.19 (.05)**	-.14 (.07)
(Semi-)Presidential system (0/1)	-.66 (.21)**	-.65 (.27)*	-.64 (.21)**
GDP PPP/1000	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.01)
Constant	5.94 (.49)	6.40 (.55)	5.86 (.87)
R^2	.68	.65	.65
N of countries	41	38	41
N of elections	107	102	-

Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients. In Model 1 and Model 2 cluster-corrected robust standard errors (in parentheses). In Model 3, country average scores are used (i.e. one country=one case).

***p ≤ 0.001; **p ≤ 0.01; *p ≤ 0.05.

I also analyze the residuals at the regional level.[55] Due to data availability, there is a strong European over-representation in the sample, as 28 out of 41 countries are from Europe. Therefore, I have divided Europe into three regions (Central Eastern Europe (12 countries), Northwestern Europe (12) and Southern Europe (4)). The other regions are Latin America (4

[55] I preferred such approach to an alternative option of adding regional dummy variables to the statistical model. The latter approach would be problematic, because the number of countries included from some regions is very small, which makes it almost impossible to reliably analyze the within-region variation.

countries), North America (2), Southeast Asia (3) and Oceania (2).[56] The residuals do not reveal strong systematic regional biases in terms of model fit. While the countries where the actual degree of affective polarization exceeds the predicted value the most are from Central Eastern Europe (Montenegro, Lithuania, Hungary, Bulgaria), the average residual for CEE countries evens out, as in countries like Croatia, Estonia and Latvia, the model, conversely, slightly overpredicts the degree of affective polarization. On average, the model most systematically mispredicts in Southeast Asian region (Taiwan, Japan, South Korea), where the API score is overestimated by 0.5 points, which is slightly more than half a standard deviation. As mentioned earlier, in these countries, partisans are rather lukewarm towards their in-parties compared to any other region, which significantly contributes to lower affective polarization levels. Model 2 in Table 3.3 displays the results of a full model without the 6 elections from 3 Southeast Asian countries. Removing the Southeast Asian countries from the sample has one notable effect on the results: it decreases the coefficient of ethnic polarization from the original .75 to .55 and renders it statistically insignificant on 95-percent level (p=.078). Thus, the ethnic polarization effect is partly driven by ethnically very homogenous and affectively not highly polarized Japan and South Korea. All the other main findings are robust to removing any of the regions from the model.

Finally, in Model 3 in Table 3.3, one country represents one case and the variables are averaged across all the elections that the respective country has in the sample. This should tackle the potential threat that the regression coefficients are distorted due to the uneven number of elections per country. For example, Germany that is in the sample with six elections could exert a higher influence on the coefficients than Italy that is represented with just one election. However, the results in Model 3 are not substantially different from the model where one case is one election. In the country average model, left-right polarization - as in Model 1 where Montenegro (2016) was removed - emerges as the strongest predictor, very closely exceeding the quality of governance. This reassures again that we should not draw too hasty conclusions regarding which of these two variables has a stronger linkage with affective polarization. Similarly to Model 2 described in the previous paragraph, the effect of ethnic polarization in Model 3 closely misses the $p \leq 05$ significance threshold (p=.067), although the coefficient is very similar to the original model. Thus, the robustness of the ethnic polarization effect is somewhat called into question by the results in Table 3.3. Nevertheless, the coefficient remains clearly positive in any possible model specification and

[56] Turkey and South Africa did not fit into any regional group.

the evidence still suggests that countries that are more heterogenous in ethnic terms exhibit higher levels of affective polarization. Overall, Model 3 confirms the robustness of the previously presented findings.

3.5 Discussion

In this section, I discuss the most significant theoretical and empirical implications of the findings presented in this chapter.

Regarding the theoretical implications, the findings appear to give a clear edge to rational theories over the identity approach, as the variables that pertain to ideology and valence overwhelmingly outperform partisan identity and ethnic polarization. However, I hope that this chapter helps to advance the idea that to really understand what drives affective polarization, we have to look past the rationality versus tribalism debate that has developed in the US literature. These broad system level results indicate that under certain structural conditions, the degree of affective polarization is systematically higher. This suggests that intense partisan hostility has logical underpinnings and does not simply appear just on the basis of (irrational) heightened partisan identity. The fact that partisan identity strength is not even a statistically significant predictor of affective polarization in the fully specified model is very telling on that matter. Nevertheless, rational considerations can be - and to some extent most likely are - clouded by in-group bias. The results regarding the effects of quality of governance and ethnic heterogeneity on affective polarization suggest that partisan affect can be a result of a complicated combination of rational calculus (e.g. disliking a party based on its perceived corruptness/incompetence) and tribal feelings (e.g. assuming that 'your party' is less corrupt/more competent than the others). However, I suggest not to dismiss non-ideological foundations of affective polarization as just irrational and identitarian.

In empirical terms, I believe that the variety of determinants that - according to the results presented in this chapter – can have an independent effect on partisan feelings only proves the utility of the affective polarization approach. Ideological polarization measures are empirically always bounded to some pre-determined issues and dimension, whereas affective polarization is much freer from any arbitrary choices. Ideological polarization is very often measured based on the single left-right dimension, which clearly falls short of capturing the 'actual' degree of polarization in some cases. For example, based on ideological polarization

data that can be obtained from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, we would be driven to a conclusion that countries such as South Africa and Montenegro exhibit very low levels of polarization, whereas The Netherlands and Iceland are more polarized than most other democracies. I do not insist that such conclusions are false; yet, I find them to be incomplete. Studies conducted mostly among US partisans indicate that voters' feelings towards parties drive their political and even social behavior, regardless of what causes these feelings. I see no reason to believe that this is not the case in other parts of the world. Thus, affective polarization should also be studied in order to obtain a more complete understanding of the nature of political competition in different countries.

Such broad system level results as presented in this chapter, however, cannot reveal the more nuanced mechanisms that might lead to affective polarization. Future research should shed more light to the linkage between quality of governance and affective polarization. At the system level, the concepts of government effectiveness and corruption were empirically indistinguishable, but more specific studies could be able to disentangle these variables, as competence and integrity are not conceptually equivalent to each other. I believe that corruption (integrity) could be an especially promising variable for understanding affective polarization, as parties do not just blame each other for not being able to tackle corruption, but also in being engaged in corrupt activities themselves (Curini 2018). This is likely to invoke even more negative feelings than incompetence, which is not necessarily a malicious act as is engaging in corruption. In many surveys people are asked whether they trust political parties in general, but I am not aware of surveys that ask such questions party-by-party to find out whether people think that some parties are trustworthy, whereas others are not. Such data would be very useful in revealing the reasoning behind affective polarization. Similarly, I believe that the connection between ideological and affective polarization should be studied in a more nuanced way, as there are intuitive reasons to believe that the so-called cultural issues pertaining to topics like race and morality are more polarizing than classic socioeconomic issues (Hetherington and Rudolph 2015). Cross-national comparisons and country case studies with more detailed data could shed light on the influence ideological polarization on different dimensions has on partisan feelings.

4. Ideological tripolarization, partisan tribalism and institutional trust: The foundations of affective polarization in the Swedish multiparty system[57]

4.1 Introduction

Manifested in a political sphere characterized by hostility and incivility towards political opponents, affective polarization is causing concerns in many democracies across the world (Gidron et al. 2019). Nonetheless, most of the literature on the topic has hitherto concentrated solely on the United States, where a dramatic increase in partisan animosity between the Democrats and Republicans has occurred over the last decades (Iyengar et al. 2019).

In the very recent years, comparative cross-national research has emerged and the findings unequivocally confirm that affective polarization is also evident in most other countries. Regarding the potential determinants of affective polarization outside the US context, however, the existing research is scarce and has mostly dealt with identifying the system level correlates (Gidron et al. 2018; Lauka et al. 2018; Reiljan 2020; Wagner 2020; Boxell et al. 2020; Harteveld 2019), while we still lack studies that examine the foundations of affective polarization at the individual level in other countries.[58] Thus, we do not know whether the findings that pertain to US two-party context expand to other countries with more complex party configurations. Several authors have called to bridge the gap between the Americanists and the rest of the world, advocating for developing a comparative research agenda of affective polarization (Iyengar et al. 2019; Gidron et al. 2019).

In this chapter, we take a step towards bridging this gap by studying the individual level correlates of affective polarization in Sweden. The overall degree of affective polarization in Sweden is relatively high compared to most other Northwestern European countries (see Chapter 2, Table 2.1), but – unlike in the USA – it has remained rather stable over the last decades (Boxell et al. 2020). Yet, under these seemingly still waters, several significant sub-trends emerged. A remarkable affective in-bloc consolidation occurred since

[57] Based on an article co-authored with Alexander Ryan and publised in Scandinavian Political Studies (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9477.12194).

[58] The exceptions are the three studies mentioned in the Introdution chapter (Huddy et al. 2018; Viciana et al. 2019 and Satherley et al. 2020), but, as mentioned, the different methodological approaches and limited country sample do not allow for making broader conclusions.

the 1980s among both right- and left-of-centre parties, as voters became much more positive towards the other parties within their own ideological camp. Meanwhile, the hostility towards the opposing party bloc did not increase. Nevertheless, strong partisan animosity is acutely present in Sweden on account of the extremely negative attitudes towards the right populist Sweden Democrats (SD) who entered the parliament in 2010 (Ryan & Reiljan 2018). The described affective structure is, thus, tripolar, consisting of consolidated centre-right and -left party blocs, and the unaligned right-populist party.[59] To unpack the patterns of affective polarization in such context, we outline a more nuanced methodological design that accounts for the multipolar nature of the party competition. As we will demonstrate in the empirical part of this chapter, an elaborated approach that distinguishes between the different camps and conflict dimensions in the party system is crucial to reach correct conclusion about the predictors of partisan feelings.

Our findings regarding the foundations of affective polarization tap into the ongoing debate, where one camp emphasizes the importance of partisan identities ('partisan tribalism'), whereas others see ideological disagreement as the central driver of partisan affect (Lelkes 2019). Utilizing nationally representative survey data, we show that, although partisan tribalism is evident also in Sweden, policy disagreement is a more crucial driver of partisan feelings as compared to partisan identity strength, especially if we look solely at the negative sentiment towards the opposing parties. We confirm that the relationship between ideological and affective polarization corresponds to the tripolar party system structure: while the affective polarization between centre-right and -left blocs is predominantly linked with socioeconomic policy stances, the hostility towards the right-populist SD connects mostly with cultural issues. However, partisan identity strength and policy attitudes do not tell the whole story. We also reveal that the degree of anti-establishment attitudes is important, especially for understanding the foundations of affective polarization on the centre-right/populist right conflict dimension. Although Sweden had unusually consolidated party blocs during the studied period, a similar ideological configuration is evident also in several other European party systems (Kriesi et al. 2008). Moreover, there is evidence of a tendency among voters to follow the ideological bloc logic in their affective evaluations in other European countries, too (see Chapter 2). Therefore, our findings are likely to have broader implications for multipolar party systems and to be relevant also outside of Sweden.

[59] This structure has been altered since the 2018 election. These developments will be discussed in the Discussion section.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, we outline a theoretical framework of affective polarization foundations in a (tripolar) multiparty system. Subsequently, we introduce the data and variable operationalization. Then, we provide a descriptive overview of affective polarization structure and trends in Sweden during the last decades. The analysis of affective polarization determinants is divided into two parts. First, we examine the polarization between the centre-right and -left blocs, and then focus on the populist right/mainstream blocs conflict dimension. The final section concludes and discusses the main implications of our findings.

4.2 Theoretical framework

In this section, we outline a theoretical framework to explain the variance in partisan affective polarization among Swedish voters. We build on the current US literature, but elaborate on it to adjust for the more complex nature of multiparty systems.

4.2.1 Partisan tribalism and ideological disagreement as the main drivers of affective polarization

Two competing theories have emerged over the past years to explain what induces (the rise of) affective polarization. The first approach - that could be termed 'partisan tribalism' (Webster & Abramowitz 2017) - posits that animosity towards political opponents increases when voters feel more attached to their own party. Partisan identity (PID) is considered as a social identity and the connection to the party is rather emotional than rational. Hence, voters with strong partisan identities are affectively more polarized, even if their actual policy attitudes are not that far from the opposing parties (Mason 2015; Iyengar et al. 2012). The second theory emphasizes the rational foundations of affective polarization and perceives policy (dis)agreement as the central determinant of voters' feelings towards the political parties. If voters and parties are ideologically more extreme, then the stakes are higher in politics, leading to more polarized feelings (Rogowski & Sutherland 2016; Webster & Abramowitz 2017; Lelkes 2019). Currently, these hypotheses have been tested almost exclusively in the US two-party context. Although the relative importance of each variable is still contested, there is clear evidence that both approaches have empirical backing: the results indicate that partisans with stronger PID and ideologically more extreme positions exhibit

higher levels of affective polarization, everything else controlled for (Webster & Abramowitz 2017).

We expand this debate into a multiparty context and propose that in Sweden, ideological dispositions should play a greater role in driving affective polarization as compared to partisan identities. This assumption rests on existing comparative work that has pointed out that cleavages have historically been more relevant in Western European party systems compared to the USA (Richardson 1991; Hetherington & Rudolph 2015). Despite the class dealignment between parties and voters that has occurred during the last decades, division over socioeconomic policy issues remains strong in Sweden (Aylott & Bolin 2015). With the rise of SD, the cultural/transnational dimension has also gained increasing importance in the Swedish party competition (Rydgren & van der Meiden 2018). Regarding the potential importance of PID, on the other hand, the dividing lines between parties in a segmented multiparty system like Sweden are not as clear-cut as in a two-party system. Voters can switch more easily between parties and attachment towards one party might not translate as easily into rejection of a single competitor as in a two-party system. Also, partisan identities are generally less visible in European countries compared to the United States, where they are often displayed openly, for example, through bumper stickers or yard signs (Westwood et al. 2018).

The aggregate level empirical trends also seem to align with our reasoning. Partisan identity strength has decreased in Europe over the last decades (Kayser & Wlezien 2011; Dassonneville & Hooghe 2018), contrarily to the USA (Mason 2015). Sweden is also part of this general trend, as the class-based attachment to parties has diminished substantially, resulting in lower numbers of strong party identifiers (Oskarson & Demker 2015). Nevertheless, affective polarization has persisted in Sweden (see Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 in the Results section). Also, the results from a wide sample of (mostly) multiparty systems presented in Chapter 3 of this dissertation indicate that, at least on macro level, ideological polarization has a stronger positive linkage to affective polarization as compared to PID strength. These considerations lead to our first hypothesis:

H1: The effect of ideological disagreement on affective polarization is stronger than the effect of partisan identity strength among the Swedish voters.

4.2.2 Tripolar party system configuration and affective polarization

As explained above, the Swedish party system - at least during the period of 2010 to 2018 - could be divided into three parts: the centre-right Alliance (consisting of Moderates (M), Liberals (L), Centre (C) and Christian Democrats (KD)), the left-of-centre Red-green bloc (consisting of Social Democrats (S), Greens (MP) and the Left Party (V))[60] and the unaligned populist right Sweden Democrats. Until the 2010 election, the socioeconomic left-right dimension was clearly dominant in the Swedish political competition and all seven parliamentary parties were gathered into either the centre-right or -left bloc (Aylott & Bolin 2007). In 2010, SD managed to gain seats in the parliament for the first time and have since then steadily increased their vote share up to 17.5 percent in the 2018 election. The rise of SD has opened the second dimension in the Swedish party system, comprising of cultural identity-related issues (most notably immigration). Although the mainstream parties initially tried to defuse the immigration issue (Heinze 2018), it became clear that the bipolar Swedish party system had transformed into a tripolar one. These developments placed Sweden in the same group with many other Western European democracies where such tripolarization had already taken place (Rydgren & van der Meiden 2018).

In a tripolar configuration, it is probable that different sets of issues determine the affect between different parties/blocs. While the centre-right and -left blocs differ from each other mostly on the socioeconomic left-right dimension, then the populist right party diverges from the others predominantly on the cultural axis (Kriesi et al 2008). Accordingly, we expect that between the centre-right and -left blocs, the socioeconomic division is the main driver of partisan affect, whereas between the mainstream (both centre-right and -left) parties and the populist right SD, it is predominantly determined by the issues that align with the cultural or 'transnational' (Hooghe & Marks 2018) dimension. Therefore, we present two hypotheses. First, we expect that the centre-right and -left bloc voters who are closer to the extremes of the socioeconomic left-right scale, have more negative feelings towards the opposing bloc, while the issues that pertain to the cultural dimension have less impact. This also implies that the ideological positions are in line with one's own ideological bloc, i.e. partisans are 'sorted' (Mason 2015).

[60] The left-bloc has been less institutionalized compared to the Alliance and The Left (V) is generally not perceived as a mainstream party; nevertheless, the three left-wing parties have still worked and occasionally even campaigned together. Thus, we also count the Left as part of the Red-green bloc in our analysis. See the 'Data and measurements' section and Online Appendix for the methodological justifications of this choice.

H2a: Affective polarization between the centre-right and the -left bloc is predominantly determined by the extent of disagreement on socioeconomic issues.

Accordingly, we predict that the voters of both the left and the right bloc who are more liberal on the cultural dimension issues such as immigration and more positive towards transnational integration, are more negative towards SD. Conversely, the SD voters who are more conservative/anti-integration, are more negative towards the mainstream blocs.

H2b: Affective polarization between the Sweden Democrats and other parties is predominantly determined by the extent of disagreement on the cultural/transnational issues.

4.2.3 Institutional trust and affective polarization

Affective polarization between the populist and mainstream parties, however, cannot be solely accountable to disagreement on cultural issues. Recent studies have revealed a strong asymmetry in the mainstream/populist right feelings in Sweden and in several other party systems, with the former being much more negative towards the latter than vice versa (Reiljan 2020; Helbling & Jungkunz 2020).[61] This applies also for centre/conservative-right voters, which suggests that even those who are ideologically not so distant from the populist right tend to dislike these parties. On the other hand, the populist right voters are almost unanimously against immigration, while their ratings towards mainstream parties are not universally negative and have notable variance. Therefore, some other variables must also be related to partisan affect on the mainstream/populist right conflict dimension.

To address this puzzle, we propose institutional trust as a potential variable that could be linked to partisan feelings between the mainstream and populist parties. In addition to holding nativist and culturally conservative views, right-populist parties often engage in anti-establishment/anti-elitist discourse, which is one of the central elements of populism. Political institutions are described as corrupt and as serving the interest of the mainstream political elite, rather than the general population. With such rhetoric, populists aim to corrode faith in the legitimate authority of elected representatives in liberal democracies (Norris & Inglehart 2019, 6). As a reaction to the rise of the populists and their anti-establishment rhetoric, the mainstream parties have often responded by asserting their pro-system stance and

[61] See the Appendix A1 for the like-dislike matrices of the European countries.

emphasizing the advantages of the established institutional structure (Mauk 2020, 47). Moreover, they have also engaged in anti-populist discourse that divides the party system into 'good democrats' and 'evil populists', the latter posing a threat to (liberal) democracy (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2018).

Such populist/anti-populist division has vividly occurred also in Sweden that is generally known as a well-performing democracy with a high level of institutional trust (Van der Meer 2017). According to the Chapel Hill Expert Survey data (2014), SD is the only parliamentary party in Sweden that scores very high (8.9 out of 10) on the salience of anti-establishment rhetoric. While SD portrays itself as a party of the 'common people' and a 'democratic victim', then the political mainstream has often depicted them as a racist and undemocratic party (Hellström et al. 2012, 201-202). This has led to a strict cordon sanitaire by both mainstream blocs that have ruled out any co-operation with SD (at least until 2018), leaving the party into an opposition throughout its whole existence (Heinze 2018). Accordingly, SD voters have much less trust towards the central democratic and social institutions of Sweden compared to the supporters of the other parties (Jylhä et al. 2019).

We hypothesize that this interplay of populist vs anti-populist rhetoric leads to a two-edged relationship between institutional trust and affective polarization on the mainstream/populist conflict dimension. Prior research on institutional trust shows that people's trust towards different democratic institutions is strongly correlated: if they (do not) trust one of them, they also (do not) trust the others (Christensen & Lægreid 2005). As such, the level of institutional trust can be seen as a general assessment of the country's prevailing political culture (Hooghe & Zmerli 2011: 4). Considering that both the centre-right Alliance and the leftist Red-green bloc have been in power in Sweden for at least two parliamentary terms during the last two decades, it is likely that voters equate these parties with the central institutions of the country. Therefore, higher trust towards institutions should be associated with more positive perceptions of the mainstream blocs. SD, on the other hand, is the most relevant party in Sweden that could be seen as a challenger to the establishment and this could lead to negative reactions from the voters that have high trust towards the institutions.

Based on this discussion, we present two hypotheses. First, we assume that SD voters that have higher institutional trust are affectively less polarized towards both mainstream blocs. Although trust is generally low among SD voters, there is more variation regarding that variable as compared to their very uniform anti-immigration stance (Jylhä et al. 2019). This

suggests that some SD voters strongly align with the party on both the cultural/transnational and anti-establishment dimensions, while others only on the former. We propose that higher trust towards institutions links with lower polarization towards Alliance and Red-Green bloc, regardless of the cultural dimension position.

H3a: The higher the trust towards the Swedish political and social institutions among the Sweden Democrat voters, the less affectively polarized they are towards the mainstream party blocs.

Regarding the attitudes of the mainstream blocs' voters towards SD, we expect this relationship to have an opposite direction. Numerous studies link political trust to higher compliance with the regime (Marien & Hooghe 2011; Hooghe & Zmerli 2011). Therefore, if the mainstream parties are seen as synonymous with the central institutions in Sweden, we expect the mainstream voters with high levels of trust to be more responsive to their anti-populist rhetoric, leading to a more negative perception of SD. This linkage should be especially relevant for explaining the loathing towards SD among centre-right supporters who tend to be ideologically closer to the populist right compared to left-wing partisans (Webb & Bale 2014).

H3b: The higher the trust towards the Swedish political and social institutions among the mainstream voters, the more affectively polarized they are towards the Sweden Democrats.

4.3 Data and measurements

We rely on data from the national SOM-survey, which is the most commonly used random probability survey of Swedish residents. To give overview of the affective polarization trends, we use the whole range of data from 1986 to 2016. In the regression models of affective polarization predictors, we use pooled data from the years 2010-2016[62], as in 2010 the Sweden Democrats party entered the parliament and the parliamentary parties have remained the same since then. The SOM-survey predominantly uses postal surveys where the respondents were divided into 3-6 independently sampled sub-groups of around 3000 observations, and the net response rate varied between 50 and 60 percent during the period (Weibull et al. 2016; Arkhede et al. 2017). We use fixed effects for years and also performed

[62] Except for 2013 that is excluded, because one of the socioeconomic left-right items was not in the survey in that year.

the analyses separately for each year as a robustness check (see Appendix C2, Figures C2.1-C2.6).[63]

4.3.1 Measurements

Affective polarization

To measure our dependent variable, *affective polarization,* we use the classic party like-dislike scale (see Reiljan 2020; Wagner 2020). The survey question asked respondents to evaluate the national parties on an 11-step scale from -5 ('strongly dislike') to 5 ('strongly like'). To ease the comparison with other similar surveys, we recode the scale to range from 0 (strong dislike) to 10.

Calculating affective polarization also requires an item that captures the respondents` party belonging (*in-party*). For this, we use a survey item that asked the respondents 'which party they prefer today'. This constitutes a more lenient definition of party belonging than the self-reported party identification that has been often used in affective polarization studies, including the two previous chapters of this thesis. It has the upside of including a larger part of the sample and, additionally, enables us to test the effect of partisan identity strength more comprehensively (see the 'Independent variables' sub-section).

Thus, our individual level affective polarization measure is based on the like-dislike evaluations that supporters of different parties assign to their in-party and to the competing out-parties. However, we introduce an additional distinction within out-parties to provide a more fine-grained operationalization, allowing us to test the previously outlined hypotheses. As explained earlier, Swedish voters evaluate other parties from their own ideological bloc favorably[64], suggesting that in-bloc parties are considered rather as allies than competitors. Consequentially, our key predictor variables have the opposite effect on feelings towards in- and out-bloc parties, e.g. for an Alliance party supporter, a socioeconomically more leftist position associates with lower evaluations towards other Alliance parties and more positive feelings towards Red-green parties. Therefore, in order to obtain valid results regarding the predictors of affective polarization, we exclude in-bloc party evaluations from the affective polarization calculation.

[63] Differences between survey years explain only a marginal share of variation in the dependent variable, as the intra class correlation with random intercepts for survey year remains under 2.5 per cent in most models.
[64] See Appendix C1 for all the party-by-party like-dislike evaluations.

As explained before, the right-populist SD is not aligned with either of the blocs. This indicates that a threefold bloc-division (centre-right, centre-left and the unaligned Sweden Democrats) is suitable for summarizing the patterns of affective polarization in the Swedish context for 2010-2016 period, both in terms of the like-dislike evaluations and distinguishing the effects of the key predictor variables. It also makes the presentation of the analyses clearer and allows us to include more observations.

Our primary measure of *affective polarization*, therefore, is the difference between like-dislike evaluations towards voter's in-party and out-bloc (average rating assigned to the out-bloc parties).[65] This constitutes an elaborated version of a classic in-party/out-party evaluation difference based affective polarization measure (see Iyengar et al. 2012; Reiljan 2020). Additionally, to shed more light on partisan hostility in particular, we run models where the dependent variable is *out-bloc evaluation*, which captures only the feelings towards out-bloc parties, not accounting for the in-party ratings. To summarize, the two dependent variables are:

a) *Affective polarization* = In-party evaluation – out-bloc evaluation; b) *Out-bloc evaluation* = average evaluation of out-bloc parties.

For affective polarization variable, higher values indicate higher polarization, whereas for out-bloc measure, lower values indicate more hostility towards the out-bloc. For both measures, the out-bloc party evaluations are weighted by the vote share of each party, so that larger parties count more. The individual's degrees of affective polarization are calculated separately for both parts of the empirical analysis (centre-right vs -left bloc; Sweden Democrats vs mainstream blocs). Appendix C1 contains a more elaborate explanation on how the affective polarization measures were calculated.

Independent variables

First, to control for the *in-bloc party evaluations* that were excluded from affective polarization calculations, we include the weighted average evaluation towards the other parties in respondent's ideological bloc as an independent variable ('in-bloc').

Partisan identity strength is a categorical variable with three options: strong, weak or no PID. Respondents were asked whether they consider themselves a convinced supporter of

[65] Huddy et al. (2018) use a similar approach; however, they do not elaborate on how to handle the tripolarity of the party configuration and treat the system as bipolar (it remains unclear whether they exclude Sweden Democrats from the analysis or not)

their preferred party. Strong identity is assigned to respondents who answered 'Yes, very convinced', weak identity corresponds to the answer 'Yes, somewhat convinced' and the answer 'No' indicates no PID. All regression models use the middle option (weak identification) as the reference category.

Issue positions are measured by survey questions that pertain to socioeconomic and cultural/transnational dimensions. *Socioeconomic left-right* attitudes are operationalized via an index composed of two highly correlated items: privatizing healthcare and reducing the public sector.[66] For *cultural/transnational* positions, we employ three different items separately: a) *immigration* (stance on a proposal that 'Sweden should take in fewer refugees'). b) *environment* (stance on the proposal that 'We should invest more in an environmentally friendly society'). c) *European integration* ('Generally speaking, what is your attitude towards the EU?').[67]

All these questions were answered on a 5-point Likert scale. We have used the original scaling and the socioeconomic left-right index is also coded to range from 1 to 5. The only exception is the environmental attitudes item: due to a very skewed distribution, we recoded it into a dummy variable with positive responses (very good or somewhat good proposal) in one category, and neutral and negative responses in the other category. We then recoded all the policy variables in a way that higher values indicate more polarized positions in relation to the opposing ideological bloc/party. For example, in the centre-right and -left bloc analysis, higher values indicate more socioeconomically leftist, environmentally friendly, pro-immigration and EU-skeptical attitudes for Red-green voters and the opposite for Alliance supporters.

Institutional trust is measured with an index consisting of a series of items: confidence in Swedish parliament, politicians, media and the court system. We coded the index to go from 1 to 5, with higher values indicating greater trust.

Finally, we include a dummy variable of *political interest* and a set of demographic controls (education, gender and age). See Appendix C for the descriptive statistics (C2) and a more detailed explanations of how all the variables were operationalized (C1).

[66] These two questions have been constantly asked from all the respondents in all the years, allowing us to avoid losing a high number of cases.

[67] Besides the EU-issue, these were some of the most salient issues for Swedish voters (Martinsson & Weissenbilder 2018). Additionally, they were among a limited number of policy issues asked to the same respondents that also answered the like-dislike item.

4.4 Results

4.4.1 The structure and trends of affective polarization in Sweden

We start by summarizing the dynamics of average in- and out-party evaluations in Sweden, without the previously described additional distinction between the in- and out-bloc parties. This has been the approach used to measure affective polarization in recent cross-national studies (see Reiljan 2020; Wagner 2020; Boxell et al. 2020). The aggregate data presented in Figure 4.1 largely corresponds to the findings of Boxell et al. (2020): the overall degree of affective polarization has been rather stable in Sweden over the last decades and has even slightly decreased compared to the 80s, although the depolarization trend has marginally turned since Sweden Democrats emerged on the political arena.



Figure 4.1. Average in- and out-party evaluations in Sweden (1986-2016). Notes: Evaluations are on a scale from 0 to 10. Only the parties that reached the parliament are included. Out-party evaluations are weighted by party size. Years displayed on the x-axis indicate the election years. Source: Swedish National SOM-survey, 1986-2016

The average in-party evaluation line in Figure 4.1 reveals a cyclical trend. Affect towards one's own party usually bounces up by about half a scale-step during the election year and then decreases, reaching the lowest point precisely between the two general elections. In

election years, the average in-party evaluation in Sweden reaches as high as 8.6-8.7, which is a very positive rating compared to many other countries. For comparison, the Democratic and Republican supporters in the US gave their parties the average evaluation of 7.5 in 2016.[68] This could relate to the much more segmented nature of the Swedish party supply, which allows voters to find a party that is very close to their ideal preferences. The average out-party evaluation does not follow such a clear pattern and has fluctuated between 3.6 and 4.4 throughout the last thirty years. This would suggest that the out-party negativity in the Swedish party system is rather moderate; for example the US Democrats and Republicans evaluate the other party, on average, with less than 3 out of 10.

However, as explained before, looking only at the aggregate average evaluation towards all out-parties hides several crucial distinctions. The left panel of Figure 4.2 displays the average evaluations within and between the centre-right Alliance and the left-of-centre Red-green bloc. The most evident time trend in Figure 4.2 is the surge of in-bloc evaluations from around 5-5.5 in the 1980s to above 6-6.5 more recently. Similarly to in-party evaluations, we see that in-bloc ratings become especially positive in election years. This reflects the increased co-operation and joint campaigning between the in-bloc parties that started to occur especially since the 2006 election (Aylott & Bolin 2007).

Average out-bloc evaluations between the two major blocs have almost always remained between 3 and 4. Thus, negative affect is clearly evident between the blocs, but it has not increased over the last decades and is less intense compared to the Democrat-Republican animosity in the USA. Fluctuations in out-bloc party ratings are not that much determined by the election cycle as we see regarding in-party and in-bloc evaluations. This could be perceived as a positive finding, as it seems that the electoral campaigns in Sweden rather bring people closer to their own party and bloc than induce hostility towards the political opponents. Also, a certain 'winner's grace' seems to occur among the supporters of the currently incumbent bloc: Alliance voters' evaluation towards the Red-green bloc increased notably during their governing periods of 1991-1994 and 2006-2014, whereas the Red-green supporters became gradually more positive towards the Alliance during the 12-year period between 1994 and 2006 when Social Democrats held the office.

[68] As shown in Table 2.2 in Chapter 2, the average in-party evaluation in European countries is around 8.0.



Figure 4.2. Average in- and out-bloc evaluations within and between the centre-right and -left blocs, and between the Sweden Democrats and the two blocs. Notes: Evaluations are on a scale from 0 to 10. All evaluations except the ones towards SD are weighted by party size. Years displayed on the x-axis indicate the election years. Source: Swedish National SOM-survey, 1986-2016.

Yet, the right panel of Figure 4.2 demonstrates vividly that intense partisan loathing also exists among Swedish voters. The evaluations towards the populist right SD have been strikingly negative across both blocs since 2007 when the party started gaining in the polls. Among Red-green voters, the average evaluation has constantly remained below 2 and around two thirds of them have assigned the lowest possible evaluation of 0 to SD. Alliance supporters' ratings to the populist party have improved over the last decade, but even in 2016 they were still substantially more hostile towards SD than towards the Red-green bloc. The like-dislike evaluations towards SD indicate a level of animosity that goes far above the Democrat-Republican loathing in the USA. SD voters, on the other hand, are not that militant towards the mainstream parties and evaluated both out-blocs with around 4 out of 10 in 2014. Since then, they have become significantly more negative towards the Red-green parties, but in 2016, there was still an approximately 2 scale-step asymmetry in the affective polarization between SD and both mainstream blocs.

4.4.2 The foundations of affective polarization between the mainstream right and left blocs

In this section, we examine the predictors of affective polarization between the two mainstream party blocs in the Swedish political system – Alliance and the Red-green bloc. Figure 4.3 displays the OLS regression coefficients on affective polarization as measured by the difference between in-party and average out-bloc evaluation (black dots) and on average out-bloc evaluation separately (grey dots). The regression analysis reveals that party

identification (PID) and placement on socioeconomic left-right issues are the two most important predictors of affective polarization between the two mainstream blocs in Sweden. Voters with strong PID and socioeconomic stances further from the centre of the scale are significantly more polarized. This indicates that, similarly to the USA, partisan affect between the two major blocs in Sweden appears to be driven by a combination of policy- and (partisan) identity-based considerations.



Figure 4.3. The predictors of affective polarization and out-bloc evaluation between the Alliance and the Red-green bloc. Notes: The dots display the OLS regression coefficients with 95% confidence intervals (robust standard errors). On policy variables, higher values indicate more rightist/conservative/pro-EU attitudes for Alliance and leftist/liberal/anti-EU for Red-green. Source: Swedish national SOM-survey; 2010-2016 pooled.

Regarding our first hypothesis (H1) of ideology being a more important predictor of partisan affect than PID, the results are somewhat mixed. Looking at the effects on the in-party/out-bloc evaluation difference based affective polarization measure (black dots in Figure 4.3), PID is clearly the most dominant variable in the model. Among the voters of both blocs, moving from no PID to a strong PID corresponds to a 2.7-point increase in affective polarization, all other variables controlled for. Considering that parties were evaluated on a 0-10 scale, this is undoubtedly a massive effect. Regarding the socioeconomic policy stances, a

one-step change on the 1-to-5 scale brings about an approximately 0.8-point and 0.5-point shift in affective polarization for Red-green and Alliance voters, respectively. The direction of the effect is as expected: the most left-wing Red-Green voters and the most right-wing Alliance supporters exhibit the highest degree of affective polarization, whereas the voters that are ideologically unaligned with their own party/bloc on socioeconomic issues have much less intense partisan feelings. Considering that around 10 per cent of Red-green and as many as one third of Alliance voters are placed right-of-centre and left-of-centre, respectively, on the socioeconomic dimension, this relationship is certainly substantial. Nevertheless, if we compare the variables directly in terms of effect size, PID exceeds all the ideological variables.

However, the effects of PID and ideological variables diverge significantly in the way they are distributed between the two components of affective polarization – in-party and out-bloc party evaluations. As we can observe from Figure 4.3, the black and grey dots are almost diametrically opposite to each other regarding the effect of ideological variables, which means that moving towards the ideological extremes decreases the out-bloc evaluation and increases the in-party/out-bloc evaluation difference to approximately the same extent. This indicates that the effects the policy positions have on affective polarization are almost solely accountable to the fact that ideologically less centrist voters (if they are aligned with their party/bloc) dislike the opposing bloc more, while the evaluation of one's own party is virtually unaffected by ideological placements. As for partisan identity strength, the black dots display an approximately two times higher coefficients than the grey ones, indicating that the negative effect PID has on out-bloc feelings is roughly equal to the positive impact it has on in-party evaluations. Such distribution of effects is intuitively rather logical: it is not surprising that voters who feel more attached to their own party also assign that party a higher like-dislike evaluation. Regarding policy positions, on the other hand, it is not so obvious that (mainstream bloc) voters with more intense ideological convictions like their own party more, considering that none of these parties - with the possible exception of the Left Party (V) in the Red-green bloc – is considered ideologically extreme.

The different effects of PID and policy attitudes are illustrated in Figure 4.4, which displays the predicted in-party and out-bloc evaluations at different levels of PID strength and ideological placements. The left panel of Figure 4.4 demonstrates the symmetric effect of PID on the two components of affective polarization, while the right panel illustrates the effect of the most dominant ideological variable - socioeconomic left-right placement. As we see from

the right panel of Figure 4.4, the in-party evaluation lines are almost flat, indicating the very weak link between the left-right placement and voters' rating of their own party, whereas the out-bloc prediction lines signify a massive negative impact. While the socioeconomically rightist Red-green voters and leftist Alliance supporters have moderate feelings towards the opposing bloc, then the voters who are ideologically sorted with their party and have the most intense left-right positions, have the predicted out-bloc evaluation of below 3. Thus, if we look exclusively at the component of affective polarization that is deemed most problematic - the hostility towards competing parties - then the effect of socioeconomic stances is even slightly larger as compared to PID.



Figure 4.4. Predicted in-party and out-bloc evaluations between Alliance and Red-green bloc, based on partisan identity strength and socioeconomic attitudes (fully specified model). Notes: The predicted values are displayed with 95% confidence intervals. On the socioeconomic scale, 1 indicates the position that is most unaligned with one's in-party, 3 is the centrist position and 5 is the most extreme position that is in line with one's in-party.

As already described, the socioeconomic left-right placement is the strongest ideological predictor of affective polarization between the two mainstream blocs, with the effect size far greater than the variables that pertain to the cultural/transnational dimension. This offers firm

support for the first half of our two-part hypothesis that relates to the tripolar nature of the Swedish party system (H2a). Nonetheless, the coefficients of cultural/transnational variables are also in the expected direction and some of them quite notable in terms of effect size. Alliance voters who are critical towards taking in refugees and an ambitious environmental policy are more negative towards the Red-green parties, while attitude towards the EU has no significant effect. Conversely, among Red-green voters, the effects of refugee policy and environmental attitudes are small and statistically significant only for the former. The EU attitude, on the other hand, is a rather strong predictor, as more anti-EU Red-green supporters display greater dislike towards Alliance. The EU has not been a particularly salient issue in the Swedish debate, but it is possible that it captures segments within the Red-green bloc that remain critical towards the EU as a primarily capitalist project and this is associated with having more negative feelings towards the centre-right bloc.

Figure 4.3 also reveals several other significant predictors of affective polarization. In-bloc evaluations have a positive effect on affective polarization, mostly because the voters who like the allied parties more tend to also evaluate their own party better, while the relationship with out-bloc evaluations is negligible. Conversely, the respondents that are interested in politics tend to dislike the opposing bloc more, especially among Red-green supporters. The strongest variable besides ideology and PID, however, is institutional trust. This relationship is predominantly accountable to out-bloc evaluations, as more trusting voters have warmer feelings towards the opposing bloc. Considering that both blocs are usually perceived as political mainstream and have held power during the period of study (2010-2016), such strong mutual effect is not surprising. In the next section, we will address the importance of institutional trust in explaining affective polarization more thoroughly.

4.4.3 The foundations of affective polarization between the Sweden Democrats and the mainstream blocs

In this section, we focus on the predictors of affective polarization between the populist right SD and the two mainstream blocs. Like in the previous part, we ran OLS regression models[69]

[69] It should be noted that evaluations towards SD are highly skewed, as more than half of the mainstream blocs' voters have assigned them the lowest possible like-dislike rating. Hence, the models of mainstream voters' attitudes towards SD should be treated with some caution. As a robustness check, we also performed logistic regression models, where we show the effects the same independent variables have on the probability

and coded the policy-related variables contrary to the out-parties` position, so that higher values indicate greater polarization.[70] The results are presented in Figure 4.5.

Regarding the relative importance of policy attitudes and PID, our hypothesis (H1), again, finds partial, yet substantively very crucial support. The black dots on the two upper panels of Figure 4.5 confirm that PID strength does have a significant increasing effect on affective polarization among mainstream bloc voters (measured as the difference between the evaluation between one's own party and SD). Yet, the impact is smaller compared to the refugee stance, which is the strongest policy variable in the model. Moreover, the grey dots indicate that the effect PID has on direct dislike towards SD is very weak among both voter blocs. This demonstrates that the intense loathing towards the populist challenger party has almost no grounding in partisan tribalism: voters with strong, weak and no PID are all very prone to strongly dislike SD. Policy variables, conversely, have a strong effect also on the dislike towards SD. The two lower panels of Figure 4.5, on the other hand, indicate that among SD voters, PID strength is a very important predictor of feelings towards the mainstream blocs. Considering that SD has been the only unaligned party in Swedish politics, it is not surprising that the strongly attached partisans are more militant towards the rest of the field.

The second half of our ideological tripolarization hypothesis (H2b) - stating that affective polarization between the mainstream blocs and the populist right should be predominantly linked to cultural/transnational issues - is confirmed to a large extent, but not unequivocally. The two lower panels of Figure 4.5 that depict the predictors of affective polarization among SD voters towards mainstream blocs, offer somewhat ambiguous results. As expected, there is very little variance among SD voters regarding the immigration stance (81% have taken the most anti-refugee position), making it difficult to discern its impact on affective polarization. We have dummy-coded this variable in SD models, comparing the effect of being most anti-refugee with all other positions from most pro-refugee to rather anti-refugee. Although this variable is a significant predictor of affective polarization in the expected direction, its effect is smaller compared to the socioeconomic left-right positioning. Figure 4.5 demonstrates that the more right-wing/pro-free market SD voters dislike the Red-

---

of having a very negative evaluation/high affective polarization towards SD. The results corroborate our main findings (see Table C2.6 in Appendix C2).

[70] However, the positioning on the socioeconomic left-right scale for mainstream blocs is coded as in the previous section: higher values indicate a more leftist position for Red-green and a more rightist position for Alliance voters.

green bloc more, while the opposite applies to their attitudes towards the Alliance. This could reflect the previous party preferences of the SD voters, as many of them were supporting either the Social Democratic party (S) or Alliance parties (especially the Moderates (M)), and the former S supporters are much more leftist in their socioeconomic stances (Jylhä et al. 2019). Our results suggest that this division has a considerable effect on how SD voters perceive other parties, despite that immigration issue is more central in SD's rhetoric.



Figure 4.5. The predictors of affective polarization and out-bloc evaluation between the two mainstream blocs and the Sweden Democrats (SD). Notes: The dots display the OLS regression coefficients with 95% confidence intervals (robust standard errors). On policy variables, higher values indicate more leftist/liberal/pro-EU attitudes for Red-green and rightist/liberal/pro-EU for Alliance voters. For SD voters, higher values indicate more conservative/anti-EU attitudes in both models and more rightist/leftist attitudes in SD to Red-green and SD to Alliance models, respectively. Source: Swedish national SOM-survey; 2010-2016 pooled

The two upper panels of Figure 4.5, however, lend overwhelming support to Hypothesis 2b. The refugee policy stance is by far the most dominant variable in both the Red-green and Alliance models. The grey dots indicate that this effect is mostly accountable to the increased dislike towards SD among those who are more pro-refugee. The fact that pro-immigration attitudes are linked to dislike towards SD is not surprising; yet, it is noteworthy that it dwarfed other predictors to such degree, especially among Alliance voters. Among Red-green voters, the socioeconomic placement also has a significant effect, but it is several times weaker compared to the impact of refugee policy. As illustrated in Figure 4.6, moving from the most anti-refugee to most pro-refugee position invokes a massive surge in affective polarization towards SD in both voter blocs, although the effect is even stronger among Alliance supporters. Yet, an equally interesting observation from Figure 4.6 is that even the most refugee-skeptical mainstream bloc voters are predicted to have a ca 5-point gap between their in-party rating and evaluation towards SD. This is, for example, higher than the average degree of affective polarization between the two mainstream blocs. Thus, also those mainstream voters who are against accepting more refugees, are prone to dislike SD.



Figure 4.6. Predicted degree of affective polarization towards Sweden Democrats among the Alliance and Red-green voters, based on the refugee stance (fully specified model). Notes: The predicted values are displayed with 95% confidence intervals.

Our final set of hypotheses (H3a/H3b) offers at least a partial explanation to the highly asymmetrical polarization between SD and mainstream parties. We proposed a two-edged relationship between institutional trust and affective polarization, and the results presented in Figure 4.5 offer substantial support for this theory. H3a receives especially ample confirmation, with institutional trust being a highly dominant variable in the SD voter models. Alongside strong PID, it is the best predictor of affective polarization towards the mainstream blocs among right-populist voters, and its effect is particularly strong on out-party evaluations (grey dots in Figure 4.5). The mainstream voter models reveal more mixed results. On bivariate level, there is a significant relationship with the expected direction for both blocs, as the more trusting centre-right or -left voters are more polarized towards SD. In the fully specified model, however, the effect remains significant only for Alliance supporters. Although the coefficient is not as high as in the SD voter models, it still confirms the proposed reversed relationship, at least between the populist and mainstream right parties.



Figure 4.7. Predicted degree of affective polarization between the Sweden Democrats and the Alliance, based on the level of institutional trust (fully specified model). Notes: The solid line indicates SD voters' polarization towards Alliance, the dashed line Alliance voters' towards SD. The predicted values are displayed with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 4.7 illustrates this finding by displaying the predicted degrees of affective polarization between SD and the Alliance, based on the level of institutional trust. We see that affective polarization is at an almost equal level among the least trusting SD and Alliance voters, but as the trust increases, the prediction lines move to opposite directions. One scale-step increase on the trust continuum corresponds to a massive 0.8-point reduction in affective polarization towards Alliance among SD voters. Although SD supporters are generally rather distrustful towards the institutions (average score of 2.6/5), about one quarter of them have a level of trust that exceeds the mid-point of the scale. For such SD voters, the predicted difference between their in-party and out-bloc evaluation towards Alliance is less than 3.5, which can be regarded as a very low level of affective polarization. Conversely, the dashed line for Alliance voters shows a significant increase in polarization as voters move up on the trust scale. Every scale-step brings about an almost 0.4-point upsurge, most of it accountable to stronger dislike towards SD. Considering that all other variables – including the refugee stance – are controlled for, this effect is certainly noteworthy and suggests that the generally high level of institutional trust in Sweden induces hostility towards the populist challenger.

4.5 Discussion

In this section, we will summarize and discuss the main implications of our findings that have unveiled the differentiated structure of affective polarization and its foundations in Sweden.

First, we find partial support for our first hypothesis, stipulating that the effect of ideological disagreement on affective polarization is stronger than the effect of partisan identity among Swedish voters. Similarly to what has been established about the Democrat-Republican conflict, both variables have a strong and distinct effect on affective polarization between voters from the left and right blocs. However, there are some notable differences in how they affect the two components of affective polarization: while PID strongly affects both in-party and out-bloc evaluations, the effect of ideological disagreement occurs only towards out-bloc parties. Moreover, the second part of our empirical analysis reveals that the overwhelmingly negative attitudes against the populist right Sweden Democrat party have almost no grounding in partisan identity strength. In sum, if we look exclusively at the more problematic component of affective polarization - the hostility towards competing parties - then the effect of ideological disagreement is larger as compared to PID. Thus, we can

conclude that intense partisan hostility can emerge without partisan tribalism. Considering that strong antipathy towards populist right parties is evident in several European multiparty systems, while partisan identification has been declining, it is likely that this finding could also apply to other countries with similar party system structures.

Regarding our second set of hypotheses, we find strong support that the structure and foundations of partisan feelings in Sweden largely correspond to the ideologically tripolar configuration of the party system. Socioeconomic placement constitutes the strongest policy related driver of affective polarization between the mainstream blocs, while cultural issues (mainly immigration) are most important between the SD and mainstream parties. Although this finding might seem rather intuitive, it entails important implications for affective polarization research in multiparty systems. Clearly, a simple distinction between in- and out-parties is not sufficient to unpack affective polarization in a more complex political system such as Sweden. Voters differentiate between in- and out-bloc parties, being much more positive about the former. As for the latter, there are additional distinctions; most notably, for a large share of respondents, the populist right SD is subject to very intense loathing as compared to other out-parties. The fact that also the predictors of these feelings differ party-by-party/bloc-by-bloc, is something that should not be overlooked in future research. It should not be assumed that voters' affect towards all out-parties is uniform and driven by the same underlying foundations. Using constructs that assign one general affective polarization score (regardless of whether it follows the mean-distance or spread-of-scores logic[71]) to an individual as dependent variables could lead to incomplete or even false conclusions. Thus, we advise the researchers to examine the affective structure of the respective party system before running any models to identify the voter level predictors of affective polarization in multiparty context.

We also add new insights regarding the intense loathing that the populist right parties are subject to in Sweden and many other countries. In accordance with our tripolarization hypothesis, the models demonstrate that the strongest predictor of affect towards Sweden Democrats is the attitude on accepting refugees. However, we reach a conclusion that the dislike towards the right populists exceeds what the policy- and PID-related variables would predict. We contribute to explaining this 'radical right penalty' by showing that at least among centre-right voters, higher trust in Swedish political and social institutions is linked to more

[71] See Chapter 1.

negative attitudes towards SD, while for SD voters the relationship is the opposite. This might reflect the mainstream voters' attachment to Swedish political culture in general, and perceiving SD as the most eminent threat to status quo. The extensive dislike towards SD, even among voters without a strong partisan identity, also relates to the concept of 'negative partisanship' that should be distinguished from positive attachment towards one's in-party (Wagner 2020; Mayer 2017; Medeiros & Noël 2014). It is likely that segments of the electorate identify more as against the right-populists than as being supporters of some other party. We hope that this phenomenon receives further attention and more precise survey questions will be developed to explain the asymmetric polarization vis-à-vis the radical/populist right parties.

Finally, in the light of the recent developments in Swedish politics, we want to point out the potential importance of (party) elite behavior in shaping affective polarization patterns among voters. Until recently, all the relevant parties in Sweden had ruled out any form of governmental collaboration with SD (Heinze 2018). This strict *cordon sanitaire* started to vane between the 2014 and 2018 general elections, as two of the Alliance parties - Moderates (M) and Christian Democrats (KD) – began showing some appeasement towards SD (Aylott & Bolin 2019). Although Alliance went to the 2018 election as a unified bloc, the disagreement over how to treat SD eventually led to its breakdown in the aftermath of the election. Preliminary data from 2018 post-election surveys indicates that Alliance voters are still sympathetic to other in-bloc parties, but a clear division over the attitudes towards SD has emerged within the bloc: while the Liberal (L) and Centre (C) party voters still exhibit overwhelmingly hostile feelings against SD, the M and KD supporters have become significantly more favorable towards the populist party (Svensson 2018). Such developments suggest that especially in the cases of incongruence between ideological and affective polarization (as the animosity towards SD goes beyond what ideological disagreement predicts), elite cues could have a crucial role in driving people's attitudes. We believe that elite-level affective polarization and elite-voter linkages constitute a promising avenue for future research.

5. Conclusion

The aim of this thesis has been to broaden our knowledge about the concept of affective polarization in multiparty systems across the democratic world. In the introductory chapter, I make a distinction between the political and social manifestations of affective polarization, the former signifying feelings towards parties as primarily political objects and the latter capturing the extent to which partisan feelings have spilled over into society at large (e.g. discriminating against out-partisans in different social situations). This thesis concentrates on the political aspect of affective polarization and does not add empirical knowedge about partisan prejudice on personal level. More precisely, I focus on three significant research gaps in the affective polarization literature outside the US context: conceptualization, measurement and the foundations of affective polarization in multiparty systems. In this chapter, I will summarize and discuss the theoretical, methodological and empirical contribution of this thesis to the emerging international affective polarization research. I will also analyze the broader implications of my findings, address the limitations of this study and sketch out further research avenues on the topic of affective polarization.

5.1 Summary of the main findings

In Chapter 1, I lay out a conceptualization of affective polarization in multiparty systems as a sum of all partisan conflicts. According to such a conceptualization, the degree of affective polarization in the party system is determined by the divergence of in- and out-party feelings among all (relevant) party dyads, and the relative importance of the polarized parties. This approach on affective polarization implies dividing voters into partisan groups according to their closest party, even if they are sympathetic towards more than one party in the system. Based on this understanding of the concept, I construct a system level index of affective polarization that indicates the average divergence of partisan affective evaluations between the one in-party and all the relevant out-parties, weighted by the electoral size of the parties. I introduce this novel measure – Affective Polarization Index (API) – in Chapter 2 and use it to rank the countries according to the degree of affective polarization also in Chapter 3.

I use the classic party like-dislike scale (ranging from 0 to 10) from the CSES survey to calculate API and estimate the degree of affective polarization in more than 40 democracies from every continent. This constitutes one of the first attempts to systematically rank the countries according to the level of affective polarization in the party system (see also Lauka et al. 2018; Wagner 2020). The results indicate that the United States that has hitherto been the epicenter of affective polarization studies is far from being the most polarized country. In fact, compared to a broad set of democracies, the degree of affective polarization in the United States is slightly below the sample average, at least when we are talking about the political manifestation of the concept that is studied in this thesis. The analysis also reveals a vast cross-national variation in the degree of affective polarization, although to a certain extent, affective polarization is detected in every studied country. The most affectively polarized country in my sample is Turkey. Very polarized partisan feelings are also evident in the only African country in the sample (South Africa), and in several Central Eastern and Southern European countries. The least affectively polarized country is The Netherlands. Consistently low levels of affective polarization are also recorded in Southeast Asian and Nordic countries.[72]

A large part of this thesis is dedicated to studying the foundations of affective polarization, both at the party system and at the individual level. I build on the current debate in the United States between the tribalist-identitarian theory that links affective polarization with heightened strength of partisan attachment, and the rational-ideological approach which posits that the central driver of partisan affect is policy disagreement. My results give partial support to both theories, although ideological disagreement appears to be a stronger predictor of affective polarization than partisan tribalism. I also show that in multiparty systems, the relationship between these variables tends to be more nuanced. Although affective polarization is correlated with partisan identity strength and ideological polarization, it is without a doubt a distinct concept from both. The results presented in this thesis clearly indicate that neither of these variables separately nor the two combined can account for most of the variation in the degree of affective polarization. Thus, while thoroughly studying the effects of partisan identity and ideology, I also look further to offer a more exhaustive understanding of the foundations of affective polarization.

In Chapter 3, I focus on explaining the cross-national variation in the levels of affective polarization at the party system level. In addition to ideological (left-right)

[72] Although Sweden and Denmark diverge from the three others and are closer to sample average scores.

polarization and average partisan identity strength, I find that government's inability to control corruption and function effectively (which correspond to the valence attributes of integrity and competence, respectively) is a very important driver of affective polarization. It has an especially strong negative relationship with out-party evaluations, suggesting that voters might be biased in favour of their own party when ascribing blame for negative governing outcomes. I also find that ethnically more heterogenous countries are systematically more polarized in affective terms, even if a range of other variables is controlled for. Moreover, while ideological polarization remains as a significant predictor of affective polarization in every possible model specification, then the effect of partisan identity strength disappears almost completely in a fully specifed model, although there is a strong bivariate correlation. This suggests that partisan tribalism, at least in most countries, does not simply appear by itself and there are structural reasons that give rise to it, simultaneously increasing the partisan attachments and affective polarization. In general, the results suggest that affective polarization might be a result of a combination of rational and tribalist considerations.

Chapter 4 focuses on the individual level predictors of affective polarization in Sweden and reveals several new nuances about the relationship between ideological convictions/partisan identity and affective polarization. Similarly to most US studies, we find support for both central theories of affective polarization foundations, as partisan feelings in Sweden are significantly associated with partisan identity strength and policy disagreement, although our findings give a slight edge to the latter. We find that among the voters of the mainstream parties, the strong, weak and non-partisans are all almost equally likely to loathe the right populist Sweden Democrats party, demonstrating that intensely negative partisan feelings can emerge without a positive attachment towards any party. We also show that the effect that policy differences have on affective polarization varies according to the conflict dimension. While the feelings between centre-right and -left blocs are mostly driven by socioeconomic stances, then by far the strongest predictor of disliking the right populist party is the attitude towards accepting refugees in the country. However, we find that the right populist party is highly disliked even among those mainstream party voters that are against immigration and transnational co-operation. We show that trust towards the central political and social institutions can, at least partially, explain this asymmetric polarization towards the right populists. While, on average, higher institutional trust leads to lower affective polarization, then this effect is reversed when it comes to evaluating the right populists. Thus,

the generally high level of institutional trust in Sweden appears to boost the negative feelings towards the populist challenger party.

5.2 Conceptualization and measurement of affective polarization

Having summarized the main findings, I will now proceed with a more in-depth discussion of the central themes of this dissertation, starting with the conceptualization and measurement that are very closely linked to each other.

My first central aim was to develop an index to cross-nationally compare the levels of affective polarization in a systematic way. As in most party systems the number of relevant parties is higher than two, developing such a measure also implied conceptual clarifications regarding how should we understand affective polarization in multiparty context. In Chapter 1, I introduced two approaches on conceptualizing and measuring affective polarization in multiparty context – the so-called mean-distance approach that I have used in my own work and the standard deviation (spread-of-scores) method proposed by Wagner (2020). The fundamental point of divergence between the two is whether we should measure the difference in like-dislike towards voter's one in-party and the relevant out-parties (the mean-distance method) or whether we should look at how large the spread of party evaluations is in general, without defining one's in-party. As I learned about the latter method only after I had already finished most of the theoretical and empirical work on my thesis, I was not able to provide an empirical comparison of the two measurements. However, when looking at the ranking of countries according to affective polarization scores, we can see several similarities between the results presented in this thesis, by Wagner (2020) and also Lauka et al. (2018) whose index is more similar to Wagner's than mine.[73] Turkey is ranking very high in all three lists (first, third and first, respectively) and the same applies to South Africa and several Central Eastern European countries. Similarly, the Netherlands and South-East Asian countries are at the bottom of the list in all three contributions. Nevertheless, further research is needed on the degree of convergence between these measurements. I hope that the conceptual and methodological comparison between the two approaches that I presented in Chapter 1 serves as a useful starting point for such studies.

[73] All three contributions relied on CSES data, making the results directly comparable.

Dividing voters into partisan groups and compiling their party evaluations into like-dislike matrices (see Table 1.1) is one of the core characteristics of my approach on studying affective polarizaton. I believe that this technique offers a chance to reveal many important nuances about partisan feelings in different countries, while it also entails limitations that could be especially problematic under certain conditions. The partisan like-dislike matrices that I rely on in all the chapters of this thesis give an elaborate overview of the affective structure of the party system. This allowed me to detect the systematic trend of asymmetric polarization on the mainstream/populist dimension, which has hitherto been overlooked in affective polarization literature (for one exception, see Helbling & Jungkunz 2020). Several other important details could be found by simply looking at the like-dislike matrices and many potentially very interesting research questions are still hidden there. On the other hand, these matrices do not include the people that have declared that they are not closer to one party compared to others (non-partisans). Omitting this group is especially problematic in countries where only a small amount of people identify with one party; consequently, I had to drop some countries from the sample due to this exact reason. Being able to include non-partisans into affective polarization calculation is undoubtedly an advantage that the standard deviation based method has over the mean-distance technique. Thus, the two approaches could complement each other and both can be useful for certain research aims and contexts.

One highly relevant implication that could clarify the substantive importance of affective polarization defined and measured either as a sum of all conflict dimensions (Reiljan 2020) or as the extent to which politics is divided into two distinct camps (Wagner 2020), is the potential linkage between affective polarization and the resilience/quality of democracy. McCoy and Somer (2019) - who consider affective polarization as a consequence of a broader concept of *pernicious polarization* - analyze evidence from eleven countries where such polarization has emerged and reveal a concomitant '...deterioration in the quality of democracy, leading to backsliding, illiberalism, and in some cases reversion to autocracy.' (p. 258) The conceptualization of McCoy and Somer (2019) aligns with Wagner (2020), as they also perceive pernicious polarization as a division between two camps with one dominant conflict line between them. However, the results presented in this thesis also give tentative support to my idea that a higher number of conflict dimensions could be even more problematic from the perspective of the functioning of democracy. The five affectively most polarized countries in my sample[74] – Turkey, Bulgaria, Hungary, Montenegro and South

[74] See Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3.

Africa – have all experienced deterioration or even an outright collapse (Turkey) of democracy compared to the early 2000s, according to the Freedom House political rights rating. The partisan like-dislike matrices reveal that the internally polarized oppositions add to the degree of affective polarization in these countries. While this is only very primitive evidence, it should at least raise a question about which type of affective polarization is more dangerous for democracy: the one where the parties have aligned into two hostile camps or the one that is closer to Sartori's notion of polarized pluralism that includes bi(or even tri)lateral oppositions.

Regardless of which conceptualization and measurement approach we rely on, the meanings of affective polarization as an aggregate and an individual level phenomenon should not be conflated (Wagner 2020). While ranking countries according to the degree of affective polarization and examining the within-country dynamics over time has some substantive meaning in itself, then simply ranking individuals is a rather insignifiicant endeavor. The interesting questions arise with regard to the individual characteristics that correlate with the divergence in partisan affect. Ward & Tavits (2019) and Wagner (2020) take a broad cross-national focus and use individual level affective polarization as an independent variable, showing that affectively more polarized individuals perceive politics as being more polarized also in ideological terms and are less satisfied with democracy, while being more likely to participate in political processes. Findings in Chapter 4 of this thesis, however, suggest that making conclusions about the individual level correlates of affective polarization based on such composite measures could overlook some important distinctions or even lead to misleading results in some cases. As shown, affective polarization between mainstream parties had significantly different correlates from the mainstream/populist dimension. Depending on the specific party system configuration, there could be a number of such differences that are likely to get lost in aggregation, while distorting the general results. For example, if being more affectively polarized towards some parties correlates with lower satisfaction with democracy, while similar feelings towards some other parties are linked with being more satisfied with democracy, the results could cancel each other out and lead to an understanding that there is no correlation between the two variables. Regardless of whether we use the mean-distance or spread-of-scores method, I suggest to be cautious in making statements about which types of individuals are more/less affectively polarized, using measures that lump all partisan evaluations into one variable.

The segmented nature of party evaluations that this thesis has revealed could also have implications for measuring some other concepts than affective polarization. Particularly, I

want to draw attention to the often used survey item of trust towards political parties. Although trust towards different political institutions such as parliament, government and parties tends to be highly correlated, the latter are usually subject to the highest level of distrust among citizens (Marien 2011; Ignazi 2017). However, such indicators leave it unclear which parties is the respondent thinking of when evaluating trust towards parties in general. As the partisan like-dislike data demonstrates, it is quite usual that people like one party to a very high extent; are rather symphatetic towards some out-parties, and moderately negative towards some others, while intensely disliking certain parties. How does the respondent combine such highly differentiated feelings into a general assessment of trust towards political parties? I believe that asking voters about their overall trust towards political parties is similar to asking the fans of some football club about how much do they love football clubs in general. Considering the knowledge gained from this thesis, I suggest to be very cautious when making broad conclusions based on general trust towards political parties. Rather, I would suggest to focus on questions like whether people think that parties are necessary (which gives much more positive results from the perspective of the reputation of political parties than the trust question, see Ignazi 2017), or ask about trust separately for each party, just as the like-dislike question is administered in the CSES questionnaire.

Finally, I want to revisit the distinction between the political and social manifestations of affective polarization that I introduced in Chapter 1. This thesis has focused solely on the former - a choice that was very much necessitated by data availiblity, as party like-dislike evaluations are the only cross-nationally available survey items that allow for measuring affective polarization. To take a step forward in cross-national affective polarization studies, we need to collect data that also taps into the social aspect of the concept. Few studies in a limited number of countries have already addressed this topic and found preliminary evidence that polarization at the party level induces distrust and discrimination between partisans in social interactions also outside the US context (Westwood et al. 2018; Helbling & Jungkunz 2020; Knudsen 2020). Yet, we know almost nothing about which structural conditions or personal characteristics induce/impede the spillover of affective polarization from the political arena to social life. While the results in this thesis have clearly indicated that at the political level, the degree of affective polarization in the United States in not exceptionally high, could it be different when we measure the social manifestations of the concept? The extent to which political polarization can divide the whole society into hostile camps is definitely an important avenue for further research.

5.3 Foundations of affective polarization

In studying the potential foundations of affective polarization, this thesis taps into the ongoing debate between the tribalist/identitarian and rational/ideological theories. Similarly to some recent findings in the US context (see Lelkes 2019; Orr & Huber 2020), my results rather give the edge to rational accounts of affective polarization. In the cross-national study, ideological polarization and quality of governance prove to be much stronger predictors of affective polarization than ethnic polarization and partisan identity strength. In the case study of Sweden, we see that policy positions are always very important predictors of affective polarization and the intense loathing towards the right-populist party is virtually unrelated to the in-party attachments of the voters. It appears that even if affective polarization correlates with the strength of partisan or social identities, it is not simply a matter of group competition per se, but there are structural reasons that underlie this linkage. Nevertheless, I am not suggesting to declare the definitive victory of the rational theory and dismissing the tribalist take on the foundations of affective polarization. Rather, I propose to combine the two theories and study the potential interplay between rational and tribalist motivations. Moreover, as we saw in Chapter 4, the widespread animosity towards the right populist party in Sweden is not sufficiently explained neither by partisan identity nor policy disagreement. This suggests that we should also look further than these two central theories on the foundations of affecitve polarization.

To combine the rational and tribalist approaches, I have connected valence theory with affective polarization literature. Indeed, basing one's evaluations of parties/politicians on their perceived competence and integrity could be seen as a rational behaviour, but if voters assume that their party exceeds others in terms of valence, this suggests that tribalist motivations might also be at play. I have used the system level quality of governance indicators to empirically support my hypothesis, but more nuanced data about people's perceptions regarding the competence and integrity of all the relevant parties in their country is needed to further substantiate this proposed linkage. Such data would allow to calculate valence polarization, i.e. the degree to which the competence/integrity of the parties diverges according to voters' perceptions. In Chapter 3, I implicitly assumed that such valence polarization is higher when the quality of governance is objectively lower. However, there could also be other variables that polarize voter perceptions about party capacities. The social media 'echo chambers' and the rise of partisan media could exaggerate the degree to which voters perceive their own party as more competent and less corrupt, regardless of the actual

capabilities of the parties. It is likely that people with stronger partisan identities are especially prone to such cognitive bias, which would corroborate the idea of rational motivations being distorted by partisan tribalism. Also, certain events and developments can induce the salience of valence considerations, one very obvious example being the global pandemic that has ravaged the world in 2020. That the competence of a party is in the eyes of the beholder is vividly illustrated by the United States, where around 80% of the Republican voters approve(d) Trump administration's handling of the crisis, while among Democrats this rating is less than 10%.[75] The concept of valence polarization (see Serra 2010) is hitherto almost completely ignored in the literature, but I believe it has great potential to help us understand the foundations of affective polarization better.

Another finding that suggests we should look further from the partisan identity and policy related variables is the systematic trend of asymmetric affective polarization between the right-populist parties and the rest of the field, the former being disliked much more intensely by the supporters of other parties than vice versa. The results from Sweden indicate that while the ideological approach fares better than partisan tribalism in explaining hostility towards the right-populists, it still leaves a substantial part of the puzzle unresolved, as mainstream voters dislike the populists even if they agree with them on central issues like immigration. Moreover, it is unclear why the populist voters are not equally militant towards other parties, considering that they should also perceive the distance on contentious ideological issues. Thus, the repulsion towards the populists goes further than policy disagreement. Such widespread rejection of parties that challenge the system relates to the concept of *region of acceptability*, introduced by Rabinowitz and MacDonald (1989). They claim that if a party fails to convince voters about its reasonableness and gets labelled as extremist, it gets penalized. While the right-populist parties have managed to attract a considerable amount of voters, it seems that for the majority of people, they fall out of the region of acceptability and the very low like-dislike ratings constitute the penalty for this. In this thesis, I go further from the identity/ideology framework by showing that in Sweden, higher trust towards central institutions is linked to more polarized feelings towards the populist challenger party, and it would be interesting to study whether this relationship holds also in other countries. However, the data that was at my disposal did not allow to study the more specific reasons why the right-populist parties fall out of the region of acceptability for a

[75] https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/coronavirus-polls/

large part of the electorate. Hopefully, future research will address this currently overlooked phenomenon.

Studying political elites and elite-voter linkages is one further avenue of research that could add crucial understanding about the foundations of affective polarization in the electorate. Regarding ideological polarization, it has been found that if party elites take more polarized positions, partisan voters tend to follow suit (Layman & Carsey 2002; Druckman et al. 2013). It is also reasonable to assume that if party elites openly exhibit negative feelings towards the political opponents, this induces affective polarization among voters. In the studies that have focused solely on the United States, this assumption has already found some confirmation, as affective polarization is shown to increase as a result of negative campaigning (Iyengar et al. 2012) and watching presidential debates (Warner & McKinney 2013). A recent experimental study by Huddy and Yair (2019) demonstrates that reading about a friendly interaction between high-profile Democrat and Republican politicians reduces affective polarization among voters. Such research about the impact of elite behaviour could be especially revealing in the situations like the previously described asymmetric hostility towards the populist parties, where affective polarization is higher than ideological disagreements would predict, or vice versa.

As explained in Chapter 2, affective polarization has always been treated as a demand side phenomenon in the existing literature, although it could theoretically also be applicable to the supply side of the political competition. I suggest we should broaden our knowledge about affective polarization by directly measuring it on the supply side, i.e. among party elites. Regarding ideological polarization, it is generally known that elites are, on average, more polarized than voters (Fiorina & Abrams 2008), and it is probably implicitly assumed that the same applies for affective polarization. However, no comparative evidence has hitherto been presented which confirms that party elites are actually more affectively polarized than voters. We could also raise the opposite hypothesis, considering that MPs - who constitute an important part of the party elite - meet their political rivals on a daily basis in their parliamentary work and it has been noted that their relations are guided by ‘elaborate rules of courtesy and respect’ and that ‘the advancement of careers, not the cultivation of principle, appears to be the true goal of political life’ (Warwick 1994: 3). Thus, we cannot rule out a possibility that the vitriolic language between top politicians is more of a spectacle for the voters than an expression of sincere animus. Comparing the degree of affective polarization and the overlap of evaluations towards the same parties among the party elites and voters

could give us a better idea about where the hostility originates from and what the potential ways for mitigating it are.

Finally, I want to acknowledge and discuss the limitations of this dissertation. First and foremost, my empirical analysis is restricted to cross-sectional conventional survey data, which allows to detect the relationships between variables, but not confirm causality. At least to some extent, there is a possibility for reverse causality regarding several relationships analyzed in this dissertation. For example, we can ask whether it is ideological divergence that drives affective polarization, or is the perception of higher ideological polarization between parties a consequence of partisan affect, as claimed by Ward & Tavits (2019). Regarding the potential linkage between valence considerations and affective polarization, this problem is probably most relevant, as voters are likely to shape their evaluations of party competence on the basis of the feelings they already hold towards the parties. Thus, while I believe that the broad and general approach of this dissertation has been useful to advance our knowledge about affective polarization, more sophisticated data and methods are needed to make explicit causal claims.

Following the recent developments in the US literature, experimental survey designs appear to constitute a promising way to address these issues regarding causality. Several important revelations about the foundations of affective polarization in the US context have already been made using experimental methods (see Rogowski & Sutherland 2016; Lelkes 2019; Orr & Huber 2020). First experimental studies have also emerged in Europe, but the focus has rather been on confirming the existence of affective polarization in a multiparty context, than scrutinizing its foundations (see Westwood et al. 2018; Knudsen 2020; Torcal et al. 2020). In addition, panel studies that track the attitude dynamics among the same individuals over time would allow to determine the directions of causal arrows. First examples of such data being gathered and used in affective polarization research have also appeared in Europe (see Harteveld 2019). Of course, due to finite resources, experimental and panel studies are usually limited to a small number of countries. Thus, we can hope that over time and country-by-country, the knowledge about the foundations of affective polarization outside the US context will accumulate.

Another limitation of this dissertation concerns individual level research, which is restricted to just one country – Sweden. As shown in Chapter 4, summarizing voter's feelings towards all parties into one variable might lead to inaccurate results regarding the predictors of partisan feelings at the individual level. That makes it difficult to conduct cross-national individual level studies, considering that the affective structures of party systems vary

significantly. When running individual level models with cross-national datasets such as CSES, I suggest to consider the hierarchical multilevel structure of the data: voters are nested into parties which are, in turn, nested into countries. Multilevel modelling techniques could help to disentangle the linkages between different variables in a valid way in such cross-national studies. The dependent variable would then be one individual's evaluation towards a specific party in a specific country. This would account for the very likely possibility that the predictors of partisan feelings vary across parties and countries, and help to avoid mistakes that might accompany aggregation. Of course, such research would again face the problem of not being able to confirm causality between variables. Nevertheless, it could help to map some relationships across a broader range of countries, and form a good basis for more specific hypotheses that could be, then, tested with more sophisticated data in a smaller country sample.

Next to elaborate statistical methods, I also want to emphasize the importance of a more qualitative perspective in affective polarization studies. A special issue of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, edited by Jennifer McCoy and Murat Somer, is a remarkable example of this type of research. Eleven country case studies offer a thorough overview of how pernicious polarization can develop on the basis of very different underlying foundations. Intensely polarized feelings between different groups are often rooted in deep social-political rifts that date back to the distant history of the country. Even the most elaborate and well-specified statistical models are not fully able to uncover this type of highly contextual linkages. Thus, qualitative methods such as process tracing should not be neglected in future research, if we want to obtain a more profound understanding about the foundations of affective polarization.

I hope that this dissertation shows the potential of the affect-based approach for revealing new aspects of the phenomenon of political polarization, and helps to induce the debate on the concept of affective polarization also outside the United States.

Supplementary material

Appendix A – Chapter 2

A1: Partisan group like-dislike matrices by country and year

The displayed scores indicate average party supporter like-dislike evaluations towards parties on a scale from 0 (strong dislike) to 10 (strong like). Rows signify the average scores that respective partisan group has evaluated other parties with, while the columns indicate average scores assigned to a respective party by other partisan groups. Grey cells on the diagonal of the matrix are the in-party evaluations. Vote shares signify parties' results in the parliamentary lower house elections. In case of a two-round electoral system, the first round results are used.

In all the countries and elections, relevant parties have been included into the CSES questionnaire.[76] Sample weights were used when provided in the dataset for respective country.

[76] The largest party that was left out was KDH in Slovakia that gained 4.9% of the vote, but did not get any seats in the parliament.

Austria

2008:

Party	Vote %	SPÖ	ÖVP	FPÖ	BZÖ	Grünen	LIF
SPÖ	29.3	**7.23**	4.25	2.36	2.14	3.47	2.16
ÖVP	26.0	3.94	**7.17**	2.47	2.30	2.73	1.87
FPÖ	17.5	3.20	3.35	**8.18**	4.85	1.95	1.57
BZÖ	10.7	3.87	3.60	5.40	**6.87**	2.45	2.46
Grünen	10.4	5.12	3.93	0.87	1.13	**7.43**	3.55
LIF	2.1	5.20	5.60	0.40	0.80	6.60	8.80

API score: 4.10

Bulgaria

2014:

Party	Vote %	GERB	KB	DPS	RB	PF	BBT	ATAKA	ABC
GERB	32.7	8.80	1.06	0.53	4.41	3.42	1.03	1.44	2.12
KB	15.4	1.37	8.93	0.85	1.67	2.39	1.13	1.35	4.23
DPS	14.8	2.73	4.51	9.02	2.38	0.38	0.97	0.16	3.61
RB	8.9	5.00	0.96	0.46	8.34	3.60	1.14	1.65	2.10
PF	7.3	3.54	1.77	0.08	4.08	8.85	2.08	2.92	3.24
BBT	5.7	2.29	0.71	0.29	2.86	2.40	7.57	0.86	1.43
ATAKA	4.5	1.53	1.75	0.19	1.82	3.06	1.32	8.62	1.38
ABC	4.2	3.04	4.71	0.79	3.30	2.70	0.63	1.67	8.71

API score: 6.68

Croatia

2007:

Party	Vote %	HDZ	SDP	HNS	HSS	HSU	HSP	HDSSB	IDS
HDZ	36.6	**8.07**	2.55	3.53	4.92	4.09	4.18	3.27	2.72
SDP	31.3	2.47	**7.62**	4.52	3.28	3.12	2.82	2.50	4.96
HNS	6.8	2.86	5.20	**7.86**	3.83	3.03	2.74	2.32	4.68
HSS	6.5	3.86	3.78	3.47	**6.62**	3.45	3.31	3.19	3.83
HSU	4.1	3.14	4.16	4.24	3.80	**7.43**	3.45	3.53	3.20
HSP	3.5	4.20	2.68	3.04	3.52	3.25	**7.36**	2.92	2.88
HDSSB	1.8	3.14	1.86	3.29	2.57	3.29	2.86	**8.86**	2.71
IDS	1.5	1.40	4.47	3.29	3.40	2.53	1.57	1.76	**6.73**

API score: 4.54

Czech Republic

2006:

Party	Vote %	ODS	CSSD	KSCM	KDU-CSL	SZ
ODS	35.4	**8.90**	2.30	0.81	4.22	**5.89**
ČSSD	32.3	2.31	**8.26**	3.96	3.26	3.97
KSČM	12.8	1.41	6.19	**9.01**	2.30	3.62
KDU-ČSL	7.2	4.78	4.27	1.47	**8.84**	5.17
SZ	6.3	4.61	4.20	1.59	3.60	**8.69**

API score: 5.63

2010:

Party	Vote %	CSSD	ODS	TOP 09	KSCM	VV	KDU-CSL	SZ
ČSSD	22.1	**8.40**	1.54	2.28	4.33	3.43	3.08	3.39
ODS	20.2	1.85	**8.42**	6.45	0.96	5.45	3.49	3.79
TOP 09	16.7	1.91	5.57	**8.60**	1.04	5.51	3.36	3.92
KSČM	11.3	5.52	0.97	1.66	**9.03**	2.60	2.94	2.94
VV	10.9	2.75	4.22	5.27	1.38	**8.71**	3.08	4.11
KDU-ČSL	4.4	3.65	4.14	3.85	1.30	4.09	**8.78**	4.47
SZ	2.4	3.06	3.44	2.57	1.42	4.66	3.31	**8.25**

API score: 5.25

2013:

Party	Vote %	ČSSD	ANO	KSČM	TOP09	ODS	ÚSVIT	KDU-ČSL
ČSSD	20.5	8.36	4.37	4.22	1.70	1.42	3.81	3.97
ANO	18.7	4.10	8.54	2.00	3.17	2.32	4.94	3.48
KSČM	14.9	5.82	3.18	9.12	0.98	0.85	4.00	3.08
TOP09	12.0	2.35	4.40	0.80	8.58	4.97	3.78	4.21
ODS	7.7	2.09	4.64	1.13	6.36	8.14	3.57	3.39
ÚSVIT	6.9	3.81	4.58	2.41	2.22	2.22	8.56	2.48
KDU-ČSL	6.8	3.82	4.50	2.09	3.57	2.93	3.62	8.50

API score: 5.23

Denmark

2007:

Party	Vote %	V	S	DF	SF	KF	RV	Y	EL	KD
V	26.3	**8.80**	4.51	4.93	3.59	6.66	3.45	2.93	1.01	2.29
S	25.5	3.61	**8.27**	2.19	6.94	3.69	5.32	2.21	3.21	3.09
DF	13.9	6.88	4.63	**9.02**	4.14	4.94	2.63	1.33	1.13	1.84
SF	13.0	2.71	6.76	1.54	**8.85**	3.36	5.72	2.39	5.00	3.62
KF	10.4	7.39	4.34	3.88	3.66	**8.55**	3.72	3.55	0.74	2.51
RV	5.1	3.80	6.44	0.82	6.75	4.35	**8.39**	3.52	3.52	4.21
Y	2.8	5.27	5.00	1.27	5.47	5.87	5.73	**8.20**	2.43	3.69
EL	2.2	1.58	5.61	0.27	7.24	2.22	5.06	2.16	**8.88**	3.33
KD	0.9	4.80	5.53	2.20	4.77	5.82	4.54	2.64	1.85	**7.33**

API score: 4.24

Estonia

2011:

Party	Vote %	RE	KE	IRL	SDE	EER	ER
RE	28.6	**8.37**	1.76	**5.68**	5.14	4.38	2.68
KE	23.3	1.85	**8.34**	1.98	**4.28**	3.82	3.48
IRL	20.5	**6.4**	1.94	**8.51**	5.79	4.3	2.62
SDE	17.1	4.47	2.98	**4.83**	**8.27**	4.18	3.12
EER	3.8	4.57	2.58	5.24	**5.32**	**7.62**	2.3
ER	2.1	3.67	4.14	4.36	**5.46**	4.15	**6.15**

API score: 4.46

Finland

2007:

Party	Vote %	KESK	KOK	SDP	VAS	VIHR	RKP	KD	PS
KESK	23.1	**8.48**	5.79	4.93	3.38	4.78	4.14	5.02	4.88
KOK	22.3	6.03	**8.48**	4.28	2.39	4.56	2.43	5.14	4.76
SDP	21.4	5.09	3.91	**7.84**	4.30	4.97	2.31	3.89	3.95
VAS	8.8	3.88	2.04	5.45	**7.92**	5.44	2.88	3.14	4.73
VIHR	8.5	4.72	4.32	5.57	5.14	**8.19**	4.22	3.76	3.74
RKP	4.6	5.73	6.29	4.63	2.62	4.90	**8.70**	4.68	2.51
KD	4.9	5.58	4.88	4.65	3.73	5.10	4.08	**8.70**	5.58
PS	4.1	5.02	4.43	4.79	3.74	4.83	3.35	4.32	**8.14**

API score: 3.67

2011:

Party	Vote %	KOK	SDP	PS	KESK	VAS	VIHR	RKP	KD
KOK	20.4	**8.73**	4.95	3.68	5.24	2.43	4.23	5.13	3.94
SDP	19.1	4.08	**8.03**	4.35	3.77	5.45	4.25	3.47	3.44
PS	19.0	3.81	5.23	**8.37**	3.61	3.93	2.92	2.29	3.75
KESK	15.8	6.29	4.83	4.56	**7.98**	3.40	4.33	4.04	4.37
VAS	8.1	2.45	6.14	3.44	3.29	**8.53**	5.46	3.20	2.09
VIHR	7.3	4.87	5.66	2.21	4.65	5.71	**8.24**	4.70	2.83
RKP	4.3	5.74	5.31	1.76	4.24	3.56	4.68	**8.42**	4.41
KD	4.0	5.54	5.35	6.27	5.38	3.46	3.73	3.75	**8.73**

API score: 4.02

2015:

Party	Vote %	KESK	KOK	PS	SDP	VIHR	VAS	RKP	KD
KESK	21.1	**8.25**	5.32	4.78	4.43	4.21	3.00	4.06	4.65
KOK	18.2	6.03	**8.17**	3.81	4.23	4.44	2.20	5.31	4.37
PS	17.7	5.48	3.61	**8.33**	4.31	3.44	3.44	2.70	3.63
SDP	16.5	4.78	3.55	4.02	**7.83**	5.06	4.80	3.74	3.57
VIHR	8.5	4.37	3.82	2.06	5.06	**8.20**	5.56	4.53	2.37
VAS	7.1	3.97	2.22	2.33	5.51	6.67	**8.24**	3.21	2.24
RKP	4.9	5.24	6.09	1.65	4.68	6.00	3.16	**8.89**	3.79
KD	3.5	6.55	5.35	5.66	5.05	4.37	3.61	4.36	**8.64**

API score: 3.88

France

2007:

Party	Vote %	UMP	PS	MoDem	FN	PCF	LV	LCR
UMP	39.5	**8.11**	3.33	4.60	1.73	1.31	3.07	0.85
PS	24.7	3.31	**7.28**	4.19	0.56	3.48	4.63	2.94
MoDem	7.6	5.20	5.01	**7.13**	0.51	2.24	3.80	1.85
FN	4.3	4.86	3.23	2.93	**7.32**	2.02	1.86	1.68
PCF	4.3	1.31	4.35	2.45	0.33	**8.35**	4.02	4.65
LV	3.3	3.26	5.56	4.07	0.59	3.52	**7.11**	3.67
LCR	3.4	1.26	4.91	2.90	0.36	4.79	4.33	**7.77**

API score: 4.45

Germany

2005:

Party	Vote %	SPD	CDU/CSU	FDP	Linke	A90/Greens	NPD
SPD	34.3	**7.64**	3.44	3.44	2.83	5.47	0.46
CDU/CSU	35.2	3.32	**8.03**	5.87	1.06	2.94	0.45
FDP	9.8	3.38	6.18	**8.17**	1.64	3.05	0.72
Linke	8.7	4.61	2.47	2.74	**7.46**	4.16	0.62
A90/Greens	8.1	6.38	2.93	3.06	2.98	**7.95**	0.13
NPD	1.6	2.42	3.93	4.18	2.34	2.37	**5.87**

API score: 4.25

2009:

Party	Vote %	CDU/CSU	SPD	FDP	Linke	A90/Greens
CDU/CSU	33.8	**7.92**	4.29	5.71	1.99	3.86
SPD	23.0	4.07	**7.54**	3.68	4.18	5.44
FDP	14.6	5.90	3.64	**8.17**	2.12	3.68
Linke	11.9	2.58	4.87	2.68	**8.17**	5.14
A90/Greens	10.7	3.47	5.68	3.42	4.94	**8.16**

API score: 3.80

2013:

Party	Vote %	CDU/CSU	SPD	Linke	A90/Grüne	FDP	AfD	Pirates
CDU/CSU	41.5	**8.72**	5.26	2.18	3.80	4.61	2.57	1.57
SPD	25.7	4.74	**8.09**	4.11	5.60	2.50	2.46	2.40
Linke	8.6	2.96	5.47	**8.68**	5.05	1.56	3.70	3.64
A90/Grüne	8.4	4.62	6.39	4.21	**8.15**	2.65	3.18	3.26
FDP	4.8	6.39	5.09	2.95	3.89	**7.12**	4.37	2.55
AfD	4.7	4.40	3.99	3.92	4.22	4.54	**8.39**	3.68
Pirates	2.2	3.30	4.81	5.16	5.99	2.78	3.23	**8.50**

API score: 4.10

Note: CDU and CSU were asked separately in the questionnaires, but as their election result is common, I coded CDU and CSU together for the average like-dislike scores. The like-dislike of other party supporters towards CDU/CSU will be determined by their evaluation of CDU solely, as CDU is clearly the dominant party in the coalition.

Great Britain

2015:

Party	Vote %	Con	Lab	UKIP	Lib	Green
Con	36.8	7.75	3.02	3.23	4.17	3.35
Lab	30.4	2.89	7.26	2.03	4.15	5.21
UKIP	12.6	4.11	2.85	8.72	2.37	2.55
Lib	7.9	4.26	4.05	1.63	7.39	4.63
Green	3.8	1.93	5.11	1.10	4.18	8.55

API score: 4.48

Greece

2009:

Party	Vote %	PASOK	ND	KKE	Laos	Syriza	OIK
PASOK	43.9	**8.23**	3.05	3.08	2.22	3.53	4.53
ND	33.5	4.24	**7.85**	2.87	4.21	2.43	3.17
KKE	7.5	3.23	1.94	**8.28**	1.00	3.53	3.50
Laos	5.6	4.59	4.44	3.31	**7.81**	1.93	2.58
Syriza	4.6	4.86	2.59	4.59	1.05	**7.02**	5.40
OIK	2.5	4.70	2.65	3.87	1.91	4.91	**6.91**

API score: 4.54

2012:

Party	Vote %	ND	Syriza	PASOK	ANEL	XA	DIMAR	KKE
ND	29.7	**7.33**	1.38	1.78	2.34	1.90	3.33	1.97
Syriza	26.9	1.61	**7.73**	1.30	3.44	0.74	3.31	4.48
PASOK	12.3	3.08	2.21	**7.13**	1.82	0.66	4.77	2.37
ANEL	7.5	2.40	3.56	0.73	**7.83**	3.08	2.48	1.95
XA	6.9	3.36	1.19	0.97	3.83	**8.31**	2.47	1.25
DIMAR	6.3	3.50	3.26	3.37	2.04	0.52	**7.54**	3.46
KKE	4.5	1.03	3.47	0.71	1.54	0.45	1.97	**8.63**

API score: 5.45

Iceland

2007:

Party	Vote %	IP	SDA	LGM	PP	LP	IM
IP	36.6	**8.33**	4.93	3.71	3.82	3.15	2.09
SDA	26.8	4.89	**7.95**	5.28	2.72	3.25	3.27
LGM	14.4	3.68	5.73	**8.26**	2.51	3.66	4.53
PP	11.7	5.74	4.17	3.26	**7.34**	2.93	1.22
LP	7.3	4.76	4.95	4.41	2.89	**7.98**	2.48
IM	3.3	4.00	5.60	6.10	1.70	3.50	**8.44**

API score: 3.81

2009:

Party	Vote %	SDA	IP	LGM	PP	CM	LP
SDA	29.8	**7.49**	2.60	5.82	3.12	4.24	2.23
IP	23.7	3.51	**7.30**	3.00	4.87	2.73	2.01
LGM	21.7	5.53	1.81	**7.98**	3.14	4.90	2.87
PP	14.8	3.65	4.28	4.39	**7.75**	3.29	2.64
CM	7.2	3.97	2.05	5.03	3.00	**7.67**	3.00
LP	2.2	3.83	3.17	3.75	2.92	2.56	**7.50**

API score: 3.85

Latvia

2010:

Party	Vote %	V	SC	ZZS	LNNK	PLL
V	31.2	**7.78**	2.53	4.66	4.59	2.27
SC	26.0	2.79	**8.36**	4.20	1.23	3.03
ZZS	19.7	4.58	2.72	**8.06**	3.56	2.93
LNNK	7.7	5.24	1.65	5.18	**7.53**	2.64
PLL	7.7	3.84	3.84	4.68	3.21	**7.42**

API score: 4.50

Montenegro

2012:

Party	Vote %	DPS	NSD	SNP	PCG	BS
DPS	46.3	**8.92**	1.81	2.28	2.67	3.31
NSD	23.2	1.51	**6.56**	4.52	3.55	1.62
SNP	11.2	2.86	4.30	**6.22**	3.98	2.07
PCG	8.4	2.76	3.08	3.45	**8.00**	2.16
BS	4.2	4.43	2.37	2.67	3.38	**4.48**

API score: 5.25

Netherlands

2006:

Party	Vote %	CDA	PvdA	SP	VVD	PVV	GL	CU	D66	SGP
CDA	**26.5**	7.93	5.04	5.38	5.93	3.26	4.71	5.98	4.40	4.66
PvdA	**21.2**	5.17	7.76	7.04	4.33	2.52	6.09	4.81	5.08	3.39
SP	**16.6**	4.76	6.50	8.33	3.89	2.69	6.36	5.17	4.81	3.48
VVD	**14.7**	7.07	4.76	4.77	7.53	4.14	4.35	5.10	4.95	4.02
PVV	**5.9**	5.00	4.90	5.51	5.08	7.36	4.35	4.00	3.71	3.65
GL	**4.6**	5.10	6.66	7.38	4.12	1.84	7.83	5.61	5.47	3.93
CU	**4**	7.08	4.48	5.03	4.22	2.35	4.61	8.61	3.18	6.24
D66	**2**	5.55	6.40	6.36	5.60	1.96	6.43	5.12	7.25	3.26
SGP	**1.6**	7.42	3.57	3.35	4.74	3.23	2.64	8.25	2.48	8.79

API score: 2.69

2010:

Party	Vote %	VVD	PvdA	PVV	CDA	SP	D66	GL	CU	SGP
VVD	20.5	**7.65**	4.77	3.29	5.81	4.18	6.35	4.66	4.36	3.21
PvdA	19.6	4.88	**7.56**	2.03	4.9	6.1	6.33	6.51	4.41	3.26
PVV	15.4	5.51	4.2	**6.83**	4.58	4.81	5.02	4.41	4.21	3.38
CDA	13.6	6.32	5.74	2.64	**7.67**	4.54	6.09	5.12	5.59	4.2
SP	9.8	4.51	6.1	2.29	4.46	**7.77**	6.07	6.62	3.86	2.69
D66	6.9	5.66	6.12	1.64	5.06	5.66	**7.88**	6.94	4.18	2.53
GL	6.7	4.35	6.85	1.3	4.65	6.72	6.72	**8.43**	4.36	2.78
CU	3.2	5.42	6.13	2.18	7.16	5.23	4.98	5.11	**8.15**	6.42
SGP	1.7	5.05	4.36	4	6.91	3.05	2.38	2.9	7.1	**8.91**

API score: 2.83

Poland

2005:

Party	Vote %	PiS	PO	SRP	SLD	LPR	PSL	PD	SDPL
PiS	27.0	**8.12**	4.88	3.10	1.58	3.83	3.67	2.16	2.01
PO	24.1	5.33	**8.04**	1.80	1.99	2.19	3.37	3.13	2.67
SRP	11.4	4.41	3.63	**8.22**	2.08	3.66	3.94	1.96	2.53
SLD	11.3	3.18	3.70	2.42	**6.84**	1.10	3.67	2.50	4.40
LPR	8.0	6.09	3.47	3.21	1.59	**8.42**	3.59	2.40	2.06
PSL	7.0	4.11	3.22	4.38	2.68	3.00	**7.11**	2.30	2.76
PD	2.5	3.92	5.80	0.64	2.20	0.42	2.88	**7.40**	3.92
SDPL	3.9	3.69	3.69	1.87	3.28	0.94	3.00	3.44	**7.15**

API score: 4.37

2007:

Party	Vote %	PO	PiS	LiD	PSL
PO	41.5	**8.03**	1.96	3.74	5.34
PiS	32.1	3.28	**8.17**	1.63	3.34
LiD	13.2	5.30	1.40	**7.11**	4.70
PSL	8.9	4.83	3.13	2.95	**7.26**

API score: 4.73

2011:

Party	Vote %	PO	PiS	RP	PSL	SLD
PO	39.2	**7.87**	1.38	2.58	**4.27**	3.33
PiS	29.9	2.50	**8.23**	0.70	3.70	2.17
RP	10.0	4.68	1.47	**7.79**	3.47	4.07
PSL	8.4	4.87	3.23	1.24	**7.50**	3.35
SLD	8.2	4.68	1.51	2.73	4.36	**6.95**

API score: 5.22

Portugal

2009:

Party	Vote %	PS	PPD-PSD	CDS-PP	BE	CDU
PS	36.6	8.23	3.34	3.01	4.19	3.56
PPD-PSD	29.1	3.56	**8.15**	4.85	2.82	2.37
CDS-PP	10.4	3.12	5.25	**8.32**	2.25	2.94
BE	9.8	3.85	2.94	2.90	**7.98**	4.20
CDU	7.9	3.57	2.45	2.38	4.69	**8.39**

API score:4.72

2015:

Party	Vote %	PàF	PS	BE	CDU
PàF	38.6	8.89	2.83	1.91	1.68
PS	32.3	2.07	8.81	5.04	3.92
BE	10.2	1.52	4.61	9.24	5.61
CDU	8.3	1.40	5.37	6.12	9.30

API score: 6.14

Serbia

2012:

Party	Vote %	SNS	DS	SPS	DSS	LDP	URS	SRS
SNS	24.1	**8.86**	2.28	5.19	3.91	1.04	2.86	3.42
DS	22.1	3.44	**7.62**	3.58	2.87	3.33	3.07	1.42
SPS	14.5	6.46	3.13	**8.68**	3.97	1.30	2.83	2.74
DSS	7.0	5.17	2.72	3.31	**8.55**	1.23	2.17	2.88
LDP	6.5	3.54	4.30	2.07	1.20	**7.83**	2.23	0.76
URS	5.5	4.77	4.44	5.46	2.97	2.07	**8.70**	1.52
SRS	4.6	4.61	1.49	3.50	4.01	1.18	1.96	**7.49**

API score: 4.89

Slovakia

2010:

Party	Vote %	Smer	SDKU-DS	SaS	KDH	Most	SNS	SMK	LS-HzDs
Smer	34.8	**8.79**	2.70	2.30	3.81	2.89	4.49	1.26	3.40
SDKU-DS	15.4	3.06	**8.48**	5.29	5.39	5.12	2.37	1.71	2.25
SaS	12.2	3.46	5.96	**8.53**	4.31	4.96	2.15	1.41	1.58
KDH	8.5	4.04	5.82	3.67	**8.82**	4.16	2.78	1.61	2.54
Most	8.1	2.48	7.49	6.87	5.69	**9.36**	0.64	4.25	1.55
SNS	5.1	6.71	2.23	2.48	3.03	1.61	**8.10**	0.71	3.39
SMK	4.3	2.13	6.29	5.52	6.25	7.17	0.50	**8.46**	2.13
LS-HzDs	4.3	6.53	2.00	2.06	3.18	2.88	4.71	0.94	**8.94**

API score: 5.14

2016:

Party	Vote %	Smer	SaS	Olano	SNS	LSNS	SR	Most	Siet
Smer	28.3	8.65	2.36	1.78	6.17	2.23	2.16	4.72	2.02
SaS	12.1	1.73	8.79	6.08	2.94	2.82	4.34	2.95	2.68
Olano	11.0	1.70	5.96	8.70	2.78	2.37	3.12	3.81	3.00
SNS	8.6	5.69	3.08	2.16	8.56	2.25	2.83	4.33	2.24
LSNS	8.0	1.79	3.47	2.85	3.13	8.63	3.41	2.54	1.70
SR	6.6	3.00	4.43	3.93	4.80	4.42	7.31	3.87	3.77
Most	6.5	3.65	4.24	4.25	2.79	1.15	3.13	9.35	2.41
Siet	5.6	4.67	5.67	3.00	7.67	2.67	2.67	5.33	8.67

API score: 5.38

Spain

2008:

Party	Vote %	PSOE	PP	CiU	EAJ-PNV	ERC	IU	BNG	CC-PNC	UPyD
PSOE	43.9	**7.32**	2.10	2.91	2.06	1.99	4.26	2.69	2.94	3.60
PP	39.9	2.03	**7.45**	1.91	1.06	0.82	1.13	1.23	1.98	3.65
CiU	3.0	4.55	1.91	**6.67**	4.00	2.80	3.14	2.92	3.60	2.25
EAJ-PNV	1.2	4.94	1.41	4.53	**7.56**	4.62	4.71	4.43	4.93	3.21
ERC	1.1	4.93	0.22	4.00	4.75	**6.85**	3.81	4.62	3.33	0.50
IU	3.8	5.34	1.16	2.52	2.27	3.02	**7.00**	2.86	2.39	2.33
BNG	0.8	5.36	0.82	3.25	2.13	3.25	4.64	**6.91**	3.29	3.88
CC-PNC	0.7	2.50	1.50	1.00	0.50	1.00	0.50	1.00	**4.50**	1.00
UPyD	1.2	4.25	4.25	1.70	0.90	0.91	2.75	1.00	2.14	**6.82**

API score: 5.02

Sweden

2006:

Party	Vote %	SAP	M	C	FP	KD	VP	G
SAP	35.0	**8.07**	3.73	3.93	3.71	3.17	4.76	4.84
M	26.2	3.42	**8.80**	5.99	6.24	5.46	1.66	3.08
C	7.9	4.16	6.22	**8.25**	5.45	4.80	2.35	4.00
FP	7.5	4.40	6.96	5.71	**8.25**	5.61	1.86	3.87
KD	6.6	3.38	6.87	6.40	6.03	**8.69**	1.60	3.47
VP	5.9	6.12	2.16	3.36	2.76	1.96	**8.36**	6.19
G	5.2	5.50	3.23	4.90	3.61	2.95	5.46	**8.56**

API score: 4.17

2014:

Party	Vote %	SAP	M	SD	MP	C	V	FP	KD	FI
SAP	31.0	8.36	3.81	1.37	6.10	4.13	5.39	4.09	3.43	3.75
M	23.3	4.11	8.53	2.30	3.38	6.12	1.86	6.22	5.28	1.52
SD	12.9	5.00	5.07	8.20	2.37	3.83	2.93	3.53	3.37	1.45
MP	6.9	6.32	4.21	0.62	8.50	4.83	5.67	4.06	3.23	5.26
C	6.1	4.37	6.59	1.37	4.14	8.29	2.30	5.63	5.31	1.68
V	5.7	6.73	2.80	0.45	7.18	3.08	8.57	3.24	2.18	6.55
FP	5.4	5.00	6.52	1.85	4.33	5.83	2.61	7.98	4.81	2.49
KD	4.6	4.21	6.97	1.93	3.90	6.45	2.17	6.34	8.52	1.71
FI	3.1	6.21	2.79	0.07	8.29	3.36	8.29	3.00	1.79	9.57

API score: 4.36

Switzerland

2011:

Party	Vote %	SVP	SP	FDP	CVP	GPS	GLP	BDP
SVP	26.6	**8.17**	3.19	5.70	4.63	2.84	4.35	4.45
SP	18.7	1.14	**8.13**	4.11	4.89	7.31	5.46	4.52
FDP	15.1	3.83	3.44	**8.10**	5.86	3.11	5.42	5.35
CVP	12.3	2.39	4.45	5.49	**8.23**	4.43	5.84	5.82
GPS	8.4	1.35	7.54	3.69	4.47	**8.50**	6.24	4.74
GLP	5.4	1.53	6.00	5.06	5.52	6.10	**8.44**	5.68
BDP	5.4	3.54	4.41	5.67	5.64	3.72	6.21	**8.25**

API score: 4.10

United States

2008:

Party	Vote %	DEM	REP
DEM	53.2	8.10	3.46
REP	42.6	3.91	7.03

API score: 3.97

2012:

Party	Vote %	DEM	REP
DEM	48.8	8.25	3.09
REP	47.6	2.91	7.34

API score: 4.80

A2: Measuring ideological polarisation in party systems

To measure ideological polarisation (IP) I employ the Party Polarisation index proposed by Dalton (2008).

There is no complete consensus over the way IP should be measured, especially in multiparty context (Kam et al. 2017). From the perspective of this chapter, the most crucial difference between alternative approaches is whether we should look at the ideological distance/range of the parties (either between the major left and right side parties, or the most extreme parties in the parliament) or the positions of all relevant parties in relation to others should be taken into account according to their size. I find the first approach not very suitable for multiparty systems, as it fails to account for the dynamics that take place between the main/most extreme parties and ignores the differences in relative importance of the parties (Schmitt 2016). Considering that my affective polarisation measure also includes all relevant parties and accounts for party size, I prefer the second approach of measuring IP in the system.

There is a number of different indices classifying under this second approach. Although they differ by exact formula type (variance, standard deviation or mean absolute difference based) and the weighting mechanism (party vote share of party seat share in the legislature), in essence these measures are similar and have shown to produce highly consistent results. Dalton's (standard deviation based) index has shown correlations of around 0.8 with other similar measures (see Schmitt 2016; Kam et al. 2017; Curini and Hino 2012). As Dalton's index is one of the most widely discussed and used polarisation measure, I find it a rather reliable and 'safe' option for measuring IP.

For weighting to account for party size, I prefer vote share over legislative seat share, because in several countries in my sample, also non-parliamentary parties are included into the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) questionnaire and I find it better to include as much information as possible. Completely irrelevant parties that receive less than 1% of the vote have been left out of the survey.[77]

[77] In Spain, some very small parties from the whole country perspective have been included, but these are regional parties that have gained a small representation in the parliament despite the very low vote share. Thus, they could still have some relevance in possible coalition formations.

Dalton's Party Polarisation Index

Dalton's polarisation index measures the dispersion of parties on the left-right dimension and is aimed to capture the standard deviation of party positions around the party system mean (also the party system mean left-right position is weighted by party vote shares, so larger parties have greater effect) (Dalton 2008: 906). The equation of the index is:

$$\text{Party Polarisation Index} = \sqrt{\left\{\sum(\text{Party vote share}_i) \times \left(\frac{[\text{Party LR score}_i - \text{Party system average LR score}]}{5}\right)^2\right\}}$$

In this equation, i represents the individual parties.

Party left-right (LR) scores are determined by public perceptions, using the CSES survey that is also used to calculate affective polarisation index. In the CSES questionnaire, respondents are asked to place the parties in the respective country on the left-right continuum ranging from 0 (left) to 10 (right). The left-right placement of each party is the average value that the respondents have assigned to that party. Accordingly, the index scores range from 0 (no polarisation, all parties placed on the same position) to 10 (maximum level of polarisation, parties in two extremes).

This index measures polarisation on the supply side of party competition, although via voter perceptions. It is possible that some respondents are not correct when placing the parties, but Dalton (2008: 909) believes that when all the answers are aggregated, the misperceptions should even out, giving a relatively reliable estimate of a party left-right position. A general look at the party LR scores used to make the calculations does not reveal any very noticeable anomalies: parties that are usually classified as left-wing are consistently placed on the left side of the spectrum, and right-wing parties to the right. Thus, the public perception scores are similar to some other more prominent methods to place political parties on ideological dimensions, such as expert surveys.

To also include an IP measure of the demand (voter) side, I again employ Dalton's formula, but use the average left-right self-placements (also ranging from 0 to 10) of party supporters as the average party positions. Partisan groups are determined by the survey question about feeling closer to one political party compared to the others (thus, the partisan groups are identical to the ones used in affective polarisation calculations).

The results indicate that supply side IP is consistently higher compared to the demand side, as parties are perceived to be further from the centre and each other than partisan groups. This is not surprising, considering that voters are usually ideologically less coherent and extreme than parties and many voters place themselves on the centre of the left-right continuum (Hetherington and Rudolph 2015), which pulls the average score towards the centre. Despite being somewhat closer to the centre, partisan are still aligned with their parties ideologically: left-wing party supporters are consistently placed to the left and right-wing partisans to the right side of the spectrum.

The correlation between the supply and the demand side index is above .9 in both the European country sample used in Chapter 2 and the global sample in Chapter 3. Essentially, the results are very similar, regardless of which precise measure is used. As Chapter 2 concentrates solely on the IP-AP linkage, I opted for the most comprehensive combined measured ($IPI=(IPI_{supply}+ IPI_{demand})/2$). In Chapter 3 I run multivariate models and utilized the most commonly used classic version of the index, i.e. the supply side measure.

A3: Other descriptive statistics by country and year

Table A3.1. Average in- and out-party evaluations, left-right polarization, and partisan and voter turnout percentages

Country	Year	Average (weighted)		Left-right Polarization			Partisan (%)	Turnout (%)
		In-party evaluation	Out-party evaluation	Supply	Demand	Combined		
Austria	2008	7.40	3.30	4.04	3.05	3.55	68.1	78.8
Bulgaria	2014	8.73	2.05	4.89	5.01	4.95	53.7	51.1
Croatia	2007	7.74	3.19	4.97	4.28	4.62	58.6	59.5
Czech Republic	2006	8.68	3.05	6.02	4.53	5.28	56.5	64.4
	2010	8.58	3.33	5.44	4.91	5.18	51.4	62.6
	2013	8.57	3.34	5.17	4.44	4.81	44.4	59.5
Denmark	2007	8.62	4.38	3.85	3.47	3.66	90.9	86.6
Estonia	2011	8.30	3.84	3.66	2.70	3.18	62.4	63.0
Finland	2007	8.27	4.61	3.65	3.42	3.54	74.1	67.9
	2011	8.34	4.32	3.47	3.35	3.41	75.7	70.4
	2015	8.22	4.34	3.10	3.01	3.06	67.8	70.1
France	2007	7.71	3.26	4.95	4.16	4.56	86.4	60.4
Germany	2005	7.82	3.56	3.12	2.74	2.93	80.3	77.7
	2009	7.89	4.09	3.69	2.76	3.22	62.8	70.8
	2013	8.39	4.29	3.29	2.52	2.90	66.4	71.5
Great Britain	2015	7.72	3.24	3.43	2.30	2.86	72.8	66.2
Greece	2009	7.99	3.45	3.66	3.41	3.54	68.8	70.9
	2012	7.61	2.15	4.78	4.47	4.63	51.6	62.5
Iceland	2007	8.08	4.27	4.13	3.08	3.61	71.2	83.6
	2009	7.60	3.75	4.19	3.06	3.63	68.2	85.1
Latvia	2010	7.95	3.46	2.57	2.19	2.38	54.6	63.1
Montenegro	2012	7.72	2.48	1.13	1.64	1.39	59.3	70.6
Netherlands	2006	7.89	5.20	3.80	3.31	3.56	69.9	80.4
	2010	7.63	4.79	4.09	3.41	3.76	69.3	75.4

Poland	2005	7.85	3.48	3.99	3.29	3.64	64.9	40.6
	2007	7.88	3.15	3.30	3.18	3.24	66.5	53.9
	2011	7.86	2.64	2.98	2.91	2.95	54.9	48.9
Portugal	2009	8.20	3.48	3.30	3.35	3.33	60.9	59.7
	2015	8.94	2.80	5.27	4.69	4.98	48.1	55.8
Serbia	2012	8.31	3.42	1.31	1.49	1.40	56.3	57.8
Slovakia	2010	8.71	3.57	4.01	3.33	3.67	76.9	58.8
	2016	8.62	3.23	4.02	3.51	3.77	44.7	59.8
Spain	2008	7.31	2.29	4.65	3.48	4.07	74.1	73.8
Sweden	2006	8.39	4.22	4.69	3.74	4.22	58.4	82.0
	2014	8.42	4.07	4.34	3.74	4.04	83.9	85.8
Switzerland	2011	8.21	4.11	4.28	3.33	3.81	71.7	48.5
United States	2008	7.63	3.66	1.75	1.48	1.62	87.1	58.3
	2012	7.80	3.00	2.44	1.57	2.01	76.4	54.9

Average weighted in-party evaluation is the arithmetic mean value of the score partisans give to their own party (from 0 to 10), weighted by party size.

Average weighted out-party evaluation is the arithmetic mean value of the score partisans give to the other parties (from 0 to 10), weighted by party size. Note that the difference between average weighted in-party evaluation and average weighted out-party evaluation equals the score of Affective Polarization Index.

Left-right polarization_supply is the classic Dalton index and indicates the polarization of political parties based on public perception. Respondents were asked to place the parties in the respective country on the left-right continuum ranging from 0 (left) to 10 (right). Party left-right score is the average value that the respondents have assigned to the party. These scores combined with party vote shares are used to calculate the polarization index. Note that scores presented are slightly different from the ones Dalton has provided (see http://cses.org/datacenter/usercommunity3/usercommunity3.htm), because I normalize the vote percentages, so it would match the way I calculate affective polarization.

Left-right polarization_demand is calculated using the same Dalton index formula, but instead of average public perception, each party is placed on the left-right continuum based on the average left-right self-placement (again from 0 to 10) of the supporters of the respective party.

Left-right_combined is the average value of LRP_supply and LRP_demand. This is the the indicator used in the models presented in the chapter.

Partisan % is the percentage of respondents that claim to feel close or at least somewhat closer to one political party than the others.

Appendix B – Chapter 3

B1: Supplementary statistics

Table B1.1. List of countries, election years and affective polarization index (API) scores

Country	Election 1		Election 2		Election 3		Election 4		Election 5		Election 6		Average API	API change
	Year	API	Year	API	Year	API	Year	API	Year	API	Year	API		
Australia	1996	4.41	2004	4.5	2007	4.86	2013	4.54					4.58	0.13 ↑
Austria	2008	4.10	2017	4.41									4.26	0.31 ↑
Bulgaria	2001	5.93	2014	6.68									6.31	0.75 ↑
Canada	2004	4.26	2008	4.37									4.32	0.11 ↑
Chile	2005	4.64	2009	4.64									4.64	0
Croatia	2007	4.54											4.54	-
Czech Rep.	1996	5.47	2002	4.9	2006	5.63	2010	5.25	2013	5.23			5.30	-0.24 ↓
Denmark	1998	4.45											4.45	-
Estonia	2011	4.46											4.46	-
Finland	2003	3.52	2007	3.67	2011	4.02	2015	3.88					3.77	0.36 ↑
France	2007	4.45											4.45	-
Germany	1998	4.27	2002	4.52	2005	4.25	2009	3.8	2013	4.1	2017	3.9	4.14	-0.37 ↓
Great Britain	1997	4.17	2005	3.98	2015	4.48							4.21	0.31 ↑
Greece	2009	4.54	2012	5.45	2015	5.19							5.06	0.65 ↑
Hungary	1998	5.25	2002	6.36	2018	6.65							6.09	1.4 ↑
Iceland	1999	3.85	2003	3.83	2007	3.81	2009	3.85	2016	3.92	2017	4.19	3.91	0.34 ↑
Ireland	2002	4.14											4.14	-
Italy	2018	5.26											5.26	-
Japan	2007	3.21	2013	3.46									3.34	0.25 ↑
Latvia	2010	4.50	2011	5.17	2014	4.59							4.75	0.09 ↑

Lithuania	2016	4.56											4.56	-
Mexico	1997	4.05	2009	3.79	2015	3.98							3.94	-0.07 ↓
Montenegro	2012	5.25	2016	6.86									6.06	1.61 ↑
Netherlands	1998	2.76	2002	2.84	2006	2.69	2010	2.83					2.78	0.07 ↑
New Zealand	2002	4.46	2008	4.56	2011	4.64	2014	4.76	2017	4.43			4.57	-0.03 ↓
Norway	1997	4.00											4.00	-
Peru	2011	4.72											4.72	-
Poland	1997	4.92	2001	4.68	2005	4.37	2007	4.73	2011	5.22			4.79	0.30 ↑
Portugal	2002	4.55	2005	4.45	2009	4.72	2015	6.14					4.97	1.59 ↑
Serbia	2012	4.89											4.89	-
Slovakia	2010	5.14	2016	5.38									5.26	0.24 ↑
Slovenia	2004	4.3											4.30	-
South Africa	2009	5.82	2014	5.48									5.65	-0.34 ↓
South Korea	2000	3.6	2004	4.23									3.92	0.63 ↑
Spain	1996	5.19	2000	4.44	2004	4.98	2008	5.02					4.91	-0.17 ↓
Sweden	1998	4.28	2002	4.23	2006	4.17	2014	4.36					4.26	0.08 ↑
Switzerland	1999	3.56	2003	4.74	2011	4.1							4.13	0.54 ↑
Taiwan	1996	3.13	2001	3.26									3.20	0.13 ↑
Turkey	2011	7.02	2015	7.38	2018	6.03							6.81	-0.99 ↓
USA	2004	4.6	2008	3.97	2012	4.8	2016	4.68					4.51	0.08 ↑
Uruguay	2009	5.09											5.09	-

Notes: The API change columns displays the difference in affective polarization between the latest and the oldest time point in the sample.

Table B1.2. Bivariate correlations between the variables

	AP	LRP	PID	QoG	EP	SP	ENP	GDP
Affective polarization (AP)	1							
Left-right polarization (LRP)	**0.37**	1						
PID strength (PID)	**0.28**	-0.01	1					
Quality of governance (QoG)	**-0.57**	-0.02	**-0.26**	1				
Ethnic polarization (EP)	**0.35**	-0.16	**0.50**	**-0.36**	1			
(Semi-)Presidentialism (SP)	-0.12	**-0.20**	**0.31**	**-0.25**	**0.34**	1		
Effective N of parties (ENP)	**-0.21**	**0.21**	-0.14	0.02	**-0.20**	-0.15	1	
GDP PPP per capita (GDP)	**-0.36**	0.01	-0.04	**0.61**	**-0.20**	-0.11	0.11	1

Note: Statistically significant ($p \leq 0.05$) correlations are in bold font.

Table B1.3. The predictors of in- and out-party evaluations separately, OLS regression

	DV: In-party evaluation	DV: Out-party evaluation
Left-right polarization (0-10)	.12 (.05)*	-.15 (.04)***
Partisan identity strength (0-2)	.23 (.27)	-.12 (.24)
Governance quality index (0-5)	-.03 (.09)	.58 (.08)***
Ethnic polarization (0-1)	.26 (.32)	-.48 (.24)
Effective N of parties	.06 (.04)	.24 (.04)***
(Semi-)Presidential system (0/1)	-.35 (.15)*	.41 (.21)
GDP PPP/1000	-.01 (.00)	-.01 (.00)*
Constant		
R^2	.29	.65
N of countries	41	41
N of elections	108	108

Notes: Both the average in- and out-party evaluations are weighted by party vote share, like in the Affective Polarization Index calculations (API=In-party evaluation – Out-party evaluation). Unstandardized regression coefficients, cluster-corrected robust standard errors in parentheses.

***$p \leq 0.001$; **$p \leq 0.01$; *$p \leq 0.05$

B2: The ethnic polarization variable operationalization

To operationalize ethnic polarization, I used the data from the Cline Center for Democracy at the University of Illinois, the Composition of Religious and Ethnic Groups (CREG) project. The dataset compiles the estimates of the ethnic and religious group sizes from 165 countries over the time period of 1945 to 2013. To the best of my knowledge, there is no better dataset that offers a time-varying coverage of the ethnic composition of a wide range of countries, although there are also certain problems regarding CREG data. I have tried to solve these problems to lose as little cases as possible and get at least an approximate estimate of the ethnic polarization in the country at a certain year.

The main problem of this dataset from the perspective of this chapter is that it lacks data for the years after 2013. For the years 2014 to 2018, I used the most recent available data point (e.g. for the Greek 2015 elections, I use data of 2013). In most cases, the change rates in terms of ethnic group sizes are rather marginal, so it should not constitute a very large problem. However, in certain cases, notable changes can occur over relatively short time. For this reason, I excluded Australia (2019) from the final sample of the cases. Previous data had shown a consistent and rather rapid rise of the Asian community in Australia that resulted in a notable increase of ethnic polarization. Thus, data from the year 2013 would have not given a reliable enough estimation of the ethnic composition in Australia in 2019 anymore.

Another issue regarding the dataset is that in many cases, there was a large number of small or for some reason unidentified ethnic groups missing from raw data. These grous were compiled into the 'Other groups' category, whch in some countries was rather large (e.g. 10.2% in Canada 2004). To get a more valid estimate of the relative size of each group, I excluded the 'Other' category from the calculations and normalized the other group estimates accordingly, i.e. if Ethnic Group A comprised 45% of the whole population and 10% of the groups were compiled into the 'Other' category, then the relative size of Ethnic Group A was 45/(100-10)=50%. The same procedure was done when calculating affective and ideological polarization, in case the full vote percentage of the parties included in the survey did not amount to 100% (see the Data and variable operationalization section in Chapter 2).

Finally, the CREG dataset does not include data on all the countries for which I have affective polarization data. The missing countres were France, Iceland and Montenegro. In these cases, I utilized two potential alternatives: Encyclopedia Britannica (EB) and the

original dataset of the author of ethnic polarization index, Marta Reynal-Querol.[78] For France (2007), I used the EB data that pertained to year 2000. As France was in the sample with just one election, I did not have to worry about capturing the change in ethnic polarization over time. Thus, even if the data of 2000 is not perfect for the year 2007, it should at least give a reasonably accurate estimation and the risk of some potential error does not overweigh losing France from the whole sample. For Montenegro (2012, 2016), I also used EB data. The data in Montenegro's EB page dates back to 2011. Again, this measure might not be perfect for 2016, but should still capture the polarization reasonably well, as to the best of my knowledge, there were no dramatic changes in the ethnic composition in Montenegro during this period. Moreover, as Montenegro (2016) was the biggest outlier of my main statistical model, I ran the model also without that case (see the 'Robustness checks' section) and demonstrated that the main findings remain the same. Finally, for Iceland (1999, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2016, 2017), I used a combined solution. For the two most recent cases (2016, 2017), I used the EB data from 2017. For the four older cases (1999-2009), I used the ethnic polarization score provided by Reynal-Querol that is based on the data from World Christian Encyclopedia from early 2000s. Thus, the values are not perfectly dynamic in this case, but I still capture a slight increase in ethnic polarization, as the score is higher for the 2016-2017 cases.

Finally, I checked the robustness of the results with two alternative operationalization. First, I used a dummy variable of ethnic polarization, that was coded as '1' when there was an ethnic minority of more than 8% of the population in the country and a majority of at least 49%. This follows the operationalization used by Fearon and Laitin (2003) to capture ethnic polarization. Secondly, I used the ethnic tension variable that is included in the The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), provided by the PRS Group.[79] According to the methodology description, the ethnic tension component is

'…an assessment of the degree of tension within a country attributable to racial, nationality, or language divisions. Lower ratings are given to countries where racial and nationality tensions are high because opposing groups are intolerant and unwilling to compromise. Higher ratings are given to countries where tensions are minimal, even though such differences may still exist.'

[78] Available at: http://www.econ.upf.edu/~reynal/data_web.htm
[79] Available at: https://www.prsgroup.com/explore-our-products/international-country-risk-guide/

The index ranges from 0 to 6 (with 0.5 increment) and I flipped the scores, so that higher values indicate higher ethnic tensions. The index has a r=.68 correlation with the main variable used to capture ethnic polarization, the Reynal-Querol ethnic polarization index.

Both alternative specifications confirm the significant linkage between ethnic polarization/tensions and affective polarization, as when I replace the Reynal-Querol index with either the dummy variable or the ethnic tension index, the variable is statistically significant in the predicted direction in the fully specified model.

Appendix C – Chapter 4

C1: Variable operationalization and item wording

Affective polarization

Affective polarization has usually been measured as the difference between in- and out-party evaluations on a like-dislike/feeling thermometer scale (Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes 2012; Mason 2015; Reiljan 2020). Sometimes, focus has been directed solely on the negativity towards out-parties, which is arguably the more worrisome element of affective polarization (Gidron et al. 2018; Webster and Abramowitz 2017).

We conduct two measures that correspond to these approaches, but we adjust the measurement according to the nature of (Swedish) multiparty system. Specifically, we differentiate between:

a) In-party evaluations
b) In-bloc party evaluations
c) Out-bloc party evaluations

Accordingly, our primary measure is *Affective polarization*, which we calculate by subtracting the average evaluation the respondent has assigned to out-bloc parties from the evaluation towards the preferred party (in-party). Additionally, we also use the *Out-bloc evaluation* as a separate dependent variable.

To identify respondent's in-party, we rely on the survey item:

'Which party do you prefer today?' [80]

Based on the answer, we divide the respondents into partisan groups. We limit our analysis to the 8 parties that have held seats in the parliament since 2010.

Eight parties are, in turn, divided into three:

[80] Approximately 89 percent of the entire sample stated a party preference, which is a clear advantage of this item as compared to partisan identity item (which will be explained below).

a) the mainstream-right Alliance bloc, consisting of four parties: Moderates (M), the Center Party (C), the Liberal Party (L) and the Christian Democratic Party (KD);
b) The left-of-centre Red-green bloc, consisting of three parties: the Social Democratic Party (S), the Green Party (MP) and the Left Party (V);
c) The unaligned right-populist Sweden Democrats (SD)

Then, we proceed with the calculations. To capture partisan feelings, we use the survey item:

'Where would you place the parties on the scale below?': (the respondent is then presented the list of parties and a scale that ranges from -5 with the label 'dislike strongly', to +5 with the label 'like strongly')

We recode the variable to go from 0 (strong dislike) to 10 (strong like), so it matches with the scale of Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) that has been the basis of most cross-national work on the topic (Gidron et al. 2018; 2019; Reiljan 2020; Wagner 2020).

Respondent's *in-party evaluation* is simply the rating assigned to the party that the respondent has stated to be her preferred party.

For the other element - *out-bloc evaluation* – we use weighting to account for party size. Essentially, the evaluation assigned to the out-bloc party is multiplied with the vote share of the party, relative to the other parties in the same bloc. As such, bigger parties have more importance in the average out-bloc evaluation of each individual.[81] Individual's average out-bloc evaluation is, therefore, calculated with the following equation:

$$Out-bloc\ evaluation_i = \sum_{p=1}^{P}(rv_p * Like_{ip})$$

In the equation, rv_p signifies the relative vote share of the party, calculated in decimals (e.g. 30%=0.3) and $Like_{ip}$ is the respondent's like-dislike evaluations towards an out-bloc party.

To calculate affective polarization we simply subtract the average out-bloc evaluation from the in-party evaluation:

$$Affective\ polarization_i = In-party\ evaluation_i - Out-bloc\ evaluation_i$$

To give an example, we calculate the weighted out-bloc evaluation and affective polarization for respondent X who is a supporter of Party A. The out-bloc for respondent X consists of

[81] This is especially crucial regarding the evaluations towards the Red-green bloc, as S is overhwelmingly the largest party in this bloc.

Party B, Party C and Party D. The hypothetical respondent X has evaluated the parties on a scale of 0-10 in the following way:

Party A (in-party): 9
Party B: 3
Party C: 5
Party D: 5

The vote shares of the parties are: Party B: 30%; Party C: 20%; Party D: 10% (the vote share of respondent's in-party (Party A) is not relevant for this calculation).

The aggregate vote share of Parties B, C and D is 60%. The relative vote share (rv_p) of each party is, therefore:

Party B: 30/60=0.5

Party C: 20/60=0.333

Party D: 10/60= 0.16666667

Now, we can calculate the average out-bloc evaluation and affective polarization for respondent X:

$$Out-bloc\ evaluation_x = (3 \times 0.5) + (5 \times 0.333) + (5 \times 0.16666667) = 4$$

$$Affective\ polarization_x = 9 - 4 = 5$$

Thus, the affective polarization variable for respondent X takes the value of 5 and out-bloc evaluation separately is 4.

These indicators were calculated for two parts of the analysis separately. For the Alliance vs Red-green models, we calculate each respondent's affective polarization and out-bloc evaluation relative to the opposing bloc, Sweden Democrats are excluded from this part of the analysis.[82]

For the Sweden Democrats vs mainstream blocs analysis, the SD voter affective polarization and out-bloc evaluations are calculated as explained above, separately towards both blocs (Alliance and Red-Green). As for the mainstream party voters, their affective polarization towards SD is calculated simply by subtracting the evaluation assigned to SD from the in-party evaluaton, and the out-bloc evaluation is the evaluation given to SD.

To weight the parties according to their size, we use the vote shares of the general elections in 2010 and 2014. In the models, we pool the data from 2010 to 2016, excluding

[82] For Figure 4.1 in the text we did not discriminate between different out-parties and simply calculated the weighted average of all out-parties (including SD and in-bloc parties).

2013 because of missing items. Thus, for the survey years 2010, 2011 and 2012 we use the vote shares of 2010 election, whereas for 2014, 2015 and 2016 we use 2014 election results. The party vote shares are presented in Table C1.1.

Table C1.1. Vote shares in 2010 and 2014 general elections.

	S	MP	V	M	C	L	KD	SD	Total
% Vote share 2014	31.01	6.89	5.72	23.33	6.11	5.42	4.57	12.86	95.91
% Vote share 2010	30.66	7.34	5.60	30.06	6.56	7.06	5.60	5.70	98.58

Source; Swedish Election Authority.

Party-by-party like-dislike matrices

In our analysis, we divide the parties into three (2 blocs and the unaligned SD). Here, we present the evaluations the supporters of each party assigned to every party separately; and vice versa, the evaluation each party received from the supporters of every party separately. The rows in the matrices indicate how the supporters of the respective party evaluated the parties, while columns indicate the evaluation the respective party received.

To avoid introducing any bias to in- and out-bloc evaluations, we have only included partisans who evaluated all the parties (6.4% of the respondents had left one or more parties unevaluated and were removed from the sample). Number of respondents that had stated the respective party as 'preferred party' and evaluated all parties is indicated in the column labelled as 'N'.

Partisan like-dislike matrix, 2010

Party	V	S	MP	C	L	M	KD	SD	N
V	8.85	6.89	6.97	2.54	2.49	1.97	1.91	0.85	65
S	5.61	8.46	6.68	3.42	3.73	3.42	3.26	1.41	336
MP	5.10	6.31	8.64	4.05	4.12	4.14	3.20	1.14	146
C	2.06	4.26	5.43	8.43	6.34	7.39	5.54	1.23	70
L	1.88	4.08	5.14	6.27	8.90	7.36	5.44	1.39	103
M	1.92	3.49	4.74	6.21	6.61	8.91	5.75	1.86	493
KD	1.72	3.66	4.81	6.58	6.57	7.32	8.61	1.11	65
SD	2.58	3.69	2.92	4.52	4.6	5.52	4.6	8.32	65

Partisan like-dislike matrix, 2011

Party	V	S	MP	C	L	M	KD	SD	N
V	8.78	6.61	6.52	2.61	2.54	1.11	1.81	1.20	54
S	5.60	8.31	6.32	3.82	4.00	3.37	3.47	1.86	374
MP	5.62	6.30	8.57	4.19	4.18	3.89	3.26	1.10	155
C	3.26	4.1	5.1	8.14	6.02	6.48	5.18	1.62	50
L	2.56	4.52	5.76	6.18	8.3	6.91	5.01	1.37	90
M	2.17	3.77	5.07	6.18	6.31	8.62	5.24	1.86	458
KD	2.27	3.82	4.72	5.7	6.05	6.67	8.37	1.5	40
SD	2.69	4.33	3.53	3.94	4.06	4.73	3.70	8.25	64

Partisan like-dislike matrix, 2012

Party	V	S	MP	C	L	M	KD	SD	N
V	8.71	6.35	6.37	2.41	2.35	1.19	1.77	0.49	80
S	5.68	8.10	6.21	3.89	3.98	3.28	3.52	2.06	392
MP	5.51	6.17	8.22	4.35	4.04	3.88	3.4	1.06	120
C	3.27	4.58	4.89	7.91	5.71	6.76	5.51	2.44	55
L	2.69	4.78	5.14	5.76	8.01	6.93	4.93	1.60	72
M	2.40	3.90	4.56	5.51	5.99	8.39	4.97	2.39	393
KD	2.51	4.15	4.93	5.71	5.32	6.29	7.80	1.44	41
SD	3.23	4.72	4.11	3.95	4.56	5.17	3.90	8.01	99

Partisan like-dislike matrix, 2013

Party	V	S	MP	C	L	M	KD	SD	N
V	8.75	7.03	6.95	2.82	2.63	1.38	2.08	1.26	85
S	5.67	8.45	6.52	3.55	3.97	3.25	3.54	1.77	408
MP	5.32	6.24	8.14	4.21	4.47	4.11	3.41	0.95	150
C	3.17	4.57	4.96	8.02	5.66	6.38	5.74	2.06	53
L	3.05	5.34	5.36	5.82	8.03	6.84	5.03	1.6	100
M	2.29	4.19	4.67	5.57	6.14	8.56	5.4	2.78	370
KD	1.91	3.76	4.36	6.28	6.22	7.00	8.5	1.84	58
SD	2.77	4.59	3.54	3.28	3.96	4.94	3.72	8.63	134

Note: 2013 data was not included in the regression models, because of some missing policy attitude items.

Partisan like-dislike matrix, 2014

Party	V	S	MP	C	L	M	KD	SD	N
V	8.66	6.65	6.57	2.88	2.90	1.98	2.56	1.30	101
S	5.67	8.42	6.67	4.11	4.30	3.43	3.74	1.58	404
MP	5.74	6.47	8.57	4.83	4.29	4.28	4.11	0.80	133
C	2.31	4.23	4.56	8.46	6.29	7.24	5.76	1.98	96
L	1.96	4.61	4.73	6.61	8.65	7.17	5.37	1.17	96
M	1.73	3.65	3.98	6.40	6.49	8.87	5.77	2.55	333
KD	1.84	3.73	4.54	6.84	6.40	7.25	8.57	2.31	67
SD	2.50	4.43	2.53	3.56	4.31	4.55	3.44	8.38	127

Partisan like-dislike matrix, 2015

Party	V	S	MP	C	L	M	KD	SD	N
V	8.98	7.11	6.32	2.86	3.14	2.34	1.92	0.36	99
S	5.79	8.43	5.84	4.15	4.40	3.78	3.49	1.28	321
MP	5.48	6.37	8.21	4.83	4.26	4.08	3.4	1.1	100
C	2.41	3.85	3.49	8.16	5.81	6.49	4.75	1.73	100
L	1.97	4.00	2.91	6.37	8.34	6.89	5.36	2.82	67
M	2.01	3.50	3.21	6.49	6.21	8.48	5.28	2.35	295
KD	1.87	3.27	2.81	6.48	6.06	6.85	8.65	3.52	48
SD	2.14	3.30	2.00	4.30	4.47	4.08	4.59	8.51	195

Partisan like-dislike matrix, 2016

Party	V	S	MP	C	L	M	KD	SD	N
V	8.62	6.18	5.97	3.03	2.91	1.73	1.59	0.29	68
S	5.54	8.09	5.65	4.30	4.34	3.80	3.25	1.40	327
MP	5.65	6.18	7.77	5.14	4.45	3.92	3.26	0.61	49
C	2.51	4.12	3.50	8.18	5.89	6.58	4.79	1.32	123
L	2.34	4.75	3.36	5.87	8.03	6.41	4.03	1.58	85
M	2.01	3.46	2.89	6.07	5.71	8.31	4.92	3.05	333
KD	2.32	3.78	3.24	5.90	5.34	5.88	7.93	2.37	41
SD	2.31	2.96	1.64	3.62	3.79	5.10	4.04	8.17	188

Party abbreviations: V – Left Party; S – Social Democratic Party; MP – Green Party; C – Center Party; L – Liberal Party; M – Moderates; KD – Christian Democratic Party; SD – Sweden Democrats.

Independent variables

In-bloc evaluation

As explained, we eliminate the evaluations towards in-bloc parties from the affective polarization calculations. Nevertheless, we control for the average in-bloc evaluation by including it into the models as an independent variable.

We calculate it the same way as out-bloc party evaluations, i.e. the average weighted like-dislike towards all in-bloc parties, except the respondent's own party:

$$In - bloc\ evaluation_i = \sum_{p=1}^{P}(rv_p * Like_{ip})$$

Relative vote share (rv_p) of the in-bloc parties depends on what is the in-party of the respondent. If we go back to the previously used example of a party bloc consisting of Party B

(30% vote share), Party C (20% vote share) and Party D (10% vote share), then for the respondent Y who supports Party B, the relative in-bloc party vote shares are:

Party C=20/(60-30)=0.666667

Party D=10/(60-30)=0.333

If the supporter Y evaluates Party C with 6 and Party D with 9, then the weighted in-bloc evaluation is:

$$In - bloc\ evaluation_y = (6 \times 0.666667) + (9 \times 0.333) = 7$$

This variable is not included in the models of SD voters, as SD is not aligned with any party bloc.

Partisan identification (PID) strength

To measure partisan identification, we a use an item that in the survey follows the 'most preferred party today' question that we used to define partisan groups. The question is:

Do you consider yourself a convinced supporter of the party?

The question has three response options:

a) Yes, very convinced
b) Yes, somewhat convinced
c) No

We dummy-code the variable in the following way: those who chose the first option are coded as having a 'strong PID'; those answering the second as having a 'weak PID'; the last option is coded as having 'no PID'.

In all the models, we use the 'weak PID' as the reference category and insert 'strong PID' and 'no PID' as dummy variables.

Socioeconomic left-right placement

We measure this variable with a two-item index. The respondents are asked:

‘*What is your opinion to the following proposals’:*

…Reduce the public sector.

…Carry out more health care under the private sector.

Both items are scaled 1-to-5 with the following options - very good proposal, somewhat good proposal, neither a good nor bad proposal, somewhat bad proposal and very bad proposal. The correlation between the items is 0.48 for the entire sample.

We recode the answers so that higher values signify more right-leaning positions for Alliance bloc supporters and more left-leaning attitudes for Red-green supporters. For SD, the coding depends on whether we study attitudes toward Alliance or Red-green bloc. We add up the respondents` score on both items and then recode the variable to go from 1 to 5. Thus, the value 5 indicates the most extreme attitude that is in line with the in-party; 1 means that a person holds an opinion contrary to the in-party`s ideological position; and 3 is the centrist placement for both blocs. For SD voters, we code it in a way that higher values mean more leftist attitudes in the models that examine polarization towards the Alliance parties, while higher values represent right-leaning attitudes in the models for polarization towards Red-green parties.

Immigration policy

We use the standard question item employed in Swedish surveys to tap into people´s attitudes towards immigration. It asks:

‘What is your opinion to the following proposals’:

…Take in fewer refugees in Sweden.

The response options are again: very good proposal, somewhat good proposal, neither a good nor bad proposal, somewhat bad proposal and very bad proposal.

The scale, therefore, ranges from 1 to 5, and we recode the variable so that higher values mean more extreme attitudes in the opposite ideological direction of the out-bloc parties:

For Red-green voters, higher values always mean more pro-refugee stance;
For SD voters, higher values always mean more anti-refugee stance;
For Alliance, the coding varies: against Red-green, higher values mean more anti-refugee stance, whereas against SD, higher values mean more pro-refugee stance.

Environmental policy

The item we use is:

'What is your opinion to the following proposals':

…Invest more in an environmentally friendly society.

The responses are again on a 1-to-5 scale, ranging from a very bad to a very good proposal. The distribution of responses is highly skewed, with 82 percent of the respondents choosing one of the two positive options (very good or somewhat good), while an additional 15 percent chose the neutral option (neither good nor bad). Therefore, we dummy-code the variable, so that the values 1 and 2 (very or somewhat good proposal) are coded as 1 for Red-green voters, while the remaining three options are coded as 0. Consequentially, the values 3-5 (neutral or bad proposal) are coded as 1 for Alliance voters in the analyses of polarization between the mainstream blocs, while values 1-2 are coded as 0. Thus, value '1' signifies positive attitudes for Red-green voters and negative/neutral attitudes for Alliance voters.
In the models that examine polarization between SD and the mainstream blocs, value '1' signifies positive attitudes (good or somewhat good proposal) and '0' negative/neutral attitudes for mainstream bloc voters, and vice versa for SD voters.

Attitude on the European Union

The question is as follows:
'Broadly speaking, what is your opinion about the EU?'

The item is scaled 1-to-5 and consists of the following response options: Very positive, somewhat positive, neither positive nor negative, somewhat negative, very negative.

There is also a 'no opinion' option. We delete respondents who stated that they did not have an opinion (4.7% of the entire sample). In the model of polarization between the mainstream blocs, we code higher values as more positive EU-attitudes for Alliance voters and negative attitudes for Red-green voters. In the analyses of polarization between SD and mainstream voters, we code positive attitudes towards the EU as higher values for mainstream voters and the opposite for the SD.

Institutional trust

For this variable, we build an additive index of a battery of five question items where respondents answered the following question:

'How much confidence do you have in the way the following institutions and groups conduct their work':

…Parliament
…Swedish politicians
…The daily press
…Radio and TV
…The courts

All items, except the one for 'Swedish politicians', are scaled 1-to-5 and have the following response options: Very much confidence, somewhat high confidence, neither high nor low confidence, somewhat low confidence, very low confidence. The question for 'Swedish politicians' has the same categories, but does not include the neutral option and is, therefore, scaled 1-to-4. We coded the items in a way that higher values indicate greater confidence and constructed the index by adding up the scores on all items. Then, we recode the index to go from 1 to 5 in order to correspond with the actual scale-steps of the items and to make it more comparable with the other variables.

The Cronbach`s alpha for the index is 0.76, with an average inter-item correlation of 0.39. Below is a correlation matrix of the items.

Table C1.2. Correlation matrix of the 5 question items making up the institutional trust index.

Variable	Parliament	Politicians	Daily press	Radio and TV	The courts
Parliament	1				
Politicians	0.61	1			
Daily press	0.36	0.33	1		
Radio and TV	0.34	0.32	0.56	1	
The courts	0.45	0.41	0.30	0.32	1

Source: Swedish national SOM-survey; 2010-2016 pooled.

Political interest

We derive the variable from the following question:

'Generally speaking, how interested are you in politics?'

The scale ranges from 1-4 and the response options are: very interested, somewhat interested, not particularly interested, and not at all interested. We dummy-code the variable so that values 1-2 (interested) are coded as 1, while values 3-4 (not interested) are coded as 0.

C2: Supplementary statistics

In this appendix, we present the descriptive statistics of the previously outlined variables and regression model replications. It should be emphasized again that the scales of the ideology variables are coded in a way that higher values signify higher polarization with regard to the opposing bloc/party. For example, the average refugee stance of Alliance voters is slightly on the anti-refugee side. In the models where we study Alliance voters' attitudes towards Red-green bloc, the average value is 3.3. In the Alliance vs SD models, conversely, the value is 2.7, because the scale is flipped. Therefore, we present the statistics separately for Red-green/Alliance and the SD/Mainstream blocs parts.

Descriptive statistics

Table C2.1. Descriptive statistics for the Red-green vs Alliance voters' analysis (corresponds to Figures 3 and 4 in the text).

	Red-green voters					Alliance voters				
Variables	Mean	S.D.	n	Min	Max	Mean	S.D.	n	Min	Max
Affective polarization	4.93	2.69	2 811	-8.49	10	4.86	2.58	3 163	-5	10
Out-bloc evaluations	3.49	2.03	2 811	0	8.96	3.69	1.95	3 163	0	10
In-party evaluation	8.42	1.43	2 811	0	10	8.55	1.30	3 163	0	10
Left-right index	3.98	0.82	2 811	1	5	3.10	0.89	3 163	1	5
Refugee policy	3.26	1.28	2 811	1	5	3.31	1.19	3 163	1	5
Proposal: invest in environment*	0.87	0.33	2 811	0	1	0.21	0.41	3 163	0	1
EU	3.08	1.04	2 811	1	5	3.38	1.00	3 163	1	5
No PID	0.37	0.48	2 811	0	1	0.39	0.49	3 163	0	1
Weak PID	0.45	0.50	2 811	0	1	0.45	0.50	3 163	0	1
Strong PID	0.18	0.39	2 811	0	1	0.16	0.37	3 163	0	1
Political/institutional trust	3.25	0.59	2 811	1	5	3.32	0.57	3 163	1	5
In-bloc evaluations	6.15	1.80	2 811	0	10	6.19	1.62	3 163	0	10
Political interest* (1=higher)	0.62	0.49	2 811	0	1	0.65	0.48	3 163	0	1
Education* (1=higher)	0.41	0.49	2 811	0	1	0.48	0.50	3 163	0	1
Age**	50.76	17.1	2 811	16	85	51.03	17.04	3 163	16	85
Gender* (1=male)						0.51	0.50	3 163	0	1

Notes: *Variable is dummy coded. **In the analyses, we use a pre-coded version of the age variable split in 9 values; where the older categories have higher values; Source: The National SOM-survey 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2015 and 2016.

Table C2.2. Descriptive statistics for the Red-green/Alliance vs Sweden Democrats analyses (corresponds to Figures 5 to 7 in the text).

	Red-green voters					Alliance voters				
Variables	Mean	S.D.	n	Min	Max	Mean	S.D.	n	Min	Max
Affective polarization	7.13	2.92	2 878	-5	10	6.53	3.05	3 187	-10	10
Like-dislike of SD	1.29	2.28	2 878	0	10	2.02	2.70	3 187	0	10
In-party evaluation	8.41	1.44	2 878	0	10	8.55	1.30	3 187	0	10
Left-right index	3.97	0.82	2 878	1	5	3.11	0.89	3 187	1	5
Refugee policy	3.24	1.28	2 878	1	5	2.69	1.19	3 187	1	5
Proposal: invest in environment*	0.87	0.33	2 878	0	1	0.79	0.40	3 187	0	1
EU	2.92	1.04	2 878	1	5	3.38	1.00	3 187	1	5
No PID	0.37	0.48	2 878	0	1	0.39	0.49	3 187	0	1
Weak PID	0.45	0.50	2 878	0	1	0.45	0.50	3 187	0	1
Strong PID	0.19	0.39	2 878	0	1	0.17	0.37	3 187	0	1
Political/institutional trust	3.25	0.60	2 878	1	5	3.32	0.57	3 187	1	5
In-bloc evaluations	6.14	1.81	2 878	0	10	6.20	1.62	3 187	0	10
Political interest* (1=higher)	0.62	0.49	2 878	0	1	0.65	0.48	3 187	0	1
Education* (1=higher)	0.40	0.49	2 878	0	1	0.48	0.50	3 187	0	1
Age**	50.88	17.1	2 878	16	85	51.11	17.07	3 187	16	85
Gender* (1=male)	0.47	0.50	2 878	0	1	0.51	0.50	3 187	0	1

*Variable is dummy coded. **In the analyses, we use a pre-coded version of the age variable split in 9 values; where the older categories have higher values; Source: The National SOM-survey 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2015 and 2016.

Table C2.3. Descriptive statistics for the Sweden Democrats vs Red-green/Alliance analyses (corresponds to Figures 5 and 7 in the text).

	Towards Red-green parties					Towards Alliance parties				
Variables	Mean	S.D.	n	Min	Max	Mean	S.D.	n	Min	Max
Affective polarization	5.03	3.36	653	-8.24	10	3.74	2.90	652	-9.41	10
Out-bloc evaluation	3.29	2.41	653	0	9.83	4.59	2.37	652	0	9.41
In-party evaluation	8.32	1.88	653	0	10	8.33	1.88	652	0	10
Left-right index	2.67	0.94	653	1	5	3.34	0.94	652	1	5
Refugee policy*	0.83	0.38	653	0	1	0.83	0.38	652	0	1
Proposal: invest in environment*	0.38	0.49	653	0	1	0.38	0.49	652	0	1
EU	3.76	1.07	653	1	5	3.74	1.09	652	1	5
No PID	0.39	0.49	653	0	1	0.39	0.49	652	0	1
Weak PID	0.38	0.48	653	0	1	0.38	0.48	652	0	1
Strong PID	0.23	0.42	653	0	1	0.23	0.42	652	0	1
Political/institutional trust	2.56	0.71	653	1	5	2.57	0.71	652	1	4.79
Political interest* (1=higher)	0.61	0.49	653	0	1	0.62	0.49	652	0	1
Education* (1=higher)	0.23	0.42	653	0	1	0.23	0.42	652	0	1
Age**	51.59	16.8	653	16	85	51.42	16.80	652	16	85
Gender* (1=male)	.65	.48	653	0	1	0.65	0.48	652	0	1

*Variable is dummy coded. **In the analyses, we use a pre-coded version of the age variable split in 9 values; where the older categories have higher values; Source: The National SOM-survey 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2015 and 2016

Model replications

Alliance vs Red-green analysis

We first present a regression table that corresponds to Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 in the text. The table consists of affective polarization determinants for each bloc and the determinants of the two components of affective polarization (in-party and out-bloc evaluations) separately (Table C2.4). Subsequently, we present the same models ran for each survey year separately for both affective polarization and out-bloc evaluation determinants (Figures C2.1 and C2.2).

Table C2.4. Linear regression analysis of the determinants of affective polarization (AP), out-bloc evaluation and in-party evaluation for the Alliance and Red-green voters.

	Red-green AP	Red-green Out-bloc	Red-green In-party	Alliance AP	Alliance Out-bloc	Alliance In-party
Left-right (1-5)	0.785***	-0.686***	0.099**	0.534***	-0.494***	0.040
	(0.060)	(0.047)	(0.034)	(0.047)	(0.038)	(0.023)
Refugee policy (1-5)	0.122***	-0.071*	0.051*	0.289***	-0.248***	0.041*
	(0.037)	(0.030)	(0.020)	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.016)
Environment (0/1)	0.178	-0.185	-0.007	0.624***	-0.574***	0.050
	(0.136)	(0.103)	(0.078)	(0.097)	(0.078)	(0.049)
EU (1-5)	0.389***	-0.375***	0.014	-0.031	0.071*	0.040
	(0.043)	(0.035)	(0.022)	(0.043)	(0.035)	(0.021)
PID (none)	-1.343***	0.557***	-0.786***	-1.195***	0.476***	-0.720***
	(0.093)	(0.074)	(0.052)	(0.085)	(0.070)	(0.042)
PID (strong)	1.427***	-0.718***	0.709***	1.557***	-0.848***	0.710***
	(0.117)	(0.095)	(0.056)	(0.110)	(0.089)	(0.048)
Institutional trust (1-5)	-0.554***	0.645***	0.092*	-0.507***	0.616***	0.109*
	(0.080)	(0.063)	(0.045)	(0.078)	(0.060)	(0.043)
In-bloc (0-10)	0.256***	0.003	0.259***	0.367***	-0.101***	0.266***
	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.016)
Political interest (0/1)	0.656***	-0.502***	0.154**	0.331***	-0.171*	0.160***
1=interested in politics	(0.090)	(0.072)	(0.050)	(0.087)	(0.069)	(0.045)
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control for survey year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.227	6.124***	6.351***	1.511***	4.982***	6.493***
	(0.439)	(0.337)	(0.251)	(0.377)	(0.302)	(0.193)
N	2811	2811	2811	3163	3163	3163
R^2	0.392	0.292	0.371	0.374	0.257	0.402
adj. R^2	0.389	0.288	0.367	0.370	0.253	0.398

Notes: Standard errors (robust) in parentheses: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. On policy variables, higher values indicate more rightist/conservative/pro-EU attitudes for Alliance and leftist/liberal/anti-EU for Red-green. Source: The National SOM-survey 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2015 and 2016.



Figure C2.1. The determinants of affective polarization between the Alliance and the Red-Green bloc for each year separately.



Figure C2.2. The determinants of average out-bloc evaluation between the Alliance and the Red-Green bloc for each year separately.

Notes: The dots display the OLS regression coefficients (robust standard errors), the lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. On policy variables, higher values indicate more rightist/conservative/pro-EU attitudes for Alliance and leftist/liberal/anti-EU for Red-green. Source: The National SOM-survey 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2015 and 2016

Sweden Democrats vs mainstream blocs analysis

To supplement the SD/mainstream blocs analysis, we present the table version of Figure 4.5 in the text, consisting of the affective polarization (AP) and out-bloc evaluation (in case of mainstream blocs vs SD, it is simply the evaluation towards SD, marked as 'out-party' in the table) determinants of SD voters towards both mainstrem blocs and vice versa (Table C2.5). We also display the year-by-year models (Figures C2.3-C2.6). Finally, due to the highly skewed distribution of evaluations towards SD, we replicated the mainstream-to-SD models using logistic regression (Table C2.6).

Table C2.5. Linear regression analysis of the determinants of affective polarization (AP) and out-bloc/out-party evaluation for the Sweden Democrat and mainstream bloc voters.

	Sweden Democrat voters				Red-green voters to SD		Alliance voters to SD	
	AP vs Alliance	Out-bloc vs Alliance	AP vs RG	Out-bloc vs RG	AP	Out-party	AP	Out-party
Left-right (1-5)	0.521***	-0.512***	0.519***	-0.528***	0.327***	-0.226***	-0.021	0.060
	(0.107)	(0.097)	(0.118)	(0.087)	(0.067)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.051)
Refugee policy (1-5)	0.795**	0.179	1.546***	-0.602**	0.787***	-0.741***	1.017***	-1.057***
	(0.277)	(0.220)	(0.317)	(0.214)	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.039)
Environment (0/1)	0.207	-0.175	0.723**	-0.679***	0.315	-0.350*	0.404**	-0.455***
	(0.200)	(0.181)	(0.223)	(0.167)	(0.161)	(0.137)	(0.127)	(0.115)
EU (1-5)	0.311**	-0.308***	0.230*	-0.224**	0.125**	-0.137***	0.270***	-0.229***
	(0.102)	(0.090)	(0.111)	(0.085)	(0.046)	(0.038)	(0.054)	(0.050)
PID (none)	-0.799***	-0.310	-1.054***	-0.057	-0.900***	0.121	-0.864***	0.147
	(0.221)	(0.186)	(0.256)	(0.180)	(0.104)	(0.086)	(0.100)	(0.092)
PID (strong)	1.916***	-0.861***	2.236***	-1.182***	0.924***	-0.205*	0.671***	0.041
	(0.267)	(0.252)	(0.264)	(0.219)	(0.122)	(0.103)	(0.132)	(0.122)
Institutional trust (1-5)	-0.800***	0.804***	-0.626***	0.637***	0.011	0.074	0.365***	-0.256**
	(0.162)	(0.140)	(0.173)	(0.127)	(0.087)	(0.070)	(0.095)	(0.084)
In-bloc (0-10)	-	-	-	-	0.310***	-0.055*	0.241***	0.024
					(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.034)	(0.030)
Interest (0/1)	-0.274	0.191	0.403	-0.482**	0.144	0.013	0.037	0.123
	(0.207)	(0.179)	(0.233)	(0.177)	(0.103)	(0.086)	(0.101)	(0.091)
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	2.757**	5.427***	3.139**	5.026***	0.862	5.609***	0.339	6.456***
	(0.858)	(0.797)	(1.025)	(0.788)	(0.459)	(0.378)	(0.406)	(0.367)
N	652	652	653	653	2878	2878	3187	3187
R^2	0.322	0.201	0.377	0.327	0.359	0.267	0.344	0.308
adj. R^2	0.305	0.181	0.361	0.310	0.355	0.263	0.340	0.304

Notes: Standard errors (robust) in parentheses: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. On policy variables, larger values indicate more leftist/liberal/pro-EU attitudes for Red-green and rightist/liberal/pro-EU for Alliance voters. For SD voters, higher values indicate more conservative/anti-EU attitudes and more rightist/leftist attitudes in SD to Red-green and SD to Alliance models, respectively. Source: The National SOM-survey 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2015 and 2016.



Figure C2.3. The determinants of mainstream bloc voters' affective polarization towards SD for each year separately.



Figure C2.4. The determinants of mainstream bloc voters' evaluation towards SD for each year separately.

Notes: The dots display the OLS regression coefficients (robust standard errors), the lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. On policy variables, higher values indicate more leftist/liberal/pro-EU attitudes for Red-green, rightist/liberal/pro-EU for Alliance voters. Source: The National SOM-survey 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2015 and 2016.



Figure C2.5. The determinants of SD voters' affective polarization towards mainstream blocs for each year separately.



Figure C2.6. The determinants of SD voters' out-bloc evaluation towards mainstream blocs for each year separately.

Notes: The dots display the OLS regression coefficients (robust standard errors), the lines indicate 95% confidence intervals; the N for the analyses towards the Alliance parties were 58 (2010), 57 (2011), 85 (2012), 109 (2014), 172 (2015), and 171 (2016). Similarly, the N for the analyses towards the Red-green parties were 56 (2010), 57 (2011), 85 (2012), 109 (2014), 173 (2015), and 173 (2016). On policy variables, higher values indicate more conservative/anti-EU attitudes and more rightist/leftist attitudes in SD to Red-green and SD to Alliance models, respectively.

Table C2.6. *Logistic regression of mainstream bloc voters affective polarization and out-party evaluation towards SD.*

	Red-green		Alliance	
	AP	Out-party	AP	Out-party
Left-right (1-5)	0.251***	0.324***	-0.075	-0.054
	(0.063)	(0.067)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Refugee policy (0/1)	0.631***	0.892***	0.747***	1.006***
	(0.043)	(0.051)	(0.041)	(0.047)
Environment (0/1)	0.247	0.212	0.255*	0.255*
	(0.139)	(0.145)	(0.108)	(0.107)
EU (1-5)	0.142**	0.145*	0.186***	0.224***
	(0.051)	(0.057)	(0.048)	(0.049)
PID (none)	-0.990***	-0.274*	-0.859***	-0.233*
	(0.102)	(0.113)	(0.095)	(0.098)
PID (strong)	0.827***	0.482**	0.198	0.004
	(0.156)	(0.161)	(0.124)	(0.128)
Institutional trust (1-5)	0.029	-0.117	0.181*	0.181*
	(0.087)	(0.099)	(0.082)	(0.085)
In-bloc (0-10)	0.296***	0.065*	0.234***	-0.021
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.029)
Political interest (0/1)	0.130	0.057	0.082	0.057
	(0.101)	(0.109)	(0.094)	(0.097)
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control for survey year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-4.780***	-3.345***	-3.992***	-3.249***
	(0.461)	(0.490)	(0.388)	(0.388)
N	2878	2878	3187	3187
Nagelkerke R^2				
% Correctly predicted				

Source: The National SOM-survey 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2015 and 2016;

Notes: Standard errors (robust) in parentheses: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; In the AP models, we code values 8 to 10 as 1 (high polarization) and -10 to 7 as 0. Similarly, in the logit-models for evaluations of SD, values 0-1 were coded as 1 (strong dislike) and 2-10 as 0. On policy variables, higher values indicate more leftist/liberal/pro-EU attitudes for Red-green, rightist/liberal/pro-EU for Alliance voters.

References

Abramowitz, A., & McCoy, J. (2019). United States: Racial resentment, negative partisanship, and polarization in Trump's America. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 681(1), 137-156.

Abramowitz, A. I., & Webster, S. (2016). The rise of negative partisanship and the nationalization of US elections in the 21st century. Electoral Studies, 41, 12-22.

Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S., & Wacziarg, R. (2003). Fractionalization. Journal of Economic growth, 8(2), 155-194.

Arkhede, S, Bové, J, Bové, K. & Jansson, D. 2017. 'SOM-undersökningarna 2016 – En metodöversikt', [SOM-rapport nr 2017:34]

Aylott, N., & Bolin, N. (2007). Towards a two-party system? The Swedish parliamentary election of September 2006. West European Politics, 30(3), 621-633.

Aylott, N., & Bolin, N. (2015). Polarising pluralism: The Swedish parliamentary election of September 2014. West European Politics, 38(3), 730-740.

Aylott, N., & Bolin, N. (2019). A party system in flux: the Swedish parliamentary election of September 2018. West European Politics, 42(7), 1504-1515.

Bankert, A. (2020). Negative and Positive Partisanship in the 2016 US Presidential Elections. Political Behavior, 1-19.

Barber,M. & McCarty, N. (2015). Causes and consequences of polarization. In N. Persily (ed.), Solutions to political polarization in America.New York: Cambridge University Press.

Berglund, F., Holmberg, S., Schmitt, H., & Thomassen, J. (2005). Party identification and party choice (pp. 106-24). na.

Bogardus, E. S. (1925). Measuring Social Distance. Journal of Applied Sociology 9:299–308.

Bougher, L. D. (2017). The correlates of discord: identity, issue alignment, and political hostility in polarized America. Political Behavior, 39(3), 731-762.

Boxell, L., Gentzkow, M., & Shapiro, J. M. (2020). Cross-country trends in affective polarization (No. w26669). National Bureau of Economic Research.

Budge, I. & Laver, M.J. (1992). The relationship between party and coalition policy in Europe:An empirical synthesis. In Party policy and government coalitions. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Campbell, A.,Converse, P.E., Miller,W.E. & Stokes,D.E. (1960). The American voter. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Christensen, T. & Lægreid, P. (2005). 'Trust in government: The relative importance of service satisfaction, political factors, and demography', Public Performance & Management Review, 28(4), 487-511.

Clark, M. (2009). Valence and electoral outcomes in Western Europe, 1976–1998. Electoral Studies, 28(1), 111-122.

Curini, L. (2018). Political Corruption and Valence Issues. In Corruption, Ideology, and Populism (pp. 1-28). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

Curini, L., & Hino, A. (2012). Missing links in party-system polarization: How institutions and voters matter. The Journal of Politics 74(2): 460-473.

Curini, L., & Martelli, P. (2010). Ideological proximity and valence competition. Negative campaigning through allegation of corruption in the Italian legislative arena from 1946 to 1994. Electoral Studies, 29(4), 636-647.

Dahlberg, S., & Holmberg, S. (2012). Understanding Satisfaction with the Way Democracy Works. QoG working paper series, 2012(8), 8.

Dalton, R.J. (2008).The quantity and the quality of party systems party system polarization, itsmeasurement and its consequences. Comparative Political Studies 41(7): 899–920.

Dassonneville, R., & Hooghe, M. (2018). Indifference and alienation: Diverging dimensions of electoral dealignment in Europe. Acta Politica, 53(1), 1-23.

De Angelis, A. (2017). Bridging over Troubled Water: Electoral Availability in European Party Systems at the Time of the Great Recession, 2009–2014 – An Application of Bayesian Ideal Point Estimation. Doctoral thesis, European University Institute.

De Sio, L., & Weber, T. (2014). Issue yield: A model of party strategy in multidimensional space. The American Political Science Review, 108(4), 870.
Downs, A. (1957). *An economic theory of democracy*. New York:Harper & Row.

Druckman, J. N., & Levendusky, M. S. (2019). What do we measure when we measure affective polarization?. Public Opinion Quarterly, 83(1), 114-122.

Druckman, J. N., Peterson, E., & Slothuus, R. (2013). How elite partisan polarization affects public opinion formation. American Political Science Review, 57-79.

Ehin, P., & Solvak, M. (2012). Party voters gone astray: explaining independent candidate success in the 2009 European elections in Estonia. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties, 22(3), 269-291.

Esteban, J.M. & Ray,D. (1994).On the measurement of polarization. *Econometrica* 62(4): 819–851.

Fearon, J. D. (2003). Ethnic and cultural diversity by country. Journal of economic growth, 8(2), 195-222.

Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance (Vol. 2). Stanford university press.

Fiorina, M. P. (1981). Retrospective voting in American national elections.

Fiorina, M. P., & Abrams, S. J. (2008). Political polarization in the American public. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci., 11, 563-588.

Gidron, N., Adams, J., & Horne, W. (2018). How Ideology, Economics and Institutions Shape Affective Polarization in Democratic Polities. In Annual Conference of the American Political Science Association.

Gidron, N., Adams, J., & Horne, W. (2019). Toward a comparative research agenda on affective polarization in mass publics. APSA Comparative Politics Newsletter, 29, 30-36.

Green, J. (2007). When voters and parties agree: Valence issues and party competition. Political Studies, 55(3), 629-655.

Haidt, J., & Hetherington, M.J. (2012). 'Look How Far We've Come Apart.' Campaign Stops, The New York Times, September 17. http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/look-how-far-weve-comeapart/.

Han, S. M. (2015). Income inequality, electoral systems and party polarisation. European Journal of Political Research, 54(3), 582-600.

Hansen,K.M. & Kosiara-Pedersen, K. (2017). How campaigns polarize the electorate: Political polarization as an effect of the minimal effect theory within a multi-party system. *Party Politics* 23(3): 181–192.

Harteveld, E. (2019) Ticking all the boxes? A comparative study of social sorting and affective polarization. Paper presented at the APSA Annual Meeting, Washington

Helbling, M., & Jungkunz, S. (2020). Social divides in the age of globalization. West European Politics, 43(6), 1187-1210.

Heinze, A. S. (2018). Strategies of mainstream parties towards their right-wing populist challengers: Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland in comparison. West European Politics, 41(2), 287-309.

Hellström, A., Nilsson, T., & Stoltz, P. (2012). Nationalism vs. nationalism: The challenge of the Sweden Democrats in the Swedish public debate. Government and Opposition, 47(2), 186-205.

Hetherington, M.J. & Weiler, J.D. (2009).*Authoritarianism and polarization in American politics*.New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hetherington, M.J. & Rudolph, T.J. (2015). *Why Washington won't work: Polarization, political trust and the governing crisis*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Hloušek, V., & Kopeček, L. (2008). Cleavages in the contemporary Czech and Slovak politics between persistence and change. East European Politics & Societies, 22(3), 518-552.

Hobolt, S.B. & Spoon, J.J. (2012). Motivating the European voter: Parties, issues and campaigns in European Parliament elections. *European Journal of Political Research* 51(6): 701–727.

Hobolt, S., Leeper, T. J., & Tilley, J. (2020). Divided by the vote: affective polarization in the wake of the Brexit referendum. British Journal of Political Science.

Hooghe,L.&Marks,G. (2018).Cleavage theory meets Europe's crises: Lipset,Rokkan and the transnational cleavage. *Journal of European Public Policy* 25(1): 109–135.

Hooghe, M., & Zmerli, S. (2011). Introduction: The Context of Political Trust. In Zmerli, S. & Hooghe, M. (Eds.). Political Trust: Why Context Matters. ECPR Press, 1-12

Horowitz, D. L. (1985). Ethnic groups in conflict. Berkeley, CA: Univ.

Huber, G. A., & Malhotra, N. (2017). Political homophily in social relationships: Evidence from online dating behavior. The Journal of Politics, 79(1), 269-283.

Huddy, L., Bankert, A., & Davies, C. (2018). Expressive versus instrumental partisanship in multiparty european systems. Political Psychology, 39, 173-199.

Huddy, L., & Yair, O. (2019). Reducing Affective Partisan Polarization: Warm Group Relations or Policy Compromise?. A paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, San Diego, April 18-20, 2019.

Ignazi, P. (2017). *Party and democracy: The uneven road to party legitimacy*.Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Inglehart, R. (1990). *Culture shift in advanced industrial society*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Iyengar, S. (2011). *The polarization of the American public: Fear and loathing across party lines*. Available online at: https://vimeo.com/30715519

Iyengar, S. & Krupenkin, M. (2018). The strengthening of partisan affect. *Political Psychology* 39(s1): 201– 218.

Iyengar, S., Lelkes, Y., Levendusky, M., Malhotra, N., & Westwood, S. J. (2019). The origins and consequences of affective polarization in the United States. Annual Review of Political Science, 22, 129-146.

Iyengar,S. & Westwood,S.J. (2015). Fear and loathing across party lines: New evidence on group polarization. *American Journal of Political Science* 59(3): 690–707.

Iyengar, S., Sood,G. & Lelkes, Y. (2012). Affect, not ideology: A social identity perspective on polarization. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 76(3): 405–431.

Johnston, C. D. (2018). Authoritarianism, affective polarization, and economic ideology. Political Psychology, 39, 219-238.

Jylhä, K. M., Rydgren, J., & Strimling, P. (2019). Radical right-wing voters from right and left: Comparing Sweden Democrat voters who previously voted for the Conservative Party or the Social Democratic Party. Scandinavian Political Studies, 42(3-4), 220-244.

Kam, C., Indridason, I., & Bianco, W. (2017). Polarization in multiparty systems.

Katz, R. S., & Mair, P. (1993). The evolution of party organizations in Europe: the three faces of party organization. American review of politics, 14, 593-617.

Kayser, M. A., & Wlezien, C. (2011). Performance pressure: Patterns of partisanship and the economic vote. European Journal of Political Research, 50(3), 365-394.

Kingzette, J. (2020). Who Do You Loathe? Feelings toward Politicians vs. Ordinary People in the Opposing Party. Journal of Experimental Political Science, 1-10.

Knudsen, E. Affective Polarization in Multiparty Systems? Comparing Affective Polarization Towards Voters and Parties in Norway and the United States. Scandinavian Political Studies. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9477.12186

Kostadinova, T. (2012). Political corruption in Eastern Europe: Politics after communism. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S. & Frey, T. (2006). Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: Six European countries compared. *European Journal of Political Research* 45(6): 921–956.

Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S., & Frey, T. (2008). West European politics in the age of globalization.

Kriesi, H., & Saris, W. (2016). The structure of the evaluations of democracy. In Ferrín, M., & Kriesi, H. (Eds.). How Europeans view and evaluate democracy. Oxford University Press.

Laakso, M., & Taagepera, R. (1979). 'Effective' number of parties: a measure with application to West Europe. Comparative political studies, 12(1), 3-27.

Lauka, A., McCoy, J., & Firat, R. B. (2018). Mass partisan polarization: Measuring a relational concept. American behavioral scientist, 62(1), 107-126.

Laver, M.J. (1992). Coalition and party policy in Ireland. In M.J. Laver & I. Budge (eds), Party policy and government coalitions. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lavine, H. G., Johnston, C. D., & Steenbergen, M. R. (2012). The ambivalent partisan: How critical loyalty promotes democracy. Oxford University Press.

Layman, G. C., & Carsey, T. M. (2002). Party polarization and 'conflict extension' in the American electorate. American Journal of Political Science, 786-802.

Lelkes, Y. (2016). Mass polarization: Manifestations and measurements. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 80(s1): 392–410.

Lelkes, Y. (2019). Policy over party: comparing the effects of candidate ideology and party on affective polarization. Political Science Research and Methods, 1-8.

Lelkes,Y., Sood,G.& Iyengar, S. (2017). The hostile audience: The effect of access to broadband internet on partisan affect. *American Journal of Political Science* 61(1): 5–20.

Levendusky, M. (2013). Partisan media exposure and attitudes toward the opposition. Political communication, 30(4), 565-581.

Levendusky,M.S. (2018). Americans, not partisans: Can priming American national identity reduce affective polarization? *Journal of Politics* 80(1): 59–70.

Levendusky, M. S., & Malhotra, N. (2015). (Mis) perceptions of partisan polarization in the American public. Public Opinion Quarterly, 80(S1), 378-391.

Lijphart,A. (1969). Consociational democracy.*World Politics* 21(2): 207–225.

Linz, J. J. (1978). Crisis, breakdown & reequilibration. Johns Hopkins University Press.

Magalhães, P. C. (2014). Government effectiveness and support for democracy. European Journal of Political Research, 53(1), 77-97.

Mair, P. (2007). Left-right orientations. In R.J.Dalton & H.-D. Klingemann (eds), *The Oxford handbook of political behaviour*.Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mason, L. (2015). 'I disrespectfully agree': The differential effects of partisan sorting on social and issue polarization. *American Journal of Political Science* 59(1): 128–145.

Mason, L. (2016). A cross-cutting calm: How social sorting drives affective polarization. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 80(s1): 351–377.

Mason, L. (2018a). Ideologues without issues: The polarizing consequences of ideological identities. Public Opinion Quarterly, 82(S1), 866-887.

Mason, L. (2018b). Uncivil agreement: How politics became our identity. University of Chicago Press.

Marien, S. & Hooghe M. (2011). 'Does political trust matter? An empirical investigation into the relation between political trust and support for law compliance', European Journal of Political Research, 50(2), 267-291.

Marien, S. (2011). Chapter Two: Measuring political trust across time and space. In Zmerli, S. & Hooghe, M. (Eds.). Political Trust: Why Context Matters. ECPR Press, 13-46.

Martinsson, J. & Weissenbilder, M. 2018. 'Viktiga valfrågor i Sverige – från miljö till invandring', in Andersson, U., Carlander, A., Lindgren, E. & Oskarson, M., eds, Sprickor i fasaden. Göteborg: SOM-institutet vid Göteborgs universitet.

Mauk, M. (2020). 'Rebuilding trust in broken systems? Populist party success and citizens' trust in democratic institutions', Politics and Governance, 8(3), 45-58.

Mayer, S. J. (2017). How negative partisanship affects voting behavior in Europe: Evidence from an analysis of 17 European multi-party systems with proportional voting. Research & Politics, 4(1), 2053168016686636.

McCoy, J., Rahman, T., & Somer, M. (2018). Polarization and the global crisis of democracy: Common patterns, dynamics, and pernicious consequences for democratic polities. American Behavioral Scientist, 62(1), 16-42.

McCoy, J., & Somer, M. (2019). Toward a theory of pernicious polarization and how it harms democracies: Comparative evidence and possible remedies. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 681(1), 234-271.

Medeiros, M., & Noël, A. (2014). The forgotten side of partisanship: Negative party identification in four Anglo-American democracies. Comparative Political Studies, 47(7), 1022-1046.

Montalvo, J. G., & Reynal-Querol, M. (2005). Ethnic polarization, potential conflict, and civil wars. American economic review, 95(3), 796-816.

Mudde, C. & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2018). Studying populism in comparative perspective: Reflections on the contemporary and future research agenda. *Comparative Political Studies* 51(13): 1667–1693.

Nardulli, P. F., Wong, C. J., Singh, A., Peyton, B., & Bajjaliegh, J. (2012). The Composition of Religious and Ethnic Groups (CREG) Project. Cline Center for Democracy, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. At http://www. clinecenter. illinois. edu/publications/CREG-White_Paper. Pdf

Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism. Cambridge University Press.

Orr, L. V., & Huber, G. A. (2020). The policy basis of measured partisan animosity in the united states. American Journal of Political Science, 64(3), 569-586.

Oskarson, M., & Demker, M. (2015). Room for realignment: The working-class sympathy for Sweden Democrats. Government and Opposition, 50(4), 629-651.

Pardos-Prado, S.& Dinas, E. (2010). Systemic polarization and spatial voting. *European Journal of Political Research* 49(6): 759–786.

Persily,N. (ed.) (2015). *Solutions to political polarization inAmerica*.NewYork:Cambridge University Press.

Petrocik, J.R. (2009). Measuring party support: Leaners are not independents. *Electoral Studies* 28(4): 562– 572.

Rabinowitz, G., & Macdonald, S. E. (1989). A directional theory of issue voting. American political science review, 83(1), 93-121.

Reiljan, A. (2020). 'Fear and loathing across party lines'(also) in Europe: Affective polarisation in European party systems. European journal of political research, 59(2), 376-396.

Reynal-Querol, M. (2002). Ethnicity, political systems, and civil wars. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46(1), 29-54.

Richardson, B.M. (1991). European party loyalties revisited. *American Political Science Review* 85(3): 751– 775.

Rogowski, J.C. & Sutherland, J.L. (2016).How ideology fuels affective polarization. *Political Behavior* 38(2): 485–508.

Rose, R. (2009). *Understanding post-communist transformation: A bottom up approach*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Ryan, A., & Reiljan, A. (2018). Åsikts-och känslomässig polarisering 1985–2014. I David Karlsson (red.) Folkets främsta företrädare.

Rydgren, J., & Van der Meiden, S. (2018). The radical right and the end of Swedish exceptionalism. European Political Science, 1-17.

Sartori, G. 1976. Parties and Party Systems: a framework for analysis. Cambridge University Press.

Satherley, N., Sibley, C. G., & Osborne, D. (2020). Identity, ideology, and personality: Examining moderators of affective polarization in New Zealand. Journal of Research in Personality, 103961.

Schmitt, J. (2016). How to Measure Ideological Polarization in Party Systems. Paper Prepared for the ECPR Graduate Student Conference 2016, University of Tartu.

Serra, G. (2010). Polarization of what? A model of elections with endogenous valence. The Journal of Politics, 72(2), 426-437.

Shugart, M. S. (2005). Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns. French politics, 3(3), 323-351.

Shugart, Matthew S. (2006). ‘‘Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations.’’ In The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, ed. Rod Rhodes, Sarah Binder, and Bert A. Rockman. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 344–65.

Somer, M. (2019). Turkey: The slippery slope from reformist to revolutionary polarization and democratic breakdown. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 681(1), 42-61.

Stokes,D.E. (1963). Spatial models of party competition. *American Political Science Review* 57(2): 368–377.

Sunstein, C.R. (2015). Partyism. *University of Chicago Legal Forum* 2015(2): 1–26.

Svensson, R. (2018). PARTIERNAS IDEOLOGISKA POSITIONER.

Szczerbiak, A. (2011). *Election briefing 65: Europe and the October 2011 Polish parliamentary election*. Brighton: Sussex European Institute.

Tajfel, H. (1970). Experiments in intergroup discrimination. Scientific American, 223(5), 96-103.

Tajfel, Henri, and John C. Turner. (1979). ‘An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict.’ In The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, edited by W. G. Austin and Stephen Worchel, 33–47. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Tavits, M. (2005). The Development of Stable Party Support: Electoral Dynamics in Post-Communist Europe. American Journal of political science, 49(2), 283-298.

Torcal, M., & Trechsel, A. H. (2016). Explaining citizens' evaluations of democracy. In Ferrín, M., & Kriesi, H. (Eds.). How Europeans view and evaluate democracy. Oxford University Press.

Torcal, M., Santana, A., Carty, E., & Comellas, J. M. (2020). Political and affective polarisation in a democracy in crisis: The E-Dem panel survey dataset (Spain, 2018–2019). Data in brief, 32, 106059.

Van der Meer, T. (2010). In What We Trust? A Multi-level Study into Trust in Parliament as an Evaluation of State Characteristics. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 76, 517–536.

Van der Meer, T. W. (2017). Political trust and the ‘crisis of democracy’. In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics.

Van der Meer, T. & Dekker, P. (2011). Trustworthy States, Trusting Citizens? A Multilevel Study into Objective and Subjective Determinants of Political Trust. In Zmerli, S. & Hooghe, M. (Eds.). Political Trust: Why Context Matters. ECPR Press, 95-116.

Viciana, H., Hannikainen, I. R., & Gaitan Torres, A. (2019). The dual nature of partisan prejudice: Morality and identity in a multiparty system. PloS one, 14(7), e0219509.

Wagner, A. F., Schneider, F., & Halla, M. (2009). The quality of institutions and satisfaction with democracy in Western Europe—A panel analysis. European Journal of Political Economy, 25(1), 30-41.

Wagner, M. 2020. Affective polarization in multiparty systems. Electoral Studies, 102199. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102199

Ward, D. G., & Tavits, M. (2019). How partisan affect shapes citizens' perception of the political world. Electoral Studies, 60, 102045.

Warner, B. R., & McKinney, M. S. (2013). To unite and divide: The polarizing effect of presidential debates. Communication Studies, 64(5), 508-527.

Warwick, P. (1994). *Government survival in Western European parliamentary democracies*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Webb, P., & Bale, T. (2014). Why do Tories defect to UKIP? Conservative Party members and the temptations of the populist radical right. Political Studies, 62(4), 961-970.

Webster, S.W. & Abramowitz, A.I. (2017). The ideological foundations of affective polarization in the US electorate. *American Politics Research* 45(4): 621–647.

Weibull, L., Holmberg, S., Oscarsson, H., Martinsson, J., Markstedt, E. & Vernersdotter, F. 2016. Super-Riks-SOM 1986-2015, v2017.1. Göteborgs Universitet: SOM-institutet, www.som.gu.se

Westfall, J., Van Boven, L., Chambers, J. R., & Judd, C. M. (2015). Perceiving political polarization in the United States: Party identity strength and attitude extremity exacerbate the perceived partisan divide. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 10(2), 145-158.

Westwood, S.J., Iyengar, S., Walgrave, S., Leonisio, R., Miller, L. & Strijbis, O. (2018). The tie that divides: Cross-national evidence of the primacy of partyism. *European Journal of Political Research* 57(2): 333– 354.

Westwood, S. J., & Peterson, E. (2020). The Inseparability of Race and Partisanship in the United States.